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‘Once, years ago, I tried to tell someone whom this book had frightened 
how I myself sometimes regarded it as a negative, as an empty form, the 
hollows and depressions of which were all pain, despair and saddest 
insight but whose cast, were it possible to produce one (like the positive 
figure obtained with bronzes) might perhaps be happiness, the most 
definite and certain serenity. Who knows, I ask myself, whether we do 
not always emerge as it were at the back of the gods, separated from the 
sublime radiance of their faces by nothing save their own selves, quite 
close to the expression for which we yearn but standing exactly behind 
it? Yet what else does this mean except that our face and the face of the 
gods look out in the same direction and are at one; how then should we 
approach the gods from the front?’ 
R. M. Rilke (1946: 264), Letter to L. H., 8 November 1915 
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ABSTRACT 
 
osmopolitan thought in recent scholarship is often used in either a prescriptive or 
a descriptive manner. It is thus most commonly understood as a research agenda 
for the prescription of various ethico-political projects or a description of the social and 
political world beyond national frameworks. In both cases cosmopolitanism seems to be 
mostly understood as a set of assumptions about the social world. This thesis aims to 
underline cosmopolitanism’s critical characteristics and its capability to engage with the 
social world in a critical and therefore transformative manner. There has been relatively 
scarce scholarship on critical cosmopolitanism, a gap that the thesis closes by focusing 
on cosmopolitanism’s capacity for critical intervention. In this study, the contribution of 
cosmopolitanism to critical thought is evaluated and advanced. Possessing an 
unparalleled ability to understand things and change them in the light of universalism, 
cosmopolitanism can be explored as a kind of critical theory that has a distinct agenda 
and normative guidance. In order to achieve this, the thesis looks at a version of critical 
theory that is in certain respects most akin to cosmopolitanism, that is, Axel Honneth’s 
critical theory and his theory of recognition, and connects the two in a way that shows 
both the cosmopolitanism’s possession of critical theory’s main features and its 
differences from Honneth’s critical theory. It is proposed that cosmopolitanism can be 
regarded as a critical theory with the concept of recognition as its main framework, but 
also that it differs from Honneth’s theory in its understanding of world disclosure and 
holding to more universalist and utopian claims. While cosmopolitanism can be 
understood as being critical, it can also be used as an enhancement of the existing 
conceptualisation of recognition relationships through cosmopolitanism’s universalist 
dimensions. 
 
Keywords: cosmopolitanism; critical theory; Axel Honneth; recognition ethics; 
immanent transcendence; solidarity; hospitality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Cosmopolitans don’t insist that everyone become cosmopolitan’, wrote Kwame 
Anthony Appiah (2006a) in an essay just before his book Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a 
World of Strangers (2006b) was published. What he meant by this is that cosmopolitanism 
is not and should not be an all-encompassing and omniscient theory that holds all the 
answers. As much as cosmopolitanism or cosmopolitans are able to prescribe their 
remedies, they must also be able to learn from strangers and change themselves and 
their beliefs accordingly. I believe that this latter component is often missing in the more 
conventional understanding of cosmopolitanisms. In normative or political conceptions, 
cosmopolitanism often lacks a critical stance that embraces receptivity, which is a 
prerequisite for being open to other suggestions but also challenging our self-
understanding. Similarly, Delanty and He (2008) argue that cosmopolitan theory in 
social science is normally either too normative and thus empirically exclusive, or 
completely empirical without any connection to the normative. A turn to critical 
cosmopolitanism is needed in order to resist and overturn this dualism and show that 
cosmopolitanism can act as a critical theory that combines the two. In this way we can 
avoid provincialisation of our world as much as of our minds. 
 
The term cosmopolitanism is an ancient Greek term (kosmopolites) that designates a 
distinct being and acting in the world as a citizen of the world. This meaning of 
cosmopolitanism is, however, only one of the meanings since the latter naturally 
changed as different historic occurrences have influenced cosmopolitanism’s raison d’être.1 
The Stoics, for instance, understood it as a declaration of people’s simultaneous 
existence in two worlds, the local on the one hand and ‘truly great and truly common’ 
on the other (Held, 2005: 10). Despite this, they thought that our moral commitments 
are owed to humanity rather than immediate locality: ‘Allegiance is owed, first and 
foremost, to the moral realm of all humanity, not to the contingent groups of nation, 
ethnicity or class’ (Held, 2005: 10). The second major transformation or appropriation !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1 Fine and Cohen (2002: 137–62) identify four historical cosmopolitan moments that show how the 
meaning and use of cosmopolitanism have changed throughout history, emphasising both limitations and 
possibilities of cosmopolitanism: Zeno’s cosmopolitanism in the ancient world, Kant’s Enlightenment 
cosmopolitanism, which has become a basis for contemporary studies, Arendt’s post-totalitarian thought, 
and Nussbaum’s cosmopolitanism and late North American thought. 
‘ 
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of the concept occurred in the Enlightenment period, and Immanuel Kant was the most 
prominent cosmopolitan theorist (Held, 2005: 10).2 He believed that the participation of 
an individual in a cosmopolitan society is his or her ‘cosmopolitan right’ (Held, 2005: 
10). However, Kant’s ideal must also be appropriated for the contemporary world. In 
his essay, Kant’s Idea of Perpetual With the Benefit of Two Hundred Years Hindsight, Habermas 
(1997) rightly points out the limitations of Kant’s idea of perpetual peace and shows how 
these should be surpassed in today’s world. For instance, Kant was satisfied with a 
purely negative conception of peace, but nowadays the aim is not merely to prevent 
violence but also to realise the ‘necessary conditions for a common life without tensions 
among groups and peoples’ (Habermas, 1997: 133). 
 
The understanding of cosmopolitanism today is broader, with research on 
cosmopolitanism being a dynamic field, such that there is no pertinent definition that 
could encompass its nuances and meanings.3 There also should not be any single 
definition of cosmopolitanism; that would defy its purpose and make it into a totalising 
grand project. Nevertheless, we can perhaps identify a few formal traits that make 
cosmopolitanism a distinct approach within social theory. According to Hayden (2005: 
11), the contemporary idea of cosmopolitanism can be understood as being based on 
three premises: that human beings are the fundamental entities of political and moral 
concern; that, derived from universalism, every human being possesses equal moral 
status; and that everyone must respect the equal moral status of all other subjects 
(Hayden, 2005: 11). There are also at least two varieties of cosmopolitanism: moral and 
political cosmopolitanism. Moral cosmopolitanism posits that all human beings must 
obey and live by the same moral laws, while political cosmopolitanism views human 
beings as being liable to the same political authority that has credibility to implement 
moral laws (Miller, 2007: 24). Critical cosmopolitanism is closer to the moral version of 
cosmopolitanism because it puts great emphasis on the equal moral worth of individuals. 
What this means is that because every individual is entitled to possessing equal moral 
worth, everyone has to simultaneously fulfil certain universal moral responsibilities, so 
that entitlements can be realised at all (Hayden, 2005: 3; Brock and Brighouse, 2005: 4). !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
2 To understand how much Kant’s cosmopolitanism is owed to ancient Stoic’s version, see Nussbaum 
(1997). 
3 Vertovec and Cohen (2002: 8–14) define six perspectives on cosmopolitanism: a socio-cultural condition, 
a philosophy or world-view, transnational institutions, multiple subjects, an attitude or disposition, and a 
practice or competence. For contemporary writings on cosmopolitanism, see e.g. Fine, 2007; Fine and 
Smith, 2003. 
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Cosmopolitanism therefore emphasises our responsibilities to others who we might not 
know or be in direct contact with, fuelled by the realisation that we nonetheless have an 
effect on their lives in some ways (Brock and Brighouse, 2005: 3). After all, we all live in 
one world and interdependence is one of the main characteristics of living together. 
Therefore, ‘[t]he particular focus of cosmopolitan thinking is on the content and weight 
of obligations beyond national (or, sometimes, state) boundaries, relative to the content 
and weight of those obligations to which national and state boundaries give rise’ (Brock 
and Brighouse, 2005: 3).  
 
Cosmopolitanism and critical theory share much in common. The latter can be 
understood as a specific tradition that stretches from thinkers such as Kant, Fichte and 
Hegel to Marx, Lukács and the Frankfurt School thinkers, and which has as a more 
general method been used to scrutinise assumptions about our social world and submit 
them to an ongoing critique (Cannon, 2001: xi), as well as to explore meanings from 
nuanced and different perspectives. Both cosmopolitanism and critical theory were 
responses in specific historical situations to atrocities or injustices in the world. The 
upsurge of their practise and theorising occurred after the Second World War, where 
such kinds of responses were absolutely needed in order to counter and understand the 
barbarism that had happened. Cosmopolitanism and critical theory, then, are both 
concerned with critique of social pathologies and of the conditions that made way for 
these to materialise. They are able to do so because they both possess a strong 
normative dimension against which social and political practices are judged. They are 
both concerned with moral and ethical issues, but always stay grounded in and stem 
from worldly affairs. Some of the characteristics of cosmopolitanism inherently possess 
the potential impetus for practising criticism. For instance, immanence is one such 
characteristic, since it allows cosmopolitanism to tackle the existing, worldly 
contradictions from within and not set an ideal well beyond reality. Openness and hence 
reflexivity are other such characteristics, as well as the ability of world-creation, 
communication and dialogue, and susceptibility to transformation with utopian intent.  
 
A link between critical theory and cosmopolitanism has already been made to a certain 
extent in scholarship, but not very directly and particularly not to the critical theory of 
the Frankfurt School. Scholars have written on a type of cosmopolitanism, that is, critical 
cosmopolitanism, which is the best approximation to what this thesis sets out to do. The 
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first chapter of the thesis will look at the existing scholarship on the topic of critical 
cosmopolitanism more closely and consider what is missing. In short, so far critical 
cosmopolitanism studies understand their critical component more broadly and also as a 
way of criticising the existing understandings and usages of cosmopolitanism that might 
be ideologically corrupt. For instance, Pieterse (2006) and Mignolo (2000) argue that 
cosmopolitanism must embrace the legacies of the past and include the perspective of 
colonialism in order to avoid building abstract universal ideals but create a project that 
stems from subaltern perspectives and dialogue. Besides this, authors such as Kurasawa 
(2011) and Rapport (2012a) emphasise the emancipatory characteristic of critical 
cosmopolitanism, where the former understands critical cosmopolitanism as a project of 
universal emancipation challenging structural sources of global injustices that deter 
development of human potential, and the latter as avoidance of man-made reduction of 
the world into limiting camps such as nations, ethnicities, castes and others. Another 
characteristic of critical cosmopolitanism is its ability to act from below (Kurasawa, 
2007; Pieterse, 2006; Mignolo, 2000; Bhambra, 2010 and 2011). Instead of developing 
grand universal designs, critical cosmopolitanism should begin its critical practice by 
looking at ordinary ways of thinking and acting in various spatial and historical 
locations. The authors emphasise that such an approach to and of cosmopolitanism also 
incites its dialogic capabilities, which is another characteristic of critical 
cosmopolitanism according to Gilabert (2006), Kurasawa (2007) and Delanty (2012). 
The main general underpinnings of critical cosmopolitanism are thus understood as 
emancipation, cosmopolitanism from below, dialogue or public deliberation, and 
inclusion of history into further development of critical cosmopolitanism.  
 
What is Missing and How Can Critical Cosmopolitanism Be 
Enhanced? 
 
What these efforts at identifying a critical kind of cosmopolitanism, which are more 
closely studied in the first chapter of the thesis, lack is an engagement and connection 
with the tradition that most intensely and overtly engages in social criticism. Such a 
connection can and should be made since it could benefit both critical theory and 
cosmopolitanism. Even though previous research on the critical capabilities of 
cosmopolitanism is absolutely valuable and enhances especially cosmopolitanism in 
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important ways, I believe that the connections between these two types of engagement 
with the social world can be made even stronger. This thesis therefore tries to 
demonstrate that critical theory and cosmopolitanism work very well together and sets 
out to show how such comradeship between two very different yet considerably akin 
movements works. I believe this is worth exploring for at least two reasons. First, 
cosmopolitanism is too often understood merely pragmatically as a design for global 
institutions and a blueprint for realisation of universal ideals, whereas in order to 
contribute to justice in such ways it has to possess a strong critical basis from which it 
then proceeds in making changes in the real world. Second, linking cosmopolitanism 
and critical theory together does not only benefit cosmopolitanism but also critical 
theory. The latter’s normative dimension has not been ‘cosmopolitanised’ and because 
numerous contemporary challenges are global in nature, critical theory must add a 
cosmopolitan perspective to its investigations. 
 
Even though critical theory does have some fundamental characteristics that form its 
core and make it distinct from other approaches, it is still a vast and diverse area of 
study. Therefore, it is necessary to be more precise and connect cosmopolitanism to a 
certain type of critical theory. I chose Axel Honneth, a critical theorist of the third 
generation of the Frankfurt School’s tradition, and his critical theory and theory of 
recognition for several reasons. Foremost, my choice has to do with recognition theory 
and cosmopolitanism’s similarity in understanding and dealing with relations among 
people and their struggles and secondly, Honneth’s theory allows for the prospect of the 
concept of recognition and cosmopolitanism enhancing each other in significant ways. 
Honneth’s understanding of recognition forms a normative keystone to social criticism 
that allows one to understand justice in a wider than just distributive sense. To 
understand social relations through the prism of recognition means to be able to take 
into account not only the structural, objective or materialist forces that impede social 
justice, but additionally and foremost also the normative claims made by subjects. 
Therefore, Honneth looks at everyday life and tries to find those experiences of 
disrespect that can launch social resistance and change. Recognition is also inherent in 
cosmopolitanism; it lies in the midst of its endeavour to make relations among people 
better and more open. However, recognition in Honneth’s theory stays conceptually 
strictly within national borders, which makes it rather inapt for dealing with instances of 
misrecognition on a global level. Honneth’s theory of recognition thus offers the 
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structure and method of critical theory to cosmopolitanism; and the latter can 
cosmopolitanise Honneth’s three recognition relations, which has not been done so far. 
Therefore, critical cosmopolitanism to a certain extent follows but at the same time can 
advance Honneth’s critical theory. 
 
So, how does this differ from existing theories on critical cosmopolitanism? Critical 
cosmopolitanism in this thesis acknowledges and retains all characteristics and critical 
qualities developed by the aforementioned authors, but it puts cosmopolitanism in direct 
connection to critical theory in order to see whether it can be deemed critical in a 
proper sense of the word. Scholars who have written on critical cosmopolitanism present 
its critical features in an isolated way – that is, identifying only one or the other 
characteristic, whereas, I argue, it is necessary to look at critical cosmopolitanism as a 
more coherent and comprehensive theory that possesses the main features of critical 
theory. Only in this way can we fully use and understand the critical dimension of 
cosmopolitanism, stipulating its aims and potentials. 
 
Aims, Methodology and Contribution of the Thesis 
 
The overall aim of the thesis is thus to show that cosmopolitanism can be understood 
and used as a kind of critical theory. This is a broad aim but is made up of five other, 
more detailed objectives: 
 
i. to identify the critical characteristics of cosmopolitanism; 
ii. to identify the constitutive elements of Honneth’s critical theory that make it 
‘critical’, and test whether they can be found in cosmopolitanism; 
iii. to pinpoint the most important constituent of critical theory (both Honneth’s 
and cosmopolitanism) that prescribes its methodology and object constitution; 
iv. to connect cosmopolitanism with the concept of recognition; 
v. to find out how and whether critical cosmopolitanism differs from Honneth’s 
critical theory. 
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Following these goals, the argument of the thesis is as follows: 
 
Cosmopolitanism can be understood as a type of critical theory because 
• it possesses characteristics of social philosophy that allow it to identify social 
pathologies; 
• it proceeds from the principle of immanent transcendence, that is, this-worldly 
and reflectively; 
• it has its own ethical drives and sensibility for justice and therefore considers both 
what is good and what is right; 
• it understands the world in an intersubjective manner and through relational 
aspects; 
• it encompasses utopia and hope and it is world-disclosing and future-oriented; 
• it is effective as social critique because it does not criticise social pathologies only 
with regards to the development of human rationality, but is able to address also 
those that are consequences of breached conditions of recognition.  
 
Taking Honneth’s critical theory as a point of departure also dictates the methodology 
of this research and the means of testing the abovementioned argument. Even though 
Honneth’s critical theory belongs to a wider tradition of critical theory, it does differ 
substantially from the other types of critical theory of the Frankfurt School, and through 
analysis of Honneth’s theory I am hoping to be able to identify what are its elements, 
how it works and how it identifies an object of investigation. These will then be applied 
to cosmopolitanism in order to be able to make a comparative analysis about where and 
how the two are similar and different. The main finding of the thesis is that 
cosmopolitanism and the critical theory of recognition are highly compatible and work 
very well together. However, critical cosmopolitanism possesses other qualities that 
differ from Honneth’s critical theory. For instance, the main differing characteristic of 
cosmopolitanism is its world-disclosing capability, which differs considerably from 
Honneth’s understanding of world disclosure. Namely, critical cosmopolitanism 
possesses a strong utopian impetus – lacking in Honneth’s theory – that enables it to 
become a critical theory that surpasses the main challenge to contemporary critical 
theory of ‘how to go on’. 
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The contribution of the thesis is therefore twofold. On the one hand, it makes a 
considerate contribution to the study of cosmopolitanism or, more precisely, critical 
cosmopolitanism, which has so far never been associated with the tradition of critical 
theory. On the other hand, it adds a cosmopolitan normative dimension to 
contemporary critical theory. The thesis shows that cosmopolitanism is indeed critical in 
nature and that it is a reflective theory which possesses those elements of critical theories 
that make them epistemologically distinct from other theories such as natural ones. 
Thus, cosmopolitanism guides human action that produces enlightenment and 
emancipation, is a form of knowledge, and is reflective or self-referential – meaning that 
cosmopolitanism is in no way a theory detached from the world, but comprehends itself 
also as a part of the object that it examines.4  
 
Structure of the Thesis 
 
The first chapter of the thesis situates the idea of critical cosmopolitanism within the 
existing literature on cosmopolitanism. Besides embodying a normative dimension, 
cosmopolitanism also expresses a certain social criticism. Whereas much scholarship has 
been dedicated to the investigation of cosmopolitanism as a normative perspective, 
relatively little attention has been paid to studying cosmopolitanism in relation to its 
characteristics which show its capacity for critique and its link to critical theory. 
Embarking on a review of existing literature, this chapter identifies the main 
characteristics of critical cosmopolitanism, which is a form of cosmopolitanism that 
resembles a critical theory most closely. It examines the manner in which various types 
of critical cosmopolitanism connect to different strands of critical theory, explores the 
main features of such a connection, and considers aspects that might be missing. The 
chapter also proposes that cosmopolitanism might be best thought of as a world-
disclosing critique, or a form of critical theory that recognises conditions that obscure or 
foreclose our possibilities and conceives of itself as a possibility-disclosing practice. As 
such, this frame of thought endorses cosmopolitanism’s imaginative quality and is 
closely related to cosmopolitanism’s capacity for world-constitution. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
4 These are the characteristics that Geuss (1981) attributes to critical theory. 
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The second chapter explores the essential aims of critical theory, and examines its 
conceptual sources and methodology. The aim of the chapter is not to create a detailed 
history of critical theory’s legacy, nor to engage in critically assessing its existing 
weaknesses. The chapter traces the origins of critical theory, its structure and 
dimensions, and already touches upon one of the most important concepts of critical 
theory, that is, immanent transcendence, which will be more thoroughly considered in 
the fourth chapter. The main goal of the second chapter is thus to elucidate the way in 
which critical theory functions as a social scientific project and the way in which it 
recognises and deals with various societal problems, challenges and crises. Thus, this 
chapter prepares important ground for further research on cosmopolitanism as critical 
theory because it identifies what conceptual principles cosmopolitanism as a social 
theory needs to possess in order to be able to connect theory with practice and function 
as a critical social theory. Immanent transcendence plays an especially important role 
and is a prerequisite of critical theory’s undertakings of social critique. The concept of 
immanent transcendence, which is a part of Honneth’s critical theory as well as critical 
cosmopolitanism, entails going beyond what is rooted in the present and actual 
situation. The point is to surpass social contradictions by discovering possibilities in the 
present. 
 
The third chapter focuses on the critical theory that is most pertinent and similar to 
cosmopolitanism. Namely, the chapter examines aspects and the methodology of 
Honneth’s critical theory of recognition. The purpose here is to identify fundamental 
and constitutive elements of his theory in order to find out how it works and how and 
whether it differs from the first and second generation of critical theorists. This is 
necessary because the exposition of critical cosmopolitanism will mainly be based on the 
critical theory of recognition, and if we want to ‘cosmopolitanise’ the concept of 
recognition and employ cosmopolitanism as a kind of critical theory, we must be able to 
identify the same fundamental elements that are found in Honneth’s theory also in 
cosmopolitanism. The chapter begins with an analysis of the central field of study which 
sets up the basis for Honneth’s critical theory, that is, social philosophy. The latter’s 
main characteristics are to understand justice in a wide sense and search for social 
pathologies. The chapter then proceeds to identify Honneth’s theory’s normative, social 
and political dimensions, which are all equally important and interdependent in the 
process of critique. The chapter also points out the concept of immanent transcendence, 
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which plays an important role in Honneth’s critical theory and distinguishes it from its 
predecessors. 
 
The fourth chapter is then able to deal with one of the central concepts of critical 
theory, that is, immanent transcendence. Instead of only criticising the social world 
immanently, the concept of immanent transcendence has been used to identify social 
injustices in the present and at the same time to point to future possibilities on the basis 
of what is found in the present. The chapter first looks at the philosophical and 
sociological texts in which the concepts of transcendence and immanent transcendence 
have been used. It then goes on to theorise about immanent transcendence and show 
how the immanent and the transcendent work together in order to avoid pure 
materialism on the one hand and otherworldly transcendence on the other. The chapter 
argues that immanent transcendence is inherent in critical cosmopolitanism, and 
distinguishes between three types, which I call dialogical, disclosing and self-
transcendent. The first type emerges in encounter and recognition between people, and 
allows for the existence of multiple truths and establishing relations among strangers. 
The second type of immanent transcendence in cosmopolitanism concerns critical 
cosmopolitanism’s ability to expand the imagination of the possible by disclosing hidden 
aspects and the potential of an object. The third type of immanent transcendence in the 
context of critical cosmopolitanism is self-transcendence or self-transformation, which 
puts a subject in a position of self-analysing with regards to the Other. 
 
The fifth chapter analyses the most central concept of Honneth’s critical theory and 
connects it to critical cosmopolitanism. Recognition and cosmopolitanism work well 
together and in this chapter not only a connection between them is pursued but it is also 
shown that Honneth’s three relationships of recognition can and must be 
‘cosmopolitanised’. The chapter closely analyses Honneth’s recognition patterns and 
then proceeds to critique them from a global perspective. The second part of the 
chapter thus offers a review of the scholarship that has already tackled the shortcomings 
of its conception of recognition from a global standpoint, and emphasises their 
contribution but their limitations as well. In the last part, the concept of recognition gets 
‘cosmopolitanised’, that is, enhanced and enriched by a cosmopolitan outlook. It is 
argued that all three recognition patterns – love, respect and esteem – can be 
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contextualised in cosmopolitanism and used as the most fundamental paradigm of 
critical cosmopolitanism. 
 
The sixth chapter focuses on another constituent of critical cosmopolitanism, that is, 
cosmopolitan ethics, because a critical theory such as Honneth’s must possess an ethical 
basis from which to challenge social contradictions. Critical cosmopolitanism not only 
distinguishes between right and wrong but tries to extend claims about a just society to a 
global level, where justice is understood in a much wider sense than just, for instance, 
distribution. In the first part of the chapter, Honneth’s conceptualisation of good life is 
studied in order to explicate the aspects of its formalistic character that will guide the 
formation of critical cosmopolitanism’s ethics. It is argued that the latter consists of three 
distinct characteristics: moderation, judgement and relationality/singularity. The last 
part of the chapter then tries to bring all these together and show how the concept of 
cosmopolitan solidarity can be formed. A connection is made between Gadamer’s 
notions of friendship and solidarity and cosmopolitan solidarity. 
 
The seventh chapter presents a different critical aspect of the nature of critical 
cosmopolitanism. It discusses critical cosmopolitanism as a world-disclosing critique that 
stems from its capacity for utopianism. This is where critical cosmopolitanism differs 
from Honneth’s critical theory; namely, it does not deny its utopianism and goes a step 
further in making world-disclosure one of its main objectives. The chapter underlines 
the transformative and critical characteristics of the concept of utopia that significantly 
revitalise critical theory and therefore form an essential part of critical cosmopolitanism. 
Such utopianism conveys a world-disclosing critique, which helps us to find new 
possibilities for surpassing social flaws and contributing to self-decentring and self-
transformation. In this way, critical cosmopolitanism does not search for truth but, 
rather, tries to open up the future and locate potentialities for improvement in the 
present. 
 
The eighth and last chapter of the thesis is an application of critical cosmopolitanism on 
the case of hospitality. Hospitality is chosen because it combines all those aspects that 
critical cosmopolitanism needs to tackle in a critique: recognition, and political, social, 
normative, and relational aspects. The chapter establishes hospitality as an object of 
critique and then moves on to reconstructive and explanatory critiques respectively. The 
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former tries to expose those elements that obstruct or distort hospitality, such as 
understanding the Other as a problem or imbalance between conditional and 
unconditional hospitality. The task of a reconstructive critique is therefore twofold – to 
identify such elements, and at the same time to indicate possible transformations with 
respect to those elements. An explanatory critique goes even deeper than that and 
identifies societal structures and mechanisms that block the practical realisation of socio-
structural possibilities. After the practice of critique has been completed, the various 
elements of critical cosmopolitanism are revisited and re-examined in a way that shows 
how they have been used in the critique of hospitality. 
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CHAPTER 1 
SITUATING THE IDEA OF CRITICAL 
COSMOPOLITANISM 
 
n trying to fulfil cosmopolitan aspirations, cosmopolitanism should also resort to 
criticism of existing norms, institutions and practices – as well as itself. 
Cosmopolitanism is not an unchanging idea that would instantly result in something 
concrete. It is a dual process of co-creating the existing world and of making new ones. 
It creates as much as it undermines, and it explains as much as it brings into question. It 
can be easily understood as the critique of methodological and political nationalism, for 
instance. A cosmopolitan outlook helps one grasp the changing social and political 
realities and in doing so, opens up new possibilities and experiences. If the world and the 
human condition are becoming increasingly cosmopolitan, it is important for 
scholarship to consider the kind of critique exercised by cosmopolitanism. What form, 
then, does critical cosmopolitanism take? Which strand of critical theory does it follow? 
The research question that I therefore pose in this chapter is: what has already been 
researched on the topic of critical cosmopolitanism and how can it be further 
developed? 
 
The chapter is divided into three main sections. The first part discusses cosmopolitanism 
more generally but because it is a very broad concept, the focus will be on the meaning 
and features that are important for further development of the argument in this draft 
chapter. Therefore, those characteristics of cosmopolitanism that show its critical 
essence will be emphasised. In the second part, a review of the existing literature on 
critical cosmopolitanism will be made, discussing how, for example, some authors have 
already written about cosmopolitanism and its ability to exercise critique, be it from the 
perspective of experience and practice from below, or, for instance, through practices of 
public deliberation and engagement of people who endorse a (critical) cosmopolitan 
standpoint. In the last part of the chapter a new way of seeing cosmopolitanism as 
critique will be proposed, that is, a critique that takes the concept of recognition as its 
main paradigm and discloses new worlds and possibilities. 
I 
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1.1 Cosmopolitanism and Its Critical Characteristics 
 
Cosmopolitanism should first function as a means of evaluation and critique before it 
can be employed by various disciplines and agents to establish social institutions that 
embody cosmopolitan norms. In addition to giving expression to a certain form of 
humanity, cosmopolitanism is also expressive of a certain vision of possibilities that stem 
from its ability to critically engage with reality. Seyla Benhabib (2011: 2) rightly points 
out that cosmopolitanism must be understood as a critical ideal that blocks false 
totalisations. This understanding at the same time also recognises that cosmopolitanism 
is not a totalising ‘grand design’ (Mignolo, 2000) either. A little differently, Ulrich Beck 
(2002: 18) understands it to be an outlook that makes us see things alternatively: ‘The 
cosmopolitan perspective is an alternative imagination, an imagination of alternative 
ways of life and rationalities’. Delanty (2009: 14–15) similarly understands 
cosmopolitanism as an orientation, and one which allows people’s imagination to adopt 
different forms and change with regards to the social setting. The cosmopolitan 
imagination is consequently not ‘a matter of an ideal that transcends reality or a purely 
philosophical or utopian idea but an immanent orientation that takes shape in modes of 
self-understanding, experiences, feelings […]. The imaginary is both a medium of 
experience and an interpretation of that experience in a way that opens up new 
perspectives on the world’ (Delanty, 2009: 14–15). Consequently, the cosmopolitan 
imagination enables the subjects to distance themselves from their immediate 
experience as well as consider and engage with others. What is more, the cosmopolitan 
imagination ‘requires in some way a problematisation of one’s own assumptions as well 
as those of the Other’ (Delanty, 2009: 16). Specifically, it is the self-problematisation, 
change in self-understanding, and distance from one’s own practices, traditions and 
viewpoints that exemplify the cosmopolitan imagination. In this way, cosmopolitan 
imagination becomes a sort of critique for challenging the existing phenomena and 
relations. Thus, cosmopolitanism is far from being only an abstract and empty ideal. 
Cosmopolitanism should be understood as a developing set of social forms that can and 
must always be recreated, modernised and criticised (Fine, 2007: 136). 
 
Cosmopolitanism is a well-researched, interdisciplinary movement that has intrigued 
many scholars in various fields such as international relations, law, political and moral 
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philosophy, social theory as well as sociology.5 If it is sometimes misused and accused of 
being doctrinal this chapter signals the beginning of an endeavour to show the contrary. 
Contemporary theories of cosmopolitanism are very wide-ranging. Therefore, there is 
no definition of cosmopolitanism that would be fitting enough to showcase the totality of 
its implications. Therefore, we will not use a particular definition of cosmopolitanism 
but will try to embrace a meaning of cosmopolitanism that is perhaps distinctive and 
moves away from the prevalent conceptualisations of cosmopolitanism that are 
normative in their nature.6 Trying to define and therefore confine something like 
cosmopolitanism can also be counterproductive: ‘Cosmopolitanism may instead be a 
project whose conceptual content and pragmatic character are not only as yet 
unspecified but also must always escape positive and definite specification, precisely 
because specifying cosmopolitanism positively and definitely is an uncosmopolitan thing 
to do’ (Pollock et al., 2002: 1). Having said that, one must be careful not to turn 
cosmopolitanism into an ‘ism’ – an ideology or doctrine with set aims or dubious 
intentions. It should and must not be prescriptive in an authoritarian way that violently 
imposes its alleged moral remedies: ‘Cosmopolitanism is not or ought not to be a 
doctrinal mindset. One always has to resist the proclivity to turn cosmopolitanism into 
an ‘ism’ – that is, into a doctrine, a dogma, an all-purpose prescription, a fixed idea’ 
(Fine and Boon, 2007: 7–8). If cosmopolitanism is to be more than yet another 
metanarrative, then it should resist being categorised into a final and all-purpose 
prescription, and it should, rather, remain pledged to openness, universalism and 
radicalism in the sense of challenging and changing the status quo.  
 
Whereas much scholarship has been dedicated to the investigation of cosmopolitanism 
as a normative perspective outlining the world’s potentialities, scant attention has been 
given to the characteristics of cosmopolitanism that show its capacity for critique. 
Cosmopolitanism does not only offer moral foundations to reality, it also serves as its 
critic. It is therefore significantly future-oriented and committed to changing the status 
quo. It is thus important that we look at what kind of social relations it envisages and its 
capability to critically reflect on unjust social conditions and to induce self-reflection of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5 See, for instance, Beardsworth (2011); Pierik and Werner (2010); Brighouse and Brock (2005); Dallmayr 
(2003); Chernilo (2009); and Kendall et al. (2009). 
6 Ferrara (2007) claims that cosmopolitanism is above all a normative concept. Such is, for instance, also 
Benhabib’s claim in her 2006 book Another Cosmopolitanism where she follows the Kantian tradition in 
thinking about cosmopolitanism as the norms for governing relations among people. 
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agents. Cosmopolitanism as a social form has strong transformative power and, once 
emerged, it can completely change social life. As Fine (2007: xii) writes, 
cosmopolitanism ‘impacts upon the deployment of civil and political rights, on the 
exercise of moral judgements, on the practices of love and friendship, on the 
organisation of civil society and on the formation of the nation-state’. For all this to 
transpire and be transformed, one first needs to exercise an adequate critique and 
envisage a different possible reality. 
 
What are those qualities and characteristics of cosmopolitanism that make it significant 
enough to exercise a critique? And which of these characteristics coincide with those of 
critical theory? First of all, what makes critical theory critical? Is it critical just because it 
criticises existing conditions? No, critical theory is not merely descriptive in that sense 
and so is not cosmopolitanism. They both aim at social change and some form of 
emancipation. They are both transformative in character and committed to the 
abolition of social injustice, war and violence. Moreover, they both perform all this from 
‘within’. The first characteristic that is common both to cosmopolitanism and critical 
theory is therefore immanence. Critical theory is devoted to the principle of internal 
(immanent) criticism. As Geuss (1981: 64–5) writes: 
 
‘Just as critical theory is supposed to contribute to the agents’ self-knowledge, 
so the proponents of the critical theory recognise as “valid criticism” only what 
could in principle be part of the self-criticism of the agents to whom it is 
addressed; if the proponents of a critical theory wish to enlighten and 
emancipate a group of agents, they must find in the experience, form of 
consciousness, and belief of those agents the means of emancipation and 
enlightenment’. 
 
Solutions should not be sought outside the real world but in people’s this-worldly 
experiences and self-criticism. Even though critical theory is a very complicated 
conceptual object we can think of it and its role with the help of its three main 
constituent parts (Geuss, 1981: 76): (1) a part which shows that a transition from the 
present state of society to another desired state is inherently and either objectively or 
theoretically possible; (2) a part which shows that the transition is practically necessary; and 
(3) a part which asserts that the transition can happen only if the agents adopt the 
critical theory as their self-consciousness and act on it. Similar structure could be 
claimed for cosmopolitanism. The transition to a cosmopolitan state is possible and 
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necessary if we ever want to live in the world of cosmopolitan ideals, and this can only 
happen if agents adopt a cosmopolitan outlook and act on it in order to realise it.  
 
Openness or world openness is one of the general characteristics of cosmopolitanism 
(Delanty, 2012: 41) and the second attribute that is common both to cosmopolitanism 
and critical theory. Despite openness being general as well as one of the central features 
of cosmopolitanism, it has been often overlooked and not explicitly written about in 
cosmopolitan studies. Skrbiš and Woodward (2011: 53) claim that openness is not only 
central to the idea of cosmopolitanism but also its driving force. Together they engender 
something ‘positive and enabling, evoking acceptance and engagement rather than 
distance and rejection’. This same characteristic is also an important predisposition of a 
critical social theory. Openness is inherently connected to a reflexive style of 
cosmopolitan engagement – such engagement is an engagement with Otherness (Skrbiš 
and Woodward, 2011: 60). It shows a willingness to be challenged and learn from other 
cultural experiences and seek new, marginal forms of culture; it rejects the idea that the 
local or current is best and it acknowledges the potential of cultural immersion and 
exchange to enhance the self (Skrbiš and Woodward, 2011: 60). Openness and hence 
reflexivity enable one to go and think beyond one’s nation and opens up new 
possibilities and understanding. According to Bronner (1994: 3), the objective of critical 
theory is precisely ‘to foster reflexivity, a capacity for fantasy, and a new basis for praxis 
in an increasingly alienated world’. Critical theory, too, is committed to an openness of 
some sort because it is open to going to marginal places and rethink what is supposed to 
be normal and natural. Cosmopolitanism and critical theory have this important 
characteristic in common since they are both capable of imagining and considering 
different worlds and not only imagining them but also transforming the existing world 
into a new one through identifying emancipatory potential within the present. 
 
That brings us to the third common characteristic, that of transformation. 
Cosmopolitanism’s capability to transform existing social conditions can change social 
life immensely as was mentioned earlier. We could even argue that not only does 
transformation take place but something even more far-reaching – world-creation. As 
argues Delanty (2009: 78), critical cosmopolitanism ‘should be seen as the expression of 
new ideas, the opening of spaces of discourse, identifying possibilities for translation and 
the construction of the social world’. Cosmopolitan processes are therefore world 
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constituting – as are those of critical theory. Critical theory’s goals are transformation 
and to explain the process of the constitution of society by accounting for the 
mechanisms at play and its deformation, and to do so in a way that facilitates problem-
solving and world creation (Strydom, 2011: 9). With criticism of the existing norms, 
institutions and conditions, both critical theory and cosmopolitanism not only passively 
describe what might be wrong and what can be improved, but at the same time also 
point to another possible form of social living, that is, they create a new world.  
 
‘Critical Theory focuses by way of its cognitive interest in particular on 
problems or crises with a moral, ethical and political significance whose 
treatment could potentially lead to problem solving or crisis resolution as well 
as to world creation. The latter would involve the improvement or 
transformation of the world, for instance, a lasting or at least long-term 
enhancement of the moral quality of the constitution and organization of 
society or of the degree of sustainability of the relation of society to nature’ 
(Strydom, 2011: 12). 
 
The fourth common characteristic is that of dialogue or, more generally, communication. 
Cosmopolitanism plays a critical role in ‘opening up discursive spaces of world 
openness’ (Delanty, 2009: 88). It has the capacity for critical dialogue and deliberation 
and can thus be related to Habermas’ critical theory (Delanty, 2009: 87–8). 
Consequently, there is already an obvious link to critical theory. Furthermore, 
cosmopolitanism possesses a clear communicative dimension because it engages with the 
perspective of the Other and this ‘is not merely a question of dialogue or understanding, 
but also requires deliberative reasoning and the critical scrutiny of cultural and political 
standpoints’ (Delanty, 2009: 261). Cosmopolitan inter-cultural communication has 
therefore a strong critical orientation: ‘Cosmopolitan inter-cultural dialogue has a 
critical trust in that it does not simply take for granted the normative claims of the 
cultures that are involved in the communicative process but requires a re-evaluation of 
positions’ (Delanty, 2009: 261). Inter-cultural dialogue thus leads to learning and 
opening up new horizons. In an ‘open and reflexive dialogue […] subjects define 
themselves as engaged with the most distant other, as bound by a shared global fate and 
experience, by the need to reconstruct one’s own belief, perspective, and interest in light 
of how it relates to anyone affected, based on the shared capabilities that enable 
culturally situated global citizens to engage with one another in this context’ (Kögler, 
2011: 239). Similarly, ‘critical theory judges social arrangements by their capacity to 
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embrace open dialogue with all others and envisages new forms of political community 
which break with unjustified exclusion’ (Linklater, 1996: 280). It, furthermore, 
‘maintains its faith in the enlightenment project and defends universalism in its ideal of 
open dialogue not only between fellow-citizens but, more radically, between all 
members of the human race’ (Linklater, 1996: 296). This is also one of 
cosmopolitanism’s main goals and it is to no surprise that cosmopolitanism and critical 
theory coincide so well precisely, though not exclusively, in the communicative 
dimension. 
 
Finally, there is emancipation. Emancipation in the sense that Seyla Benhabib (1986: 353) 
describes it: ‘the formation of communities of need and solidarity in the interstices of our 
societies. Such Utopia is no longer Utopian, for it is not a mere beyond. It is the 
negation of the existent in the name of a future that bursts open the possibilities of the 
present. Such utopia is not antagonistic to norm; it complements it’. Cosmopolitanism 
and critical theory are utopian in this sense, and here emancipation is closely connected 
to utopia. They both carry the promise of forming communities of solidarity, a promise 
that opens up in the present and carries with it norms that underpin this journey.7 
 
1.2 Critical Cosmopolitanism: A Review 
 
Now that we have looked at some general characteristics of cosmopolitanism that can be 
seen as critical, we must turn to those researchers who have already explicitly explored 
the idea of critical cosmopolitanism. We will focus on two related questions: (1) which 
characteristics have these authors emphasised?; and (2) which strand of critical theory 
have they associated critical cosmopolitanism with (if any)? To this end, we will attempt 
to identify what has been covered and what can still be advanced. It is important to 
distinguish between two kinds of critique with regards to cosmopolitanism: one that is 
used to criticising existing cosmopolitanisms, and another that is employed by !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7 Comparing Arendt to the Frankfurt School, Benhabib (2011: 22) acknowledges that, despite differences, 
both are strongly united in faith in human emancipation. She writes: ‘They never lost faith in human 
beings’ capacity to “start anew” and change their collective conditions of existence (Arendt), or to 
anticipate the “wholly other” (das ganz Andere) and imagine a better future (Horkheimer). […] Members of 
the Frankfurt School repeatedly evoked the hope that human emancipation would not only herald an 
empty but a concrete utopia. Hannah Arendt and members of the Frankfurt School are fundamentally 
united in their insistence upon the power of human beings to change their world, even in the face of 
developments where despair was more tempting’.  
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cosmopolitanism in order to tackle social phenomena, practices and world order. 
Although they are not completely unrelated, this chapter aims to focus more on the 
latter. 
 
Firstly, as is argued by critical cosmopolitanism theorists, cosmopolitanism should not be 
regarded as something pre-conceived in form or content if we are to consider it as a way 
of looking at the world that requires some sort of a perspective. This is something that 
authors such as Bhambra (2010; 2011), Pollock et al. (2000), Pieterse (2006), Mignolo 
(2000), Rumford (2008) and Walkowitz (2006), among others, emphasise, and they 
therefore try to take into account legacies of the past that still shape the present and 
should for this reason not be neglected. Pieterse (2006) claims that bringing history back 
into cosmopolitanism is necessary as a counterpoint to monocultural, corporate and 
hegemonic cosmopolitanisms. This could simply be understood as a critique of 
cosmopolitanism rather than an account of a critical version of cosmopolitanism. Even 
though his article also aims to be a critique of capitalist cosmopolitanism, as he calls it, 
and a critique of cosmopolitanism’s alleged reflection of parochial order, he nevertheless 
acknowledges cosmopolitanism’s critical position and its possibility to make a difference 
and to offer an emancipatory perspective. He therefore speaks of an emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism that is rooted in experience, action, history and practice from below. If 
cosmopolitanism is to be emancipatory, it must involve other cosmopolitan visions 
beyond Eurocentrism. A similar argument can be found in Mignolo’s (2000) account of 
critical cosmopolitanism. The latter, in his opinion, can only exist if we re-conceive 
cosmopolitanism from the perspective of coloniality and within the frame of the 
modern/colonial world. In such a way, critical cosmopolitanism does not lose a 
historical dimension. Unlike some other cosmopolitanisms, critical cosmopolitanism is 
able to escape the ideological frame imposed on it by global designs and narratives that 
are driven by the will to control and homogenise ‘either from the right or from the left, 
as in the Christian and civilizing mission or in the planetary revolution of the 
proletariat’ (Mignolo, 2000: 723). Cultural differences are replaced with the colonial 
difference. ‘Diversality’ is no longer thought as a form of cultural relativism but as new 
forms of projecting and imagining, ethically and politically, from subaltern perspectives 
(Mignolo, 2000: 743). In such a critical and dialogic cosmopolitanism where everyone 
participates (cosmopolitanism from below), the abstract universal ideals that have helped 
to hold together the modern/colonial world system are replaced by diversity as a 
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universal and cosmopolitan project. Such cosmopolitanism aims at the 
reconceptualisation of human rights, democracy and citizenship. Similarly, Chris 
Rumford (2008: 154) understands critical cosmopolitanism as post-western, consisting of 
multiple perspectives, voices and worlds, and criticising globalisation’s claim that we all 
live in one world. 
 
Beside the necessarily included historical aspect or multiple perspectives that make 
cosmopolitanism more critical, scholars also call attention to the emancipatory feature 
of critical cosmopolitanism, which is an important characteristic and aim of every 
critical theory. Pieterse’s (2006) idea of emancipatory cosmopolitanism has already been 
mentioned although he does not explore the feature of emancipation fully and more 
comprehensively. He sees emancipatory cosmopolitanism as being able to rebalance 
corporate, political and social globalisation if it is ready to include other ‘cosmovisions’, 
that is, historical aspects and cosmopolitanism from below. Emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism’s aim is to transform overall globalisation, whereas Kurasawa (2011) is 
more radical in embracing cosmopolitanism’s quality of emancipation. What he aims to 
do in his article is to shift the conception of cosmopolitanism from being a set of 
subjective or attitudinal dispositions to other human beings towards a project of 
universal emancipation tackling structurally-produced sources of inequality and global 
injustices that block the exercise of individual and collective capabilities and the 
flourishing of human potential. In the spirit of critical theory, he thus looks at the gap 
between normative aspirations and their actualisation in the present world order. Nigel 
Rapport (2012a) also writes about emancipatory cosmopolitanism, which he 
understands to be a critique of culture and the artificial reduction of the world into 
simplistic classes such as nations, ethnicities, castes and others. Emancipatory 
cosmopolitanism would free humanity from this differentiation and free an individual to 
explore what he or she is and what he or she would like to become. Cosmopolitanism 
thus offers ontological and moral emancipation and ‘a vision of individuals who may 
never be transformed into the ‘camp dust’ of Nazi ghettoes and lagers, Stalinist gulags or 
Islamist millets’ (Rapport, 2012a: 114).  
 
Another significant aspect of critical cosmopolitanism that can be found in existing 
writings on this topic is the importance of cosmopolitanism from below. This is an 
important aspect of critical cosmopolitanism that connects it to critical theory with 
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regards to agents who employ critical theory and exercise critique. If in Marxism the 
working class has been seen as being representative of humanity, in critical 
cosmopolitanism there is no single class or group of people that would single-handedly 
lead political action which could represent all people. In late-capitalist societies there are 
numerous actors that are capable of resisting and do so for various reasons and causes. 
As Benhabib (1986: 347) warns, thinking that there is one group or organisation of 
people that can act in the name of the whole can lead to the politics of collective 
singularity and such politics has authoritarian implications. The key to avoiding such 
politics is to replace it with a more ‘radical, participatory, and pluralist conception of 
politics’ (Benhabib, 1986: 348). And this is something that critical cosmopolitanism or 
cosmopolitanism ‘from below’ can offer. Kurasawa (2011: 281) claims that critical 
cosmopolitanism is able to draw attention to the existence of a worldly sensibility from 
below, grounded in ordinary ways of thinking and acting, and is not content with the 
liberal idea of multicultural diversity. In such a way, critical substantivism begins from 
below by making sense of the social labour of groups implicated in human rights 
struggles in historically specific socio-cultural contexts, and proceeds ‘upward’ to 
formulate normative reconstructions of what is required ethically and politically of these 
struggles to advance the work of global justice (Kurasawa, 2007: 10). Pieterse (2006: 
1254) finds cosmopolitanism from below in diasporas, migrants, traders, itinerant 
artisans, pilgrims, and scholars who have been traversing the world for a long time. 
Therefore, in his (Pieterse, 2006: 1255) opinion cosmopolitanism from above is empty 
without cosmopolitanism from below, which is the actual experience of world 
citizenship. Bhambra (2010: 43) claims that such cosmopolitanism ‘would be made up of 
dialogues among a series of local perspectives on cosmopolitanism, with no unifying 
centre’. In another article, Bhambra (2011: 323) argues that the worth of provincialised 
cosmopolitanism is in its capability to learn from others wherein we recognise that what 
others contribute is not the confirmation of what we already know, but the bringing into 
being of new understandings relevant to the worlds that we inhabit together. ‘These new 
understandings both reconfigure our existing perceptions of the world, as well as inform 
the ways in which we live in the world’ (Bhambra, 2011: 323). A similar version of 
cosmopolitanism from below is found in Mignolo’s (2000: 741) proposal. Instead of 
cosmopolitanism managed from above (i.e., global designs), he puts forward a 
cosmopolitanism that is critical, dialogic and which emerges from the various spatial 
and historical locations of colonial difference. In this way, critical cosmopolitanism 
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becomes inclusive and is able to investigate social practices as well as the beliefs of all 
agents in society. Following Geuss (1981), these are also the main rationales of critical 
theory. 
 
Beside cosmopolitanism from below, the dialogic feature of cosmopolitanism seems 
particularly important for further discussion about critical cosmopolitanism. A lot of 
authors include dialogue or public deliberation as one of the characteristics of critical 
cosmopolitanism. For Gilabert (2006: 1–2), cosmopolitanism can be a form of social 
criticism only if it simultaneously combines a search for basic universal rights, sensitivity 
to contextual specificities, and the autonomous empowerment of all individuals. He 
claims that this can be achieved through the practices of public deliberation in which 
people enacting a critical cosmopolitan stance should engage. Discursive practices test 
the validity of claims, and most of all, with their help one is able to criticise, in a critical 
cosmopolitan manner, the unilateral approaches to universal rights, plurality and 
empowerment, and to defuse the epistemic risk of following false universals. Kurasawa 
(2007) suggests that public discourse is an important part of cosmopolitanism from 
below, that is, socio-political actions that escape formalism and open emancipatory 
possibilities. Public deliberation and dialogue foster criticism and expose different 
realities, and are therefore an important part of every conceptualisation of critical 
cosmopolitanism.8 Engaging in a dialogue ‘always already’ entails a kind of critique. As 
Habermas (1990: 26) writes, in communicative action, no one is superior to another 
because it is impossible to decide a priori who is to learn from whom: ‘interpreters give 
themselves over to a process of reciprocal critique’. Within a process of interpretation 
and reaching an understanding, a correct interpretation is not finding the truth per se 
but explaining that which the interpreter is to understand. This then requires 
participation and not merely observation. Everyone becomes actively involved in a 
dialogue and everyone must ‘relinquish the superiority that observers have by virtue of 
their privileged position’ (Habermas, 1990: 26) and get engaged in negotiations about 
the meaning and validity of assertions. We could say that such understanding of 
cosmopolitanism to some extent relates to Habermas’ critical theory. 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
8 Delanty (2012: 42) writes: ‘As a dialogic condition cosmopolitanism can be understood in terms of 
critical dialogue or deliberation. A deliberative concept of culture and politics captures the cosmopolitan 
spirit of engaging with the perspective of the Other as opposed to rejecting it. This is where the tie 
between cosmopolitanism and critical theory is strong’. 
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An author who does not speak of critical cosmopolitanism per se but nevertheless makes 
similar claims in the field of international relations and critical theory, is Andrew 
Linklater. In his book, titled Beyond Realism and Marxism (1990), he considers a form of 
critical theory that would be able to identify the prospects for realising human freedom 
across the world as a whole. Three main concerns of traditional international relations 
theories (realism, rationalism and revolutionism) are power, order and emancipation. 
The latter is especially pertinent in the context of critical cosmopolitanism. Specifically, 
revolutionism asserts that a ‘Cosmopolis’ which will realise the moral potential of the 
species is already immanent within the international system of states (Linklater, 1990: 8). 
The revolutionist tradition therefore most closely approximates the idea of critical 
international theory, which is to a certain extent similar to critical cosmopolitanism. 
Revolutionism, and a critical turn in international theory more generally, has been 
influenced by the Frankfurt School. It engages in a sociological analysis of conflicts 
which may give rise to a society in which there is a higher level of autonomy and which 
calls into question all institutions and power relations. It is action-oriented and it clarifies 
a range of possibilities that are feasible transformations of the existing world (Linklater, 
1990: 28). In another work, Linklater (2001) similarly argues for a critical international 
relations theory but acknowledges its changing contours. Its aim, he claims, should be to 
increase social interaction with dialogue and consent rather than power and force, and 
to expand the number of people who participate in a speech community. Furthermore, 
the central feature and moral goal of such a critical theory should be to diminish 
exclusion and to lift restrictions ‘in which morally irrelevant distinctions based on class, 
gender, race, or ethnicity are used to deny groups access to the rights the privileged 
already enjoy’ (Bernstein in Linklater, 2001: 27). A similar claim can be found in Seyla 
Benhabib’s (2004) book, where she argues for a cosmopolitan theory of justice that 
incorporates a vision of just membership together with the distribution of resources. A 
cosmopolitan theory of justice would integrate citizenship claims into a universal human 
rights regime. Benhabib shows that the human right to membership is more general 
than the specific citizenship legislation of a country. She exercises an internal critique of 
institutions and in such a way gains a clearer understanding of people’s rights and 
freedoms. She does so from a cosmopolitan perspective and even though she does not 
explicitly speak of critical cosmopolitanism, one could argue that she does this in its 
manner.  
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Seeing what critical cosmopolitanism stands for in the existing literature, we should now 
turn to critical theory and try to make some concluding remarks. In doing so we must 
acknowledge the importance of the Frankfurt School’s critical theory for critical 
cosmopolitanism but at the same time recognise that it needs to be appropriated for 
today’s worldly circumstances. Critical theory has new conditions to confront because 
the world has changed profoundly in the last decades. The world has grown larger in 
population, there are new societal conflicts and problems across the globe that need to 
be addressed, economies have grown bigger and more intertwined, new identities have 
emerged and new oppressions have taken place. McCarthy (1994: 92–3) sees a strong 
need for critical theory to become more global: ‘I have wanted to underscore the need 
for critical theory to adopt a consistently global perspective, so as to locate the received 
problematics of the nation state in a broader web of interconnected histories’. Despite 
this need, there are some common characteristics between all strands of critical theories 
that can be found also in critical cosmopolitanism. It must be emphasised that critical 
cosmopolitanism not only brings a global component to critical theory but also acts as a 
critical theory of its own. From Hegelian Marxists to Habermas and the third 
generation of critical theorists with which Axel Honneth can be counted, critical theory 
has never been only descriptive but also a way to set social change in motion by 
providing knowledge of social inequality that can inform on political action aimed at 
emancipation or diminishing domination and inequality (Rush, 2004: 9). The 
difference, then, between traditional critical theory and critical cosmopolitanism is that 
the latter’s main concern is with societal problems that are global in scope whereas 
traditional critical theory is more concerned with the critique of domination and is more 
Western-focused (Delanty, 2012: 43). Critical cosmopolitanism also has its own 
normative guidelines and distinct approach to enacting critical-social praxis. After 
reviewing the existing work in the emerging field of critical cosmopolitanism, the main 
general issues seem to be: emancipation; cosmopolitanism from below (provincialised 
cosmopolitanism); dialogue/public deliberation; and the inclusion of history into further 
development of critical cosmopolitanism. This final issue could also be understood to be 
a critique of cosmopolitanism itself, however, it was also shown in the chapter that the 
authors employ it as an aspect of critical cosmopolitanism. 
 
Just as in critical theory, the central topics of critical cosmopolitanism are human 
agency, autonomy and reconciliation with the Other. Those authors of critical 
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cosmopolitanism that follow Habermas (Linklater and Gilabert, for instance), who make 
the biggest quantitative leap in terms of a model of autonomy, also presuppose that 
social action is a subject-subject relation and as such, a form of communication. The 
important aspect of this model of activity, then, is human plurality and intersubjectivity. 
The former does not merely mean that we are different bodies in space and time, but 
that our identity, and the narrative history that constitutes our selves, gives us a unique 
perspective on the world (Benhabib, 1986: 140). Thus, the communicative dimension is 
one of cosmopolitanism’s (as well as critical theory’s) main features. Although 
‘traditional’ Marxist critical theory focuses on production, future developments of 
critical theory posit communication as their core paradigm. Constructing a new critical 
social theory adequate to the task of elucidating the demands of late-capitalist societies, 
as Benhabib (1986: 12) argues, requires a paradigm shift in critical theory from 
production to communicative action, from the politics of the philosophy of the subject to 
the politics of radical intersubjectivity. On the other hand, authors who emphasise the 
importance of cosmopolitanism from below seem to adhere more to Axel Honneth’s 
conception of critical theory. The struggle for recognition, as Honneth (1996) argues, is 
one that provides the motivation for social progress and can lead to social action. The 
objective is to create an alternative to the Machiavellian-Hobbesian idea of society as a 
selfish struggle for self-preservation. There are three primary dimensions to the 
intersubjective relations of recognition; namely, love (family and friendship), rights 
(universal, moral and legal principles), and esteem (solidarity and welfare of all people). 
Should any of these be denied, or if there exists any kind of disrespect or humiliation, 
then it is the task of the recognition theory to reveal the socio-structural causes 
accountable for that humiliation and disrespect, and to take into account also historical 
experiences of such disrespect. This theory is above all apt in the study of transnational 
movements, for instance, and it is especially pertinent for connecting it to 
cosmopolitanism from below – as it is found in Kurasawa’s (2007; 2011) work on critical 
cosmopolitanism, for example. 
 
1.3 The Future of Possibility 
 
Cosmopolitanism envisages a different social reality. The latter is a relational social 
reality and it is therefore important that we look at the kinds of social relations 
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cosmopolitanism envisions and its capability to critically reflect on unjust social 
conditions as well as to induce self-reflection in agents. The interconnectedness of 
people and their relations in today’s world testifies to the fact that we can no longer 
conceive of other people as essentially ‘other’, separated from us in fundamental ways. 
Given this global interconnectedness, detachment is no longer an option – on the 
contrary, a lot can be gained from taking a critical attitude that begins from, rather than 
denies, acknowledged connectedness and dependence (Kompridis, 2011b: 270). This is 
where cosmopolitanism is relevant – it recognises interdependence among people and 
the responsibility we have towards others while simultaneously performing a critique as 
it discloses alternatives that differ from the actual condition.  
 
If we are thinking about cosmopolitanism as critique and its ontological implications, 
one form of critical theory seems especially pertinent that has not yet been associated 
with cosmopolitanism. That is the idea of critique as world-disclosure as it has been 
developed by, among others,9 Nikolas Kompridis (2006). He argues that such a critical 
theory recognises conditions that obscure or foreclose our possibilities and conceives of 
itself as a possibility-disclosing practice. It is more pluralistic than its predecessors and is 
primarily concerned with ‘disclosing novel forms of thought and action that might make 
possible a more productive practical orientation towards the future’ (Sinnerbrink, 2011: 
1054). Understanding cosmopolitanism as critique in this way means two things: firstly, 
that the idea of critical theory as world-disclosure enhances cosmopolitanism’s existing 
critical orientation because it engages with the world in a manner of understanding;10 
and, secondly, that cosmopolitanism importantly supplements such a critical theory 
because it provides it with a normative direction.  
 
If we are to focus on the implied idea of disclosure in cosmopolitanism then we must 
consider how and in what ways critical theory and disclosure are intertwined. Following 
Honneth’s (2000: 123) claim, the conception of a critique can be understood as world-!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9 Richard Rorty also endorses world-disclosing critique. He argues that the best way to approach a 
questionable practice in society is through the imaginative, creative and poetic articulation of a new 
practice (Strydom, 2011: 171). Even though such reasoning may be criticised because imaginative and 
alternative practices seem to be relatively easy to articulate but not implemented, critical cosmopolitanism 
can fill this gap by proposing viable alternative practices while at the same time retaining the imaginative 
impulse. 
10 Understanding here conforms to Arendt’s (2005: 307–8) conception: ‘Understanding, as distinguished 
from having correct information and scientific knowledge, is a complicated process which never produces 
unequivocal results. It is an unending activity by which, in constant change and variation, we come to 
terms with and reconcile ourselves to reality, that is, try to be at home in the world.’ 
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disclosure which attempts to change our beliefs about values by invoking new ways of 
seeing and highlights facts that were previously not perceived in social reality. Similarly, 
Kompridis (2006: xi) follows Martin Heidegger’s idea of disclosure or world-disclosure, 
by calling for an alternative vision of critical theory ‘that, in recognition of the various 
ways in which conditions of modernity obscure or foreclose our possibilities, conceives 
itself as a possibility-disclosing practice’. Both cosmopolitanism and critical theory have 
the ability to see things in light of possibilities, and both of them can be characterised as 
being open to as well as engaged with what is disclosed (Kompridis, 2006: 34). In critical 
theory, this requires both a reflective responsiveness to historical experiences as well as 
the ability to see something that is familiar or even taken for granted from a new 
perspective (Kompridis, 2006: 19). In a similar manner, cosmopolitan social theory 
reconstructs the history and traditions of social theory anew in terms of a universalistic 
concept of society, the recognition of differences within a universalistic frame, and the 
critique of methodological and political nationalism (Fine, 2007: x). This is one of the 
most important methodological features and claims of cosmopolitanism since it engages 
in understanding and criticising the world precisely from the perspective of universalism, 
which presupposes a single subject – that of humanity. This does not mean that 
cosmopolitanism subsequently eradicates all difference. On the contrary, it 
acknowledges all forms of difference and at the same time conceptualises them as 
internal to the substantive unity of all human beings (Fine, 2007: x). The conception of 
cosmopolitan social theory that is used in this thesis in connection to critical theory 
understands ‘social relations through a universalistic conception of humanity and by 
means of universalistic analytical tools and methodological procedures. Its simple but by 
no means trivial claim is that, despite all our differences, humankind is effectively one 
and must be understood as such’ (Fine, 2007: xvii). I believe that this normative and 
methodological component of cosmopolitanism would further enrich understanding of 
critical theory as containing world-disclosure.  
 
When we speak of the concept of world disclosure, we can distinguish between two 
different kinds or levels of disclosure: ‘At one level, it refers to the disclosure of an 
already interpreted, symbolically structured world; the world, that is, within which we 
always already find ourselves. At another level, it refers as much to the disclosure of new 
horizons of meaning as to the disclosure of previously hidden or unthematised 
dimensions of meaning’ (Kompridis, 1994: 29). It is no surprise that cosmopolitanism 
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connects so well with the notion of (world) disclosure. The second level of world-
disclosure seems especially important to the discussion. It is linked to ‘a more reflexive 
conception of how our shared practices, linguistic interpretations and conceptual 
mappings can be as much world-making as world-revealing’ (Sinnerbrink, 2011: 1055) and 
as such closely related to cosmopolitanism’s ability of world-making and its imaginative 
quality.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this first chapter, a review of the literature on critical cosmopolitanism has been made 
and a new form of critical theory has been proposed to be associated with 
cosmopolitanism. In previous scholarship on critical cosmopolitanism several recurring 
topics have been found. The main general concerns and underpinnings of critical 
cosmopolitanism are emancipation, cosmopolitanism from below (provincialised 
cosmopolitanism), dialogue/public deliberation and inclusion of history into the further 
development of critical cosmopolitanism. The latter could also be understood as a 
critique of cosmopolitanism but it was shown how the authors use it to strengthen their 
idea of critical cosmopolitanism. The common characteristic that most authors ascribe 
to critical cosmopolitanism can be connected to characteristics of critical theories. From 
Hegelian Marxists to Habermas and the third generation of critical theorists, critical 
theory has never only been descriptive, but also a way to set social change in motion by 
providing a critique of social reality which inspires political action and emancipation 
(Rush, 2004). Critical cosmopolitanism encompasses various features of different strands 
of critical theory. However, none of the authors have linked it to a specific critical theory 
and developed it within its own frame, although this should be made if critical 
cosmopolitanism wants to be further advanced as a critical theory itself. 
 
Besides Axel Honneth’s critical theory of recognition, which is the main critical theory 
that cosmopolitanism will be linked to, another form of critical theory seems especially 
pertinent for further development of critical cosmopolitanism and has not yet been 
related to it. That is the idea of critique as world-disclosure. Such a critical theory 
conceives of itself as a possibility-disclosing practice. It is more pluralistic, in the way 
that it not only focuses on reason or one form of domination. Like cosmopolitanism, it 
Chapter 1: Situating the Idea 
of Critical Cosmopolitanism 
!
- 30 - 
has the ability to invoke new ways of seeing and highlights facts that were previously not 
apparent in social reality. Cosmopolitanism and a type of critical theory that is both 
historically reflective as well able to see something from a new perspective are highly 
fitting to each other and will be explored further in the thesis, but let us first turn to the 
tradition of critical theory more generally in order to understand its main aims and 
operations. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE CONCEPTUAL SOURCES OF CRITICAL THEORY 
AND ITS METHODOLOGY 
 
‘In general, to understand a philosophical argument and to evaluate its cogency, 
it is necessary to know the questions and puzzles which such an argument 
proposes to answer. To understand these questions and puzzles, in turn, it is 
necessary to reconstruct those social, historical, and conceptual contexts which 
form the horizon of inquiry of different theories. […] Understanding always 
involves understanding from within a framework which makes sense for us. In 
this sense, learning the questions of the past involves posing questions to the past in 
light of our conceptual preoccupations in the present. The reconstruction of the 
history of theories proceeds like a dialogue in which one asks a question, seeks to 
comprehend whether this question is meaningful to the other, listens and 
reformulates the answer of the other, and in light of this answer rearticulates 
one’s original position’ (Benhabib, 1986: x) 
 
efore this thesis moves on to a more detailed exploration of cosmopolitanism as 
critical theory, the latter must be thoroughly studied first in order to identify its 
fundamental characteristics and operations. To this end, the main purpose of this 
chapter is to reconstruct the essential aims of critical theory, and put forward its 
conceptual structure and methodology. The chapter does not present a detailed history 
of critical theory’s legacy,11 nor does it engage in critically assessing its possible flaws. 
Instead, it illuminates the way in which critical theory functions as a social scientific 
project and the way it may be employed to confront various societal problems, 
challenges or crises. Thus, this chapter prepares the ground for further research on 
cosmopolitanism as critical theory. Namely, it shows what conceptual principles 
cosmopolitanism as a social theory needs to fulfil in order to be able to operate as a 
critical social theory. 
  
The chapter is divided into four sections. It begins with an investigation into the origins 
of critical theory. Early critical theory set the foundation for a rich tradition, and since 
its foundations define critical theory’s uniqueness, they are still very relevant to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
11 For an account of critical theory’s legacy see, for instance, Jay (1973) or Wiggershaus and Robertson 
(1995).  
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contemporary endeavours to renew the theory in the light of the current social reality. 
The second part of the chapter goes a step further and deeper into discovering critical 
theory’s structure and deals with its architectonic structure. This consists of seven 
distinctive dimensions that constitute the system of critical theory: the transcendental; 
dialectical; normative; ontological; theoretical; epistemological; and the methodological 
dimension. The third section briefly touches upon one of the most important concepts of 
critical theory, that is, the concept of immanent transcendence – briefly, since this 
concept will be studied in detail later in the fourth chapter. Immanent transcendence is 
also one of critical theory’s defining notions because it captures critical theory’s essence 
and outlines its course of operation. The last part of the chapter discusses critical 
theory’s methodology. It explicates how critical theory connects theory with practice, 
how it diagnoses the problem, engages with it, and exposes its work to public scrutiny 
and criticism.  
 
2.1 The Origins of Immanent Critical Theory: An Overview of 
Early Critical Theory 
 
The first part of this chapter will not dwell on the detailed chronological history of 
critical theory but will provide the reader with an overview of the main themes and 
concepts that form early critical theory and create the foundation for its tradition. The 
discussion thus begins with the Frankfurt School and its theorists. Critical theory is 
usually associated with the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research, which was 
established in 1923. Members of the institute are generally referred to as the Frankfurt 
School.12 The Frankfurt School is not unanimous in their scholarship but, despite this, 
one can find harmony between the thoughts of different theorists which form some 
common ground to critical theory’s endeavours. Specifically, its interdisciplinary 
character is bound to the emancipation of agents, the ending of social oppression or 
injustice, and the employment of reflective, instead of instrumental, reason. Critical 
theory is therefore not a set of fixed claims or a blueprint that could only confront 
particular historical circumstances. Or, as Max Horkheimer (1982: 223–4) writes, 
‘[c]ritical theory is neither “deeply rooted” like totalitarian propaganda nor “detached” !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
12 Members include Max Horkheimer, Friedrich Pollock, Theodor Adorno, Erich Fromm, Herbert 
Marcuse, Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, Leo Lowenthal, Henryk Grossmann, Arkadij Gurland, 
among others (Held, 2013: 14). 
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like the liberalist intelligentsia.’ It is neither foundationalist, on the one hand, nor 
completely relativist, on the other. It is based on a commitment to freedom and the need 
for revision in order to meet new questions posed by new historical situations (Bronner, 
1994: 322). Critical theory challenges different forms of oppression, people’s suffering, 
systemic injustices, and tackles these issues in the spirit of freedom, hope and utopia. 
However, it has not been termed critical just because it criticises or condemns certain 
ways of social and political reality. Finding fault or discovering what is immoral means 
foremost reflecting upon disclosed circumstances and seeing well beyond tangible 
appearances. Critical theory therefore not only reveals possibly hidden meanings but 
also guides human action in order to surpass the conditions that inhibit subjects and 
their social being. Critical theory produces knowledge that contains enlightenment and 
emancipation. It is therefore important to emphasise that such a social theory does not 
only describe and criticise social life, but takes an active part in shaping, creating and 
reflecting on social knowledge and the future as well. It investigates social knowledge, 
meaning the beliefs people hold about their social reality. Critical theory is itself a part 
of such social knowledge and can or must thus be challenged and rethought when 
historical circumstances change: ‘The critical theory does not, then, like objectifying 
theories, purport merely to give information about society, its members, and their form 
of consciousness, it also purports to provide the criterion by which to evaluate whether 
or not the critical theory itself, and the information it provides are acceptable.’ (Geuss, 
1981: 79). A part of critical theory’s methodology must therefore also be its subjection to 
public inspection.13 
 
To understand where it all began and uncover those foundations of early critical theory 
that made it critical and distinct from traditional social theories, one needs to identify its 
main goals and means. Despite critical theory’s rich and wide spectrum, it is possible to 
pinpoint its sources. As Alway (1995: 23) writes, ‘as complex and ambiguous as Critical 
Theory might be, one does find within it a consistent emphasis, both institutionally and 
theoretically, on autonomy and independence’. The emphasis on autonomy is one of 
the key elements of critical theory, as is emancipation, and reflection. These three are all 
related to each other, with reflection facilitating a potential for self-determination or 
autonomy and only in this way enabling us to decide what a better and more 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
13 See section 2.4 on methodology. 
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emancipated life would look like (How, 2003: 6). Though not exhaustive, these three 
features were at the foundation of the Frankfurt account of critical theory and its 
normative agenda, that is, the emancipation of humanity from social injustice 
(Chambers, 2004: 221). Social totality consists of not just economic institutions, but also 
of forms of consciousness, social ideals and ideas of the good life (Geuss, 2004: 130). 
Critical theory proceeds from locating certain facts in the social world and subsequently 
identifying both positive and negative beliefs, structures or human works, and thereby 
criticising the present: 
 
‘One important task of Critical Theory, then, is to extract from such traditional 
conceptions both positive images of the good life and negative images of lives 
that are not good, to translate them into a form which brings out as clearly as 
possible those parts of them that are no longer merely utopian, but could 
actually be reali[s]ed, and to compare our present society with those images. 
This confrontation is a critique of our present. Dialectical thinking critici[s]es 
existing institutions, practices, or states of affairs simply by contrasting what they 
are with what they could be, and are in some sense striving to be but are not’ 
(Geuss, 2004: 133).  
 
Critical theory’s task is therefore to analyse the constitution of ideas in consciousness, 
explain and change human-made historical concepts, and to understand history and 
tradition in a critical and reflexive manner, and thus to recognise possible ideologies 
behind it (Held, 2013: 173). The Frankfurt School criticised positivism as the only valid 
form of gaining knowledge, its connection to instrumental reason and the creation of 
ideology. Though not entirely separate from natural sciences’ methodology, critical 
theory tries to avoid instrumental thinking and judgement, and instead focuses on 
understanding empowerment of individuals or groups with knowledge, and freedom. 
 
Autonomy or independence of agents became one of the most important claims of critical 
theory. Without an autonomously thinking and acting agent, the demands of critical 
theory can never be realised. Theorists of the Frankfurt School were well aware of the 
social and political conditions which forced men and women into oppression and 
subordination. In the Preface of the book Eclipse of Reason, Horkheimer (2004: v) writes: 
 
‘The hopes of mankind seem to be farther from fulfillment today than they were 
even in the groping epochs when they were first formulated by humanists. It seems 
that even as technical knowledge expands the horizon of man's thought and 
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activity, his autonomy as an individual, his ability to resist the growing apparatus 
of mass manipulation, his power of imagination, his independent judg[e]ment 
appear to be reduced’. 
 
This was written in 1946 but could also be applied to the conditions of the 21st century. 
Life in a rationalised world can mean a reduced degree of autonomy because everything 
is subordinated to limited and predetermined goals with precisely set means in order to 
achieve them. Men and women do not (need to) possess critical minds because 
everything is set out for them already. As Marcuse (1998: 49) claims: 
 
‘Rationality is being transformed from a critical force into one of adjustment and 
compliance. Autonomy of reason loses its meaning in the same measure as the 
thoughts, feelings and actions of men are shaped by the technical requirements 
of the apparatus which they have themselves created. Reason has found its 
resting place in the system of standardi[s]ed control, production and 
consumption. There it reigns through the laws and mechanisms which insure the 
efficiency, expediency and coherence of this system.’ 
 
Subjects are deprived of the very conditions for autonomous agency/thinking and 
therefore lack the ‘capacity to engage in critical-reflective discourse concerning the 
justifiability of established or proposed norms and beliefs’ (Hoy and McCarthy, 1994: 
44). Since human being’s autonomy has been privatised, he or she cannot participate in 
public criticism and other public activities that could result in reaching mutual 
understanding. In critical theory, autonomy is the basis of rational resistance to social 
and political domination (Jacobs, 2001: 139). 
 
It is for this reason that reflection plays such an important part in achieving any critical 
theory’s aim. Being capable of reflection or reflective thinking is closely connected to 
fostering one’s imagination or fantasy, which can prompt imagining a different, better 
future: ‘One thing which this way of thinking has in common with fantasy is that an 
image of the future which springs indeed from a deep understanding of the present 
determines men’s thoughts and actions even in periods when the course of events seems 
to be leading far away from such a future and seems to justify every reaction except 
belief in fulfillment’ (Horkheimer, 1982: 220). The ability to understand and critically 
reflect on one’s conditions and beliefs enables one to change reality and the social 
knowledge that forms such a reality. Reflection is therefore closely related to the notion 
of autonomy because without possessing the latter an agent cannot employ a reflective 
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mind: ‘Having given up autonomy, reason has become an instrument’ (Horkheimer, 
2004: 14). If a mind’s function is reduced to a limited, instrumental use, it is more prone 
to being misused and not being employed in a way that would emancipate the subject. 
The notion of reflection is therefore different from consciousness, because the latter 
‘projects systems, deductions, and conclusions, but reflection is always ready to relativise 
those conclusions once more. Reflection knows the individuality of the knower and of 
the known, so it is always ready to revise a standpoint as soon as it has reached it’ 
(Roberts, 2004: 69). The reflective attitude is therefore a way of retaining the critical 
faculties of the masses. It is contrary to objectification or an objectifying attitude, which 
is closely associated with a merely instrumental use of reason (Geuss, 2004: 119). The 
logic behind the critical theory, or its ‘cognitive structure’ as Geuss (1981: 55) calls it, is 
that it is reflective (it reflects on the social knowledge) and self-referential (it takes into 
account that critical theory is a part of (producing) such social knowledge as well). On 
the one hand, this means that critical theory is itself always a part of the world it 
describes and can itself be subjected to criticism (Geuss, 1981). On the other, it means 
that critical theory induces self-reflection in agents. With reflection ‘they come to 
reali[s]e that their own form of consciousness is ideologically false and that the coercion 
from which they suffer is self-imposed’ (Geuss, 1981: 61). In this way, critical theory 
helps agents see both that they hold an ideological world picture and also how their 
beliefs, consciousness and institutions are formed by it.  
 
The effect of a successful critical theory is enlightenment and possible emancipation. This 
means a social transition from an initial state of oppression or domination to a following 
state that is devoid of false consciousness. ‘Emancipation is not reduced to a formal 
possibility, but is viewed both as a matter of immediate struggle and a long-term goal’ 
(Antonio, 1981: 341). Despite this relatively narrow explanation, it is not always clear 
what is meant by emancipation. Emancipation can mean freedom from hunger and 
degradation or physical and social security; it can also mean juridical equality for 
oppressed people; or it can mean the expansion of democracy over markets and 
bureaucracies (Ray, 1993: viii). The members of the Frankfurt School must show that 
ideological beliefs are false in order to be able to achieve an emancipatory effect. The 
emancipation depends on the ability to make those who adopt it able to resist the 
pressure of the legitimate apparatus of society (Geuss, 1981: 94). The immanent critique 
depends on the possibility of emancipatory social change, which needs to be attainable 
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(Wyn Jones, 1999: 38). Emancipation is therefore not some utopian, unreachable goal of 
humanity, but something that can well be achieved in the present social circumstances. 
The feasible alternatives from which emancipation stems need to grow out of the 
immanent, and this is achieved through immanent critique (Toros and Gunning, 2009: 
99–100). Such emancipatory immanent critique aims at pointing to the possibilities for 
overcoming the contradiction between a crisis and ideals. This is not an idealist 
reduction because emancipatory immanent critique aspires to become a basis, not a 
substitute, for praxis (Antonio, 1981: 342). 
 
2.2 Critical Theory’s Architectonic Structure 
 
Critical theory as an intellectual tradition is ‘articulated in terms of a social scientific 
theoretical and research programme’ (Strydom, 2011: 8). It contains both theoretical 
and empirical understanding of the world. It has its own methodology, which will be 
discussed at the end of this chapter, and an architectonic structure that conditions and 
facilitates its methodology. Strydom (2011) identifies seven dimensions of critical theory: 
transcendental; dialectical; normative; ontological; theoretical; epistemological; and 
methodological. These dimensions constitute critical theory and give it a distinctive 
character. The word architectonic is here used with good reason. It is used in a similar 
way that Immanuel Kant used it in his book Critique of Pure Reason. He (1998: 691) writes: 
 
‘By an architectonic I understand the art of systems. Since systematic unity is 
that which first makes ordinary cognition into science, i.e., makes a system out of 
a mere aggregate of it, architectonic is the doctrine of that which is scientific in 
our cognition in general, and therefore necessarily belongs to the doctrine of 
method. Under the government of reason our cognitions cannot at all constitute 
a rhapsody but must constitute a system, in which alone they can support and 
advance its essential ends. I understand by a system, however, the unity of the 
manifold cognitions under one idea. This is the rational concept of the form of a 
whole, insofar as through this the domain of the manifold as well as the position 
of the parts with respect to each other is determined a priori. […] The whole is 
therefore articulated (articulatio) and not heaped together (coacervatio); it can, to be 
sure, grow internally (per intus susceptionem) but not externally (per appositionem), like 
an animal body, whose growth does not add a limb but rather makes each limb 
stronger and fitter for its end without any alteration of proportion’. 
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Critical theory, too, is understood to be a system in which its method plays an important 
part in determining whether critical theory forms a scientific system. The individual 
dimensions of critical theory can grow and be changed internally and together they 
form an articulated whole. 
 
The meaning of transcendental in the context of critical theory does not mean that 
critical theory transcends or surpasses all existing knowledge or conditions. Its meaning 
connects to the connotation that Immanuel Kant gives to the notion of the a priori 
knowledge. ‘Transcendental knowledge is concerned with identifying the mind’s 
contribution to our various modes of knowing, or more exactly with isolating the tacit 
knowledge that is put to work when we know anything’ (Kitcher, 2006: 48). That is to 
say that our knowledge is not dependent on our experience but can be deduced 
cognitively and with the help of transcendental or a priori conditions of possible 
experience. In Critique of Pure Reason, Kant (1998: 137) writes: ‘Experience teaches us, to 
be  sure, that something is constituted thus and so, but not that it could not  be 
otherwise’.14 Kant claims that empirical concepts can demonstrate their objective reality 
more easily than a priori concepts. Even though the latter type cannot do that so simply, 
they still must not be determined to be as usurpatory as fortune or fate and must be 
admitted to have some legitimate application to experience despite not having resulted 
from it (Guyer, 2010: 119–20). The first constitutive element of critical theory is thus its 
transcendental dimension. As Strydom (2011: 9) argues, transcendentalism 
fundamentally distinguishes critical theory from other types of social science such as 
empirical, realist, and interpretative social sciences. Human beings are often seen as 
‘practical, corporeal beings who engage with the world in a restricted number of ways 
which allow the opening up of different perspectives, interests in knowledge, categorical 
lines of questioning and constitution of corresponding objects of knowledge as well as 
intersubjective reflection in the form of argumentation or discourse’ (Strydom, 2011: 9). 
Critical theory, on the other hand, proceeds from transcendental knowledge which tries 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
14 Kitcher (2006: 48–9) writes: ‘To arrive at items of transcendental knowledge, we look for the conditions 
on which the possibility of experiential knowledge depends, and the key is to find what remains “if one 
abstracts from everything empirical in the appearances” (A 96). Hence the general feature of Kant’s 
“proofs” of the principles he hails as a priori lies in their starting with some form of knowledge and using 
some sort of abstraction or isolation method to strip away the contributions of experience and leave some 
element that could not have been supplied by experience’. 
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to expose the future possibilities for the improvement of the human socio-cultural 
environment.  
 
The dialectical critique treats the participants’ views of their practices dialectically: ‘the 
dialectical critique of reason does not abstractly negate ideas of reason but seeks 
critically to appropriate them and to enlist them in the struggle for a better world’ (Hoy 
and McCarthy, 1994: 20). This means that the dialectical dimension of critical theory 
represents some kind of a faculty of judgement, a possible resolution of contradiction: 
‘Dialectics probes […] between consciousness and being, subject and object. It did not, 
indeed could not, pretend to have discovered ontological first principles. It rejected the 
extremes of nominalism and realism and remained willing to operate in a perpetual 
state of suspended judg[e]ment’ (Jay, 1973: 54). A disputation, as Rescher (1977) calls 
the background of the dialectic, shows how the validating mechanisms of knowledge 
work. In dialectics, there is always a proponent, an opponent and a determiner who 
judges over the conduct of the dispute (Rescher, 1977: 5).  
 
Critical theory has a characteristically normative orientation. It does not stem from 
nowhere and has clearly set objectives, so it therefore also possesses a strong normative 
dimension that guides its actions and intentions. Critical theory’s normative dimension 
distinguishes it profoundly from other social sciences and theories: ‘Whereas empiricism 
potentially serves control, governance, planning and social engineering, and 
interpretativism the clarification of meaning and furthering of understanding, Critical 
Theory aims at enlightenment, emancipation and transformation, including self-
transformation’ (Strydom, 2011: 9). It is underlined with a normative basis which 
contributes to critical theory’s broader aim of ending oppression and social injustice, 
and realising freedom for all. Or, as Honneth (2007: 4) argues: ‘Since its primary task is 
the diagnosis of processes of social development that must be understood as preventing 
the members of a society from living a “good life,” it relies upon criteria of an ethical 
nature’. But before Honneth’s theory of recognition, critical theory lacked a more 
strongly elaborated normative foundation. Honneth transformed Horkheimer’s 
understanding of critical theory into something that will bring about emancipation to 
those who are wronged and oppressed. Critical theory must be able to answer a 
different kind of question, namely, the question of how ‘a moral culture could be so 
constituted as to give those who are victimi[s]ed, disrespected, and ostraci[s]ed the 
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individual strength to articulate their experiences in the democratic public sphere, 
rather than living them out in a counterculture of violence’ (Honneth, 2007: 78). What 
is more, Honneth suggests that critical theory must give an account of what is wrong in 
society – what the latter’s social pathologies and possible moral remedies are. Or, as 
Finlayson (2009) argues, for this to be possible, the normative position must be broadly 
moral.  
 
Understood broadly, ontology is concerned with the nature of being. And in this sense, 
critical theory assumes that social reality is socio-culturally organised ‘in an open-ended 
process of constitution, organi[s]ation, transformation and evolution’ (Strydom, 2011: 
10).15 Critical theory’s ontological dimension deals with the perception and structure of 
social reality. Social reality is not understood either in a functional, completely empirical 
nor solely normative manner: ‘This active, processual and temporal conception entails 
that society cannot simply be regarded as an empirical phenomenon made up, for 
instance, of regularities, as in empiricism, or of intentions and their expressions, as in 
interpretativism, but is to be treated as a complex that is dynamically structured by sets 
of rules and relations which are partly real yet hidden, non-empirical, unobservable and 
partly counterfactual’ (Strydom, 2011: 10). Critical theory focuses on structure 
formation, its stability and transformation, while privileging those moments of tension, 
contradiction or conflict in which structure formation becomes a problem or crisis-
stricken and therefore an at least potential issue with moral, ethical or political 
significance. If this issue is resolved through acceptable reasons, it could have a 
significant impact on the continuing process of constitution in a normatively adequate 
manner (Strydom, 2011: 10).  
 
The theoretical dimension of critical theory focuses on the fundamental features of 
social reality and the relations among its components. It adopts the form of social theory 
to deal with: (1) the relationship between theory and empirical research; (2) the 
relationship between theory and values or between scientific inquiry and moral !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
15 According to Postone (2004: 166): ‘Central to Critical Theory was the view that capitalism was 
undergoing a fundamental transformation, entailing a changed relationship of state, society, and 
economy. […] Whatever their differences, they all shared a fundamentally historical approach to 
questions of the state, law, politics, and economics. They did not accord ontological status to these 
dimensions of modern social life, but regarded political, legal, economic, and cultural forms to be 
intrinsically related, and sought to delineate their historical transformation with the supersession of 
nineteenth-century liberal capitalism by a new bureaucrati[s]ed form of capitalism in the twentieth 
century’. 
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judgement; and (3) the relationship between academic work and wider society, or 
between theory and politics (Turner, 2009: 4). Strydom (2011) emphasises critical 
theory’s multidimensional theoretical character and how different theoretical versions of 
critical theory can be distinguished between. The distinction depends on the choice of 
the prism through which the theorist posits critical theory’s ontology ‘in both a concrete 
situational and a situation-transcendent direction’ (Strydom, 2011: 11). One can 
differentiate between a reconstructive theory, on the one hand, and substantive 
historical-sociological or materialist theory on the other (Strydom 2011).  
 
The epistemological dimension of critical theory is one of its most important dimensions 
because it concerns ‘assumptions regarding access to reality, the process of cognition 
and knowledge production, the kind of knowledge sought of reality, the interest in 
knowledge guiding that search, the inferential modes at play in the acquisition of 
knowledge, and the intersubjective context in which knowledge is developed and 
justified’ (Strydom, 2011: 11). To this, one may also add history’s important relation to 
epistemology since immanent critique presupposes an understanding of how things 
stand in relation to tradition (Bronner, 1994: 262–3). ‘Critical theories differ 
epistemologically in essential ways from theories in the natural sciences. Theories in 
natural science are “objectifying”; critical theories are “reflective”’ (Geuss, 1981: 1–2). 
Strydom (2011: 12) calls critical theory’s epistemological position ‘pragmatic epistemic 
realism’: ‘It accepts that reality is knowable in principle but becomes visible only to the 
extent that we engage […] with it through confrontation with problems, threats or 
challenges, or impact on it through our activities or practices in such a way that we are 
compelled by the consequences to take it into account’. Reality is neither something that 
exists completely independently of us and nor something that is completely objective. 
Critical theory proceeds from a pragmatist assumption, namely, that we experience 
reality when we ‘run up against it under particular experiences and are compelled to 
form a concept or theory of it which could guide appropriate action; reality exposes us 
and we expose ourselves for the benefit of learning, problem solving and world creation’ 
(Strydom, 2011). Similarly, Hoy and McCarthy (1994: 139) also warn against 
preoccupation with theory and the isolated epistemological vocabulary of truth and 
reality, which forgets to focus on practice and presence.  
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Last but not least, the methodological dimension of critical theory plays an especially 
important role in understanding how critical theory works and produces knowledge in 
social research. The methodology must enable critical theory to criticise problematical 
or pathological states of affair with a practical effect in the real world. ‘The 
intersubjective testing and justification of theoretical knowledge and the explanation and 
critique made possible by it cannot be limited to the traditional positivistically conceived 
“context of justification” confined to the scientific community alone since, as both 
critical theorists […] and pragmatists […] understand, we are not dealing here with a 
purely intra-scientific process, but one which is social as well’ (Strydom, 2011: 13). 
Following Habermas, Strydom (2011: 14) designates critical theory’s methodology as 
‘critical theoretical objective explanatory hermeneutic reconstructionism’. Critical 
theory does not only critically interpret meaning but its methodological nature suggests 
‘the critical, interpretative reconstruction of real mechanisms in the context of the 
development of social structures in socio-historical process’ (Strydom, 2011: 14).16 
 
2.3 Immanent Critique and Immanent Transcendence: The 
Future is Always Already in the Present 
 
2.3.1 Immanent Critique  
 
Before discussing the concept of immanent transcendence, which is a key concept of 
critical theory (Strydom, 2011), we need to ask ourselves what immanent critique 
means. One of the models of critique is the immanent critique, the proponents of which 
were members of the Frankfurt School. ‘Immanent’ here means remaining within what 
is criticised. A transcendent critique could be at first glance understood to be the 
opposite of immanent critique, because something that is transcendent is usually 
contrary to the immanent. The former criticises an object from the outside, with its own 
appointed principles, whereas the latter ‘starts out from the principles of the work under 
discussion itself’ (Jarvis, 1998: 6). Therefore, immanent critique operates from the inside 
and it is precisely because of this that critical social theory is distinguished from other 
social theories: ‘The critique of unjust and oppressive social relations is neither unique to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
16 See section 2.4 on methodology. 
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critical theory, nor the defining feature of its orientation. Critical theory seeks to identify 
the potentials for emancipation immanent in the needs of subjects and aims to provide 
an analysis of contemporary society that apprehends its developmental possibilities’ 
(Browne, 2008: 7). Immanent critique is an essential characteristic of critical social 
theory: ‘It is a methodology that underpins theoretical diagnoses of contemporary 
society, based on its linking normative and empirical modes of analysis. Immanent 
critique distinctively seeks to discern emancipatory or democrati[s]ing tendencies’ 
(Browne, 2008: 5). It presumes that existing reality contains a reference to normative 
ideals, which can serve as an important basis to assess reality’s rationality (Bernstein, 
1994: 175). It does not appeal to some otherworldly ideals and pursue utopian promises 
that could only exist beyond humanity. 
 
The immanent or reconstructive critique is neither objectivist nor constructivist. It not 
only interprets existing principles in a new light but also employs ‘normative potentials, 
such as the potentials for a new society contained within workers’ practices of solidarity, 
or within the shared experience of oppression. These potentials transcend the agreed-
upon norms of a society, but are, in some way or another, nevertheless already 
“immanent” in social reality’ (Stahl, 2013: 534). This means that immanent critique 
always begins its criticism from within society’s conventional norms and beliefs or social 
practices. However, as Sabia (2010) argues, this does not mean that immanent critique 
is completely conservative since it supposedly tries to preserve established norms and 
standards. Rather, Sabia (2010: 698) claims that ‘immanent critique need not be hostile 
to the possibility and possible efficacy of universal or cosmopolitan norms thought to be 
grounded in some culture-independent form of reasoning or foundation, nor to equally 
ambitious norms admittedly grounded in some alien culture’.  
 
Central to the programme of immanent critique is the critique of ideology. Ideology 
distorts social reality by legitimising existing irrationalities and thus makes their own 
claims to truth and rationality – it acknowledges that reality should conform to certain 
normative ideals (Bernstein, 1994). It is the task of the critique of ideologies to unmask 
the discrepancy between reality and its ideals (Bernstein, 1994: 175). In doing so, 
immanent critique also embraces an explicit normative dimension and it is not value-
free. It does so through highlighting the incongruity between societal beliefs and actual 
reality (Gotham, 2007: 96; Gross, 2009: 132). It does not reject the world-as-it-is but 
Chapter 2: The Conceptual Sources of 
Critical Theory and Its Methodology 
 
!
- 44 - 
instead drives the factual reality toward its own highest possibilities, and seeks to turn 
mere potentiality into actuality (Gross, 2009: 132). 
 
2.3.2 Immanent Transcendence  
 
Immanent transcendence is the mechanism or methodology by which immanent 
critique operates. The concept will be briefly introduced here, with the emphasis put on 
its relation to the methodology of critical theory, but it will be more closely looked at in 
the fourth chapter. Firstly, a few distinctions must be made, namely, between the world 
and practices within the world, and between pragmatic presuppositions of 
communication/action and idealised pragmatic forms standing in tension-laden relation 
to one another within the world (Strydom, 2011: 97). The latter distinction means the 
dialectical difference between the world as it is and the world as it could be, and is 
normatively underpinned. These basic distinctions, as Strydom (2011) calls them, lay 
down the outer parameters of the concept of immanent transcendence and the basic 
framework of critical theory. Specifically, the world consists of real (experience, 
phenomenological, material world) and idealised dimensions, and therefore practices in 
the social world are driven and changed both by pragmatic presuppositions as well as 
transcendent ideas of reason. Pragmatic (materialist) presuppositions and transcendence 
inform on one another and together they build ground for ethical and political 
aspirations. This is how immanent transcendence works; its essence is in looking at both 
tangible, existing conditions and the imagination that stems from these conditions. 
 
The world or socio-historical situation consists of three axes: the decisive one concerns 
the normative quality of the situation that is captured by the concept of immanent 
transcendence (the difference between the pragmatic presupposition of practices and the 
idealised presupposition of ideas of reason); the second is agency-structure or lifeworld-
system which constitutes the world as a dynamic, structured action situation; and the 
third axis covers the scope and depth levels of the situation (from micro to macro). 
‘[E]stablishment of transcendent pragmatic forms is achieved through social or 
discursive construction involving fantasy, reflexivity, distantiation and generali[s]ation 
or universali[s]ation. The resulting normatively potent ideas of redirection of the process 
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produced by the actions and practices and of the reali[s]ation to some degree of the 
normative import guiding it’ (Strydom, 2011: 100). 
 
What is the ontological status and the consequent regulative function of transcendent 
ideas of reason? One must bear in mind that transcendent ideas are not the only ones 
possessing regulative function in society. Pragmatic forms or socio-practical ideas also 
play a regulative role in social life (Strydom, 2011: 101). So, if ideas of reason want to 
possess a regulative role, a balance between wholly transcendental and completely 
material extremes must be found. Not just balance, a transcendental project must 
specifically stem from material reality and take into account its socio-historical 
configuration in order to achieve social transformation. Stahl (2013) also argues that 
within immanent criticism there is a hermeneutic-type strategy that deals with accepted 
norms and beliefs, and there is a practice-based strategy that deals with social practices. 
There can of course be antagonism between immanent pragmatic presuppositions and 
transcendent counterfactual ideas, which results in tension-laden relation. The latter can 
be resolved in the actual situation only ‘through action and practices of various kinds, 
depending on circumstances including social interaction, practical discourse, problem 
solving and transformative collective action, which in the best-case scenario serve as the 
vehicle of collective learning’ (Strydom, 2011: 102). This can be conceived of as a 
process of practical realisation of the potential of ideas of reason. ‘It proceeds by way of 
both problem solving and world creation, which are necessary for the constitution and 
organi[s]ation of society’ (Strydom, 2011: 102). I would not argue that the relationship 
between the transcendent and immanent is necessarily tension-laden. It seems to me 
that the two inform on and need each other, and that the immanent or the immediate 
life is truly lived only if it is oriented towards what is yet to be, an idealised form of life 
(Haynes, 2012: 15). 
 
However we look at the relation of immanence and transcendence, there must be a 
medium through which the practical realisation of reason’s ideas take place, and that is 
usually communication. ‘Both Critical Theory and pragmatism stress that it is necessary 
for the critique or knowledge they produce to be publicly tested or verified, yet the 
implied communicative framework making it possible is never adequately clarified’ 
(Strydom, 2011: 103). The third-person perspective is often neglected, but the public is 
necessary for the establishment of the epistemic authority of the emerging rules or 
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structures: ‘It represents the party […] who observes and monitors the participants by 
evaluating, judging and commenting on their communication and behaviour; thus 
exerting a significant influence on the definition of reality and the related decision 
making that emerges from the joint communicative process’ (Strydom, 2011: 104). 
Critical theory cannot just appeal to unfulfilled normative claims in the existing social 
reality as concrete evidence for the necessity and justifiability of critique (Strydom, 2011: 
104). The relation between immanence and transcendence must be understood in terms 
of a deeper dimension of social reality, where the latter means an abiding form of 
human engagement, experience, interests or practices which simultaneously makes 
social reproduction possible and points beyond all forms of social organisation (Strydom, 
2011: 104). As has been mentioned earlier, previous variations of critical theory 
anchored their critical engagement in labour, human drives, communication and 
recognition. 
 
Finally, critical theory can offer a practically significant critique if it successfully explains 
blockages or distortions of the immanent realisation of transcendent ideas of reason. 
The factors which prevent the practical realisation of reason’s ideas must be identified in 
order to be surpassed. Such factors or threats cause problems and crises, and therefore 
usually possess a negative character; but critical theory must recognise in them also their 
positive role – namely, when identifying such forces, the structures and knowledge of 
reality are exposed. It is therefore crucial for the project of immanent transcendence 
that it engages in pinpointing to structural and other problems.  
 
2.4 Critical Theory’s Methodology 
 
One of the main vulnerabilities of critical theory is to the question of its scientific status 
(Morrow and Brown, 1994). Therefore, methodology is a very important aspect of 
critical theory that needs to be closely investigated, because it is a source of critical 
theory’s credibility and at the same time provides critical theory with a research 
programme. Critical theory has always stressed the need for linking theory and practice 
(Forester, 1987), and this reflects also in its methodology. Despite the interdisciplinarity 
of critical theory’s project, sociology has a strong case for centrality because it deals with 
problems of society as a whole (Morrow and Brown, 1994: 12). It is in a way similar to 
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what C. W. Mills (1959: 11) calls sociological imagination: ‘The sociological imagination 
enables its possessor to understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning for 
the inner life and the external career of a variety of individuals. It enables him to take 
into account how individuals, in the welter of their daily experience, often become 
falsely conscious of their social positions’. This is something that critical theory deals 
with and its methodology tells us how this is done. 
 
The concept of immanent transcendence, which was introduced in the previous section, 
represents the core of the methodological structure of critical theory (Strydom, 2011: 
135). It dictates the way critical theory operates. Immanent transcendence consists of 
historically accumulated socio-practical reason and does not embody only some 
normative idea that resides outside of existing society. Rather, it is ‘emphatically 
regarded as always already operative in structuring social life by directing and guiding 
or potentially critically regulating social practices to some degree and in some way’ 
(Strydom, 2011: 135). Methodologically, then, the concept of immanent transcendence 
guides critical theory to focus on the dialectical tension between social practices and 
cultural models, that is, between social reality and transcendent ideas of reason 
(Strydom, 2011). Besides immanent transcendence, reconstruction is another concept 
that is crucial for the methodology of critical theory, and that mediates between 
immanent and transcendent (Strydom, 2011: 135). While immanent transcendence 
formulates the general methodological structure, reconstruction specifies the 
methodological direction of critical theory. This direction can be designated as 
‘reconstructive explanatory critique’ (Strydom, 2011: 136). Critical theory’s research 
programme thus consists of combining a metatheoretical approach with a concrete set 
of empirical explanatory problems (Morrow and Brown, 1994: 86). 
 
The function or methodological implication of immanent transcendence in critical 
theory’s methodology is threefold.17 First, reconstruction identifies and makes explicit 
the structuring force of both pragmatic presuppositions and possibilities of the concrete 
situation, and the ideas of socio-practical reason, expressed in cultural models. 
Reconstruction transforms and relates the immanent interpretative moment and the 
transcendent constructive moment in such a way that the reconstructive-interpretative !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
17 These three implications will be illustrated in the eighth chapter where the application of critical 
cosmopolitanism is made. 
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and the reconstructive-constructive moments support the taking of a critical view both 
of the concrete situation and of its normative framework (Strydom, 2011: 136–7). 
Therefore, reconstruction does not mean something final but requires reiteration in the 
form of moral revising of the move from immanent to transcendent. Reconstruction 
could perhaps be seen as more connected to the transcendental (because it identifies 
ideas of reason and structures of life such as communication or recognition) but it has an 
important role also within the immanent. Specifically, the role of reconstruction is to 
indicate the relevant possibilities in the actual situation and is therefore based on pre-
theoretical knowledge. Reconstruction or reconstructive science is somewhere between 
purely empirical and transcendental. It rejects absolutist foundationalism and dogmatic 
antifoundationalism and, rather, tries to link is and ought in such a way that social 
analysis becomes connected to ethical imperatives (Morrow and Brown, 1994: 152–3). 
For instance, if cosmopolitanism claims that the rights and the needs of the marginalised 
(in whatever way) are not adequately recognised and realised, it is making an empirical 
claim. However, in such an empirical claim there is also a normative one, which implies 
that which ought to be. Reconstruction can do this in two forms of critique – a negative 
exposing and a positive disclosing critique: 
 
‘Immanent reconstructive critique takes a negative form in targeting what is 
amiss with the self-understanding of actors, their orientations, practices, 
relations and institutions, and a positive form in disclosing new possibilities, 
interpretations, orientations, modes of organi[s]ation, or protest or 
transformative potentials available in the situation. Transcendent reconstructive 
critique takes a negative form in exposing distorted, ideological, naturali[s]ed or 
reified and such features of socio-practical ideas of reason or cultural models, 
and a positive form in disclosing surpluses of meaning contained in ideas of 
reason or cultural models that are ignored, only partially or selectively used in 
practice or not recogni[s]ed at all’ (Strydom, 2011: 137–8).  
 
The second methodological implication of the concept of immanent transcendence 
refers to the theoretical significance of the concept and its explanatory ability. It 
concerns not only a concrete situation in the social world but also an instance of a force 
deeply rooted in concrete social life that determinedly exerts pressure towards 
transgressing, transforming and overcoming the status quo (Strydom, 2011: 138). 
Recognising a concrete problem in social reality is followed by an explanation which 
identifies the interferences causing that specific problem. For instance, the insufficient 
rights of the marginalised is a concrete problem in today’s world, and an explanatory 
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critique’s task is to find the interferences or blockages that are causing and upholding 
such a situation. It looks at the reconstructed structures and tries to find normative 
forces that have been corrupted. In the case of the rights of the marginalised the 
corrupted normative force would be deficient recognition, for instance. An example of 
an explanatory critique is, for instance, a genealogical critique which claims that power 
relations not only distort knowledge but that knowledge is rooted in power relations 
(Morrow and Brown, 1994: 135). 
 
The third methodological implication of the concept of immanent transcendence is the 
nature of the socio-historical situation. This means that different contexts need to be 
taken into account methodologically in approaching a social situation that represents 
the object of critical theory (Strydom, 2011: 142). A situation is structured across three 
dimensions. First, immanent transcendence constitutes the normative dimension of the 
situation to which critical theory gives priority. Second, the lifeworld-system or agency-
structure dimension represents the dynamic temporal dimension of the situation. And 
third, the micro-meso-macro dimension is the spatial dimension that captures the scope 
and depth of the situation. All these need to be taken into account when criticising an 
actual situation in social reality. This is because knowing the different dimensions of 
reality is very important methodologically. The dimensions stretch from the superficial 
empirical level, through the objective level of the actual concrete situation and its real 
structuring or generative mechanisms, to the level of reality as validated and collectively 
accepted as such (Strydom, 2011: 146). These dimensions also presuppose a particular 
engagement with reality. For instance, a social conflict affects the knowledge producer 
who undergoes sensations and has a vague perception of the situation. This qualitative 
impression opens up an access route to the object, and finally, the resulting concept, 
theory formation, critique and explanation are tested and validated in the 
communication community (Strydom, 2011: 149).  
 
2.4.1 Application of Methodology  
 
Critical theory’s methodology mirrors the processes of knowledge and meaning 
production which form social practices whereby society is created and reproduced. As 
part of these social practices, critical theory contributes to problem-solving and world-
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creation to the extent that it is communicatively connected with its addressees (Strydom, 
2011: 152). Strydom (2011) therefore develops three interrelated (through mediation 
and interpretation) methodological moments, which can, among other things, serve as a 
basis for demonstrating an application, and which will be used later in the thesis when 
making an application of cosmopolitanism as critical theory.  
 
The first of these methodological moments is ‘problem disclosure and constitution’. The 
methodological priority is given to problems, crises, pathologies and threats, and this is 
where the process of critical theorising begins. However, critical theory does not 
commence its investigation simply with an arbitrary problem or some given challenge.18 
It ‘depends on some occurrence, development or change in the objective context of life 
or society itself to give rise to a phenomenon of some kind that offers those involved a 
glimpse of a relevant structural or generative aspect of social reality and thus a 
privileged access route to acquire an understanding of it’ (Strydom, 2011: 152). An 
instance of suffering, expression of moral indignation, resistance, struggle, conflict or the 
like opens up the possibility of gaining knowledge of the structural mechanisms 
generating social reality. When such knowledge is gained, the erroneous or taken-for-
granted assumptions that build social reality are revealed and a new perspective on 
social reality is recognised. Knowledge production is connected to practice, and not only 
certain problems or conflicts are disclosed but also new perspectives on the possible 
structuration or production of reality open up (Strydom, 2011: 154). The world gets 
disclosed in a way that may begin a formation of new experiences, action and 
knowledge. To be able to do this, one needs to employ relational thinking, which 
connects agents and structure, micro and macro perspectives, and immanent and 
transcendent dimensions of social reality. Opening up reality to scrutiny is the main goal 
of the first methodological moment. Problems, crises, deformations and pathologies are 
identified and prepared for an adequate critique. An example of such problem 
disclosure would be the study of social pathologies which prevent people from living a 
‘good life’ (Honneth, 2007). Examples of social phenomena would be depersonalisation, 
commodification, alienation and so on. These have become social living conditions 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18 Critical theory allows us to make selective choices about what is regarded as an ‘appropriate’ problem 
to tackle. Following the concept of immanent transcendence, there is a preference towards ‘problems 
arising in the wake of the deformation or prevention of the historical process of the actual social 
reali[s]ation of reason’ (Strydom, 2011: 152). 
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which prevent human beings’ self-realisation. Such damaging social reality is in need of 
an analysis, both normatively and critically. 
 
The second methodological moment is the so-called ‘diagnostic reconstructive 
explanatory critique’ which means an engagement with critical theory’s object. Whereas 
the first methodological moment focuses on some quality of reality, the second one shifts 
to the identification of the problem in question in the context of the real social situation. 
The engagement with the object requires, firstly, a diagnostic analysis; secondly, 
reconstruction that involves both reconstructive explanation and critique; and thirdly, 
explanatory critique (Strydom, 2011: 158). The diagnosis begins with a comprehensive 
description (micro-macro, agency-structure, lifeworld-system dimensions) of the actual 
social situation. However, critical theory is not just interested in describing the actual 
situation but also in the structures and mechanisms that generate it. This is where not 
only description but also reconstruction is needed. Reconstruction, as discussed earlier, 
identifies and makes explicit structuring and generating forces. It can be employed in a 
genealogical manner. In this way, a corrupted normative idea can be made explicit. 
What precisely is reconstructed is dependent on what is recognised as the immanent 
force rooted deeply in concrete social life (labour, communication, recognition, for 
instance), which aims at transforming the status quo. Reconstruction also needs to relate 
the reconstructed immanent and transcendent structures of the situation in a manner 
that shows how they mutually contribute to the constitution of the social practices. The 
reconstructive explanatory model is methodologically important in two ways: ‘first, it 
forms a basis for a reconstructive critique of the situation and, second, it opens the way 
for the culmination point of the second moment of Critical Theory’s methodology, 
namely explanatory critique’ (Strydom, 2011: 157). Explanatory critique has the task of 
accounting for whatever causes the social pathology. It focuses on what explains the 
problem, namely the real causal structure or mechanism representing the deforming 
factor or blockage that could be transformed to allow a more adequate and justifiable 
practical reali[s]ation of socio-practical rationality’ (Strydom, 2011: 158). Explanation in 
such a critique is of a ‘postempiricist’ type, which means that it not only empirically 
depicts a situation and without resorting to common sense to make sense of it,19 but that 
it also tries to avoid such interpretivist reductions. There are two types of explanatory !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19 Critique should not only be concerned with empirical practices, because becoming absorbed only in 
micro analysis can lead to a loss of focus for macro analysis (Delanty, 2011: 71). 
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critique or two explanatory strategies. The first one assumes a causal form, and the 
second one is more related to understanding (Verstehen) (Morrow and Brown, 1994: 249). 
The former identifies the generative mechanisms that underlie the historical production 
of a studied phenomenon; and the latter involves identification of empirical regularities 
as embodied in the narrative structures of texts and actions. 
  
The third methodological moment works with the outcome of the first and second one, 
and it is called ‘scientific-public validation and practical application’. It is 
communicatively mediated and thus publicly oriented. What has been discovered in the 
second methodological moment needs to be subjected to (scientific) validation, which 
means that it needs to go through discursive practice and argumentation. This 
validation does not have consequences only in the scientific context; it also has social 
and public significance since critical theory contributes to problem-solving and world-
creation in society. By undergoing the validity procedure, critical theory moves away 
from adopting a possible dogmatic position, and exposes itself to criticism and testing 
(Strydom, 2011: 158–60). Critical theory engages in communication as a form of action 
because it ‘communicates an ethical orientation for action, a context-transcendent 
reference point, a norm to follow in order to attain a problem-solving or world-creating 
goal which in some sense entails self-transformation and the transformation of reality’ 
(Strydom, 2011: 160). Critical theorists expose the questionable, taken-for-granted 
assumptions about social practice to the public. Everyday social practices do not change 
quickly, but with enough patience and critical stamina, such systemic critics can and do 
contribute to social transformations. In the end, it all depends on how the public 
receives and accepts constructive criticism and contributions to the moral development 
of societies, and how these contribute to the beginning of self-transformation.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, conceptual sources of contemporary critical theory have been studied. 
In the first part, an overview of the concepts that form early critical theory and set the 
foundation for its tradition was made. The discussion began with the Frankfurt School, 
and autonomy, reflection and emancipation were identified as the core and 
fundamental concepts of critical theory. The second part discussed seven unique 
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dimensions that structure critical theory, and the third part dealt with the key concept of 
immanent transcendence. It was shown that the latter not only shapes the distinctive 
character of critical theory, but that it is also instrumental to its methodology and the 
way critical theory functions. The last part of the chapter showed that a conceptualised 
sense of critical theory’s methodology is possible despite its usual fragmented and 
disunited character. 
 
The next chapter will focus on a particular strand of critical theory, that is, Axel 
Honneth’s critical theory and his conceptualisation of recognition. Recognition and thus 
Honneth’s critical theory seem especially similar to cosmopolitanism in the way that 
they both possess a strong normative dimension that helps them identify people’s plights 
as well as structural factors that prevent people from leading good lives. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ELEMENTS AND METHODOLOGY OF AXEL HONNETH’S 
CRITICAL THEORY 
 
xel Honneth is a critical theorist of the third generation of the Frankfurt School, 
and his normative project continues this tradition and at the same time 
importantly enhances it. Even though his critical theory does not form a coherent 
system, this chapter will nonetheless try to illuminate those elements of his theory that 
seem the most fundamental and constitutive of his thought. The aim is to understand 
how his critical theory works as well as what its goals and principles are. Such systematic 
exposition of Honneth’s critical theory will give us an understanding of how and why it 
is different from preceding types of critical theory, as well as prepare the ground for 
further study of cosmopolitanism as critical theory. In this way, we will come to know 
which elements should be present in cosmopolitanism if we are to link it with Honneth’s 
theory. The chapter starts with an analysis of the central approach that forms the basis 
of Honneth’s critical theory, that is, social philosophy; and continues, following Deranty 
(2011), with identifying his theory’s three main dimensions: normative, social and 
political. The chapter ends with an investigation of Honneth’s methodology, where most 
importance is given to the concept of immanent transcendence. 
 
3.1 Social Philosophy as the Core of Critical Theory 
 
To define what social philosophy exactly means or does is rather difficult. It is not an all-
encompassing theory or well-established discipline, but one that is actually always 
‘incomplete, relatively open and, therefore, […] temporary, theoretically “imperfect”, 
“non-systematic” and vulnerable’ (Morkūnienė, 2004: 1). Nevertheless, social 
philosophy has an object of investigation, goals, functions, and methods of its own, and 
it is therefore distinct from other disciplines (Morkūnienė, 2004). We could (albeit, 
somewhat simplistically) argue that contemporary social philosophy possesses two main 
functions: first, it analyses social phenomena in theoretical terms; and, second, it 
articulates principles that play the role of methodological criteria in evaluating social 
A 
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progress and serve as a basis for action (Morkūnienė, 2004: 7). However, the principal 
exceptionality of social philosophy lies somewhere else. Namely, it looks for those 
occurrences in the social world that are often neglected by other disciplines, but it is 
nevertheless so important that without social philosophy’s work, other similar disciplines 
would not be able to exist.20 Or, as Morkūnienė (2004: 17) puts it: ‘Social philosophy 
can begin asking the kind of questions which others might overlook, and it appreciates 
the fact that there are no strictly technical solutions for any of the social problems. The 
fundamental principles of social philosophy allow one to see the new forms, potentials 
and human developments that others do not see’. 
 
Axel Honneth bases his critical theory on the subject of social philosophy. In his book, 
Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory (2007), he explicates the development 
of this field of study, identifies its current precarious situation, and therefore tries to 
counteract the latter by defining social philosophy as being concerned with ‘processes of 
social development that can be viewed as misdevelopments […], disorders or “social 
pathologies”’ (Honneth, 2007: 4). Whereas in a Hobbesian understanding of the social 
world, the focus is set on questions of self-preservation and maintaining the social order, 
in social philosophy these shift to questions of the good life and the ethical dimensions of 
our social lives. Special importance is given to distinguishing between not only what is 
just and unjust, but also and especially under which conditions human beings can 
flourish.21 Honneth (2007: 4) sees Jean-Jacques Rousseau as the founder of the tradition 
of social philosophy, a tradition that emphasises self-realisation instead of mere self-
preservation. This means that if one wants to identify what is wrong or unjust in society, 
one must focus on those processes of social development that prevent members of 
society from flourishing and living a good life (Honneth, 2007: 4). Justice is therefore not 
something that only pertains to legal and moral principles that form a purportedly 
impeccable order of justice. In this way, understanding of justice is expanded – it 
includes consideration of the social conditions that make justice possible and those that 
make it impossible (Deranty, 2009: 320). Justice is therefore understood in the context of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
20 As Gaus (1999) understands it, social philosophy sets the ground for political and legal philosophy, as 
well as links ethics with political philosophy. He (1999: xiii) writes that ‘it [social philosophy] is not 
concerned with what is of value, with personal ideals, or with the evaluation of people’s lives and 
characters. Its subject matter is those moral standards that can be justified to all, and that regulate social 
life among strangers’. 
21 Honneth (2007: 5) argues: ‘Unlike political philosophy, it [social philosophy] would no longer seek out 
the conditions of a correct or just social order, but instead would attempt to ascertain the limitations that 
this new form of life imposed on humans’ self-reali[s]ation’. 
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social life, and not only as normatively correct if pertaining to chosen moralities: ‘Social 
philosophy in this sense therefore entails a critique of the social-cultural order based on 
the idea that fateful directions in the development of modern society lead to distortions 
of human potentials and capacities, and produce socially induced suffering’ (Deranty, 
2009: 321). Honneth’s understanding of social philosophy in this way therefore 
profoundly impacts upon his account of critical theory, its object and methodology.  
 
As it is clear by now, critical social philosophy does not address distortions in social 
development simply in terms of a binary distinction between justice and injustice. To do 
so would mean to appeal to certain norms that unmistakably distinguish between what 
is just and unjust, but at the same time limit the understanding of why such distortions 
happen at all and what their consequences are. Social philosophy approaches the 
question of justice differently, that is, with a much broader understanding of what 
constitutes justice. It not only focuses on the criteria of justice/injustice (which can often 
be very narrowly defined and concern only redistribution, for instance), but expands its 
research scope by investigating social phenomena in their particularity.22 The benefit of 
conducting research into social pathologies in this way can be summarised in two points: 
first, it brings to light the distorted social or institutional practices that led to injustice in 
the first place; and, second, it understands suffering in a much wider sense and therefore 
detects those forms of suffering that do not necessarily breach the principles of justice 
but nevertheless exist and are felt by subjects (Varga and Gallagher, 2012: 244).  
 
The main task of social philosophy as a critical social theory is therefore to identify those 
social developments that can be deemed to be social pathologies – that is, being not only 
unjust but foremost preventing people from leading and living a good life. In order to 
identify such distortions of social life, social philosophy needs to possess a strong 
normative framework, on the basis of which it judges potential pathological social 
developments (Varga and Gallagher, 2012: 245). What exactly is meant by good life is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
22 Sen (2009) distinguishes between two understandings of justice, the second of which seems to be very 
similar to the one of social philosophy. He presents an approach to justice, with emphasis given to the 
actual lives of human beings, and not to institutions or norms. He focuses on the lives that people are able 
to lead under certain conditions. The aim of one of the understandings of justice is to identify perfect and 
just social institutions for a given society. Such theory of justice can be named the ‘contractarian 
approach’ or ‘transcendental institutionalism’ (Sen, 2009: 5), because the idea is about a social contract 
and its institutions that would ensure social justice. On the contrary, a ‘comparative approach’ is aimed at 
‘making the comparisons between different ways in which people’s lives may be lead, influenced by 
institutions but also by people behaviour, social interactions and other significant determinants’ (Sen, 
2009: xvi). 
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of course very difficult, if not impossible, to outline. But the truth is that social 
pathologies can only be discovered if we already have an idea of which conditions are 
necessary for human self-realisation and how these conditions are constituted (Honneth, 
2007: 34). Such a normative guideline in Honneth’s critical theory is the ‘feeling of 
injustice’. Since domination and oppression do not always appear in overt forms, it is 
necessary to acknowledge such a normative guideline that is able to overcome the 
structural prevention of suffering becoming explicit. It is important to know that the 
feeling of injustice is not some arbitrarily chosen personal feeling, and that it does not 
point to some ‘vague malaise, or a superficial psychological discomfort or irritation’ 
(Deranty, 2009: 318). Rather, it points to a breach of some normative dimension that 
injured the subject’s dignity, and that a subject consequently experiences as an injustice. 
Not all suffering is of course also injustice. But when suffering, be it physical or of 
another kind, carries also some normative content and is disrespectful to a person’s or 
group’s dignity, then such suffering can be considered as misrecognition. Domination 
and exploitation understood in terms of misrecognition or a denial of recognition result 
in denying ‘the moral value of the person, her integrity, rights or social value’ (Deranty, 
2009: 318).23  
 
To emphasise the distinctiveness of the area of social philosophy, it is perhaps useful to 
contrast it with social theory and understand the main difference. Social theory usually 
begins its task with studying social reality and phenomena, and then drawing theory 
from it and theorising about it. On the other hand, social philosophy starts with 
theorising and remains at the level of theory, where it studies and clarifies the concepts 
used by social theory (Deranty, 2009: 332). Honneth’s most important question in this 
regard is therefore how ‘to obtain the conceptual framework for an analysis which is 
capable both of coming to grips with the structure of social domination as well as with 
identifying the social resources for its practical transformations’ (Honneth in Pedersen, 
2012: 634). Honneth uses recognition as a critical normative concept which is 
constructed for empirical analyses giving these investigations simultaneously a 
normative and a descriptive function – the task of social philosophy is therefore to 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
23 Deranty (2009: 322) identifies concepts that diagnose social pathologies and the destruction of those 
conditions that are necessary for human flourishing. Critical theorists have used different concepts, such 
as alienation, bifurcation, reification, nihilism, rationalisation, anomie, discipline, colonisation of life-
worlds, and misrecognition. 
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reconstruct critical normative concepts and make them appropriate for empirical use 
(Pedersen, 2012: 636). 
 
3.2 Historical and Normative Underpinnings  
 
As Deranty (2011) claims, the model of Honneth’s critical theory rests on a historical-
conceptual thesis about modernity. Modernity and normative progress within it are 
understood to be a historical fact, which means that Honneth sees modernity and the 
development of communities as moral progress. In such modern societies, social values 
and norms are not of transcendent origin anymore but are constructed in accordance 
with individual freedom and essential norms of value plurality (Deranty, 2011: 60–1). 
Honneth sees post-traditional communities as those that harbour and uphold these 
norms, and make democratic political life possible as well as guard the freedom of 
individuals. The debate of what community means, and what role is ascribed to it in 
relation to an individual is particularly lively among so-called liberals and 
communitarians. Each of these holds their own definition and priorities when it comes 
to the debate about community vs. individual. However, despite the differences in their 
viewpoints as to what is more important in society, Honneth claims that they do agree 
on one thing – that community must possess a normative character: 
 
‘If we take a look at the current confrontation between liberals and 
communitarians, we will quickly reali[s]e that most of the representatives of both 
positions appear to have reached agreement on an essential point: without a 
certain degree of common attachment to overarching values, i.e., without what 
we might call a social community of value or, to take a less freighted term, a 
form of cultural life, a democratic society’s ability to function cannot be 
guaranteed’ (Honneth, 2007: 254).  
 
The integration of society no longer occurs via top-down values, that is, values that were 
imposed on society from above, either from some religious leaders or other political and 
authoritarian figures. Such metaphysical, strict norms were once indisputable, but in 
modernity the contestation over what norms should govern and form societies has 
become more overt and common. According to Deranty (2011: 61), a double structural 
transformation occurs: first, social integration does not happen vertically, ‘along the 
hierarchical scale of values and norms’ anymore, but horizontally through conflict of 
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plural value statements competing for the recognition as valid ways of achieving the 
ethical aims; and second, while obtaining social esteem a process of individualisation 
occurs (Deranty, 2011: 61) because each individual is seen in his or her particularity. 
The ethical values get pluralised so acquiring the social status is no longer a matter of 
group possession (Deranty, 2011: 61). 
 
The paradigm of recognition is a historical fact. Honneth (2007: 80) sees the link 
between normative theoretical intention and historically situated morality as a central 
issue of critical theory. He argues that both Adorno and Marcuse were unable to 
imagine a morality that arises from socio-structural conflicts, whereas he identifies the 
morality in struggles for recognition. In short,24 the full identity of a subject is formed 
only through all three practical relations to oneself, that is, self-confidence, self-respect 
and self-esteem. These can be acquired only intersubjectively and depend on the 
establishment of relationships of mutual recognition: relationships of love, legal relations 
of respect, and relations of solidarity (Anderson in Honneth, 1996: xi–xii). These 
relationships are not just ahistorically prearranged, but have had to be established 
through social struggles (Honneth, 1996). Honneth (1996) specifically emphasises that 
these struggles are not just utilitarian in nature and they do not just happen because of 
the certain interests of people. If we understood social conflicts, struggles and aspirations 
only in terms of peoples’ interests, then the motivational factor would not be as strong – 
people rarely gather in groups and struggle for social change if only pragmatic interests 
are at play. Therefore, rather, Honneth explains such struggles in terms of moral 
feelings. Human beings encounter each other with some expectations for mutual 
recognition. Our moral experiences are consequently the basis of our social interaction 
and feelings of disrespect or injustice can therefore lead to collective action if they are 
experienced by ‘an entire circle of subjects as typical for their social situation’ (Honneth, 
1996: 165). 
 
Critical theory needs to possess a strong normative point of view that points to a 
desirable end-state. The latter does not have to be or, even, must not be an absolute and 
exclusive imposition from above, but has to be a less rigid, more democratic endeavour 
to build a better social world. Honneth understands such a desired end-state in the so-
called ethical or good life. In this way, he departs from the Kantian understanding of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
24 The paradigm of recognition will be more thoroughly explored in the fifth chapter. 
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morality, that is, the understanding of the moral autonomy of individuals, but, focuses, 
rather, on the conditions that make self-realisation of subjects possible. To avoid an 
authoritarian, historically particular conception of a good life, he (1996: 171–3) avoids 
identifying substantive values that should form a good life or a society, but rather stays 
on a formal or abstract enough level in order not to endorse any particular 
interpretation of good life. 
 
‘Rather, it has to do with the structural elements of ethical life, which, from 
the general point of view of the communicative enabling of self-reali[s]ation, 
can be normatively extracted from the plurality of all particular forms of life. 
To this extent, insofar as we have developed it as a normative concept, our 
recognition-theoretic approach stands in the middle between a moral theory 
going back to Kant, on the one hand, and communitarian ethics, on the other. 
It shares with the former the interest in the most general norms possible, 
norms which are understood as conditions for specific possibilities; it shares 
with the latter, however, the orientation towards human self-reali[s]ation as an 
end’ (Honneth, 1996: 172-3). 
 
Honneth derives his conception of such post-traditional, postmetaphysical, democratic 
ethical life from both early Hegel and Mead. He follows and in a way advances these 
two authors’ ideas in envisioning a society ‘in which the universalistic achievements of 
equality and individualism would be so embedded in patterns of interaction that all 
subjects would be recogni[s]ed as both autonomous and individuated, equal and 
particular persons’ (Honneth, 1996: 175). The relations of recognition are one of the 
ways in which this can be achieved. Through instances of recognition, subjects can 
attain their self-realisation, which is a precondition of fulfilled ethical life. And since 
relations of recognition are never ahistorical but develop precisely from within, in 
accordance with and through specific historical occurrences, the conception of ethical 
life, too, is historically grounded yet formal enough to retain its impartiality.25 Such a 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25 Petherbridge (2013: 168) writes: ‘Such an orientation towards ethical values is, however, not intended 
to provide a substantive notion of the “good life.” Rather, Honneth wants to account for a notion of 
ethical life in formal terms only: the three interdependent patterns of recognition are intended to account 
for successful self-reali[s]ation in an abstract manner in an effort to avoid embodying particular visions of 
the good life. The anthropological structures of recognition are intended to provide a context-
transcending claim to validity that is universally applicable regardless of historical or socio-cultural 
context. The forms of recognition associated with love, rights, and achievement as Honneth presents 
them, therefore, “do not represent established institutional structures but only general patterns of 
behaviour, they can be distilled, as structural elements, from the concrete totality of forms of life.” 
Honneth suggests such a theoretical proposal cannot expect to determine once and for all which values 
might constitute an ethical life. The development of substantive values must be left open to historical 
change and to the future of social struggles’. 
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formal conception of ethical life, which is expressed and realised through relations of 
recognition, offers a much broader understanding of what needs to be fulfilled in order 
for subjects to lead a good life. If we only speak of, for instance, individual autonomy, it 
gives us few guiding points of how to build an ethical life. Especially conventional 
theories of justice often focus only on redistribution of goods in order to supposedly 
ensure individual autonomy and enable one to lead their life as they wish. Honneth 
(2012: 39–50) thinks that such procedural theories of justice are not ambitious enough in 
considering what makes up a just social order. On the contrary, recognition possesses 
strong normative underpinning as well as fulfilling intersubjective conditions that are 
necessary for individual self-realisation. Autonomy is a relational entity and it is 
achieved intersubjectively (Honneth, 2012: 41). Honneth’s ‘own means of articulating 
the necessary structural conditions for a formal concept of ethical life is provided by the 
connection he makes between the necessary experience of the three forms of 
intersubjective recognition, the three corresponding forms of self-relation, and the forms 
of social organisation required to ensure successful self-realisation’ (Petherbridge, 2011: 
16). 
 
3.3 Social and Ontological Elements  
 
A strong social dimension is a very important element of Honneth’s critical theory.26 He 
argues that previous critical theorists have all tended to marginalise it,27 and therefore 
his critical theory embodies a strong account of the social. The latter is much needed in 
order to be able to understand the reproduction of society through conflicts between 
social groups, which are themselves the products of members’ struggles (Anderson, 
2011: 48). He has been critical of the inclination to measure the apparent ‘health’ or 
‘sickness’ of a society only in terms of the yardstick of rationality – the problem with 
such a perspective ‘is that pathologies that do not pertain to the cognitive dimensions of 
human beings cannot come to light at all, thereby resulting in a one-dimensional 
philosophical anthropology and an inadequate basis for social critique’ (Rundell et al., 
2004: 15). Honneth (1991: 100) thinks that it is thus important for critical theorists to !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26 Honneth thinks that the social should supply critical theory with normative and practical orientation 
(Baynes in Honneth, 1991: ix). 
27 Honneth (1991: 100) claims that ‘critical theory seems to have renounced the theoretical possibility of 
determining whether, and to what degree, social groups actively participate in the integration of society’. 
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take into account the struggles of social groups and he illustrates the reason with the 
following analogy: 
 
‘A conception of critical theory that is connected to the disciplines of political 
economy and psychoanalysis in a merely external manner loses sight of the 
everyday cultural action of social groups in the same way that a 
psychoanalytically supported concept of the totally administered society loses 
sight of the consensual basis of administrative domination. Both ignore the 
cognitive and moral synthetic accomplishments of which social groups are 
capable through the cooperative interpretive efforts of their members’. 
 
Of course, as Anderson (2011: 49) warns, a question remains as to how progressive 
group struggles for recognition are. However, Honneth is fairly optimistic about how 
such agonistic events propel progressive historical development. Nevertheless, the main 
point in arguing that critical theorists should take into consideration the social when 
evaluating the condition of society is that it offers one a much broader perspective into 
why and how pathologies occur. One also needs to take into account that both 
subjectivity and rationality cannot be studied in their isolated form anymore, but must 
be understood as being constructed intersubjectively and therefore their development be 
dependent on other people and other factors. 
 
Honneth’s critical theory embraces the intersubjectivistic turn proposed by Habermas 
(the detranscendentalisation of a subject), though he extends and further develops 
Habermas’ paradigm of communication (Petherbridge, 2011: 5). While he endorses the 
move from instrumental to communicative reason, Honneth nevertheless does not 
ground his theory of intersubjectivity in linguistics like Habermas does, but instead bases 
it on recognition. As Petherbridge (2013: 14) observes, the difference between 
Habermas’ and Honneth’s project is that whereas the former mostly analyses speech, 
the latter understands intersubjectivity more anthropologically in terms of subject-
formation. Intersubjectivity thus becomes an entirely new understanding of the social. 
Crossley (1996: 173) defines intersubjectivity as a generative principle of our identities, 
agency and society: ‘We are inter-subjects. Our actions and thoughts aren’t reducible to 
us alone. They are moves in a game which has many players, responses to a call to 
action which is expressed in every gesture of the other. And their significance is precisely 
constituted through their place in that game’. Crossley (1996: 174) further thinks that to 
talk about intersubjectivity means to actually talk about social life: 
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‘To think about intersubjectivity and to tackle the problems it poses as a 
concept is to confront the very question of social life itself. It is to unpick the 
fabric of social life and to wonder how it ever fits together in the first place, 
how we ever manage to coordinate ourselves through time and space, sharing 
thoughts and meanings, agreeing enough at least to disagree. It is to wonder 
what thought, meaning and action actually are, such that they can be shared 
or joint. It is to wonder how the human organism can ever be involved in 
anything which transcends its spatial boundaries. These are not just academic 
questions, even if they have a strong academic aspect. They are ultimately also 
existential questions about our very being (my being and your being 
particularly). To confront the question of intersubjectivity is to consider the 
type of beings that we are and the sort of world to which we belong. 
 
As Deranty (2009: 136–7) argues, we need to distinguish between two different 
dimensions of intersubjectivity which are essential for Honneth and stem from Husserl’s 
writings: ‘First, “intersubjectivity” designates the special problem of the constitution of 
the meaning of others, the mystery of the apperception of another body as a lived, 
intentionally enlivened organism. Secondly, intersubjectivity designates more generally 
the “intersubjective community” in which the ego is always already embedded and 
which already appears with the primordial forms of intentionality, at the level of passive 
genesis’. So, on the one hand, intersubjectivity refers to our perception and constitution 
of the Other and, on the other hand, it denotes the nature of the community where 
subjects are formed and conditioned by it. Besides different dimensions of 
intersubjectivity, the latter also possesses several meanings. Deranty (2009: 146–50) 
distinguishes its meanings with regards to 1) perception, 2) the Other, 3) the social, and 
4) communication. Intersubjectivity as a perception understands the objective world as a 
consequence of multiple perspectives. Secondly, intersubjectivity can also be understood 
as an ethical encounter with the Other. In the realm of the social, the emphasis is given 
to the understanding of how a subject develops his or her autonomy in contexts that are 
always already pre-constituted. And lastly, intersubjectivity is connected to the 
communicative, where the focus is on the organisation of agents’ actions through a 
process of communication that ideally results in understanding (Deranty, 2009: 150). 
 
Intersubjectivity consists of the ‘dimensions of sharing and commonality that are 
constitutive of the objective world’ (Deranty, 2009: 137). Though sharing and 
commonality are important aspects of intersubjectivity, we must also emphasise that 
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intersubjectivity and plurality28 of the world are closely interconnected as well. The 
world is intersubjective when it is fabricated through people’s thinking, actions, 
judgements and relations with other people. In this way, we construct our social and 
political world while the world also poses some conditions on us. Plurality is one such 
consequence, for instance. Whatever we do or make in the common world, we have to 
realise that we live together with other people. This is a political conception of plurality 
that allows us to re-establish the common world. The social world and its constitution 
are no longer understood through subject-object relations but through subject-subject 
relations.  
 
For Honneth, practical relations-to-self (self-confidence, self-respect, and self-esteem) are 
‘not a matter of a solitary ego appraising itself, but an intersubjective process, in which 
one's attitude towards oneself emerges in one's encounter with an other's attitude toward 
oneself’ (Anderson in Honneth, 1996: xii). The self in Honneth’s critical theory is 
therefore intersubjectively conceptualised, in which the possibility of an undistorted 
relation to oneself proves to be dependent on three forms of recognition: love, rights, 
and esteem’ (Honneth, 1996: 1). In this respect, he follows Hegel in asserting that the 
recognition of one’s individuality can only be achieved intersubjectively (Honneth, 1996: 
17). Such recognition of individuality does not only comprise of the recognition of the 
individual’s autonomy but also of the individual’s specific needs as well as particular 
capabilities (Honneth, 2004: 363). In connection to that, Honneth (2009: 25) 
understands social pathologies as deviations ‘from the ideal that would be achieved with 
the social actuali[s]ation of the rational universal’ and at the same time as the ‘loss of 
prospects for intersubjective self-actuali[s]ation’. The concept of recognition actually has 
a double meaning – it accounts both for the individual’s self-formation or self-realisation 
and ‘more encompassing forms of sociali[s]ation and social institutions’ (Petherbridge, 
2013: 81). Recognition’s normative foundation is grounded anthropologically by 
intersubjective conditions, which are the prerequisites for identity-formation and self-
realisation on the one hand, and the development of ethical life on the other 
(Petherbridge, 2013: 81). 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
28 As Arendt (1978: 19) beautifully writes: ‘Nothing and nobody exists in this world whose very being does 
not presuppose a spectator. In other words, nothing that is, insofar it appears, exists in the singular; 
everything that is meant to be perceived by somebody. Not Man but men inhabit this planet. Plurality is 
the law of the earth’. 
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3.4 Political Aspects 
 
Honneth’s critical theory also carries a strong political connotation. As has already been 
mentioned in the previous section, the fact that Honneth builds his theory on a very 
political understanding of the social world, that is, through intersubjectivity, already 
attests to the political underpinning of his critical theory. The main two political goals or 
two political ideals of his critical theory are even greater autonomy of individuals and at 
the same time the elimination of oppression (Deranty, 2011: 70). Like in the Frankfurt 
School tradition, Honneth also focuses his research on finding the emancipatory interest 
within social reality. He looks for the possibility of emancipatory struggle and critique 
within the realm of everyday human experience, rather than in the detached, radical 
theory of intellectuals (Anderson in Honneth 1996: xi).29 He does not look for sources of 
emancipation in often inaccessible ideals of reality, but is committed to locating it in 
precisely those conditions, phenomena or reason that have hitherto blocked it. If our 
rationality is distorted by capitalist society we need to start to administer therapy 
precisely where the pathology began: ‘The forces that contribute to the overcoming of 
the social pathology are supposed to stem from precisely that reason whose 
actuali[s]ation is impeded by the form of organi[s]ation present in capitalist society’ 
(Honneth, 2009: 36). Honneth draws the idea from Freud and acknowledges his 
significance for critical theory: ‘It is from his psychoanalytic theory that Critical Theory 
takes the thought that social pathologies must always express themselves in a type of 
suffering that keeps alive the interest in the emancipatory power of reason’ (Honneth, 
2009: 36). 
 
The political aspect of Honneth’s critical theory is also expressed in the way he theorises 
subjectivity. Subjects are perceived as active and responsive agents that are capable of 
using their rationality to make changes in society. ‘Without a realistic concept of 
“emancipatory interest” that puts at its center the idea of an indestructible core of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
29 Petherbridge (2011: 2) writes: ‘For the critical theorist to avoid claiming a privileged or paternalistic 
position, the emancipatory instance or experience that compels social change must be identified within 
the existing social order and must be of the same normativity or rationality that becomes manifest in new 
forms of social organisation. A pre-theoretical interest must “be regarded as a moment of socially 
embodied reason insofar as it possesses a surplus of rational norms or organizational principles that press 
for their own reali[s]ation”. For Honneth this pre-theoretical condition is identified in a recognition-
theoretical stance that provides the normative ground from which critical assessments of social life can be 
made’. 
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rational responsiveness on the part of subjects, this critical project will have no future’ 
(Honneth, 2009: 41–2). People have an interest in their own emancipation – such 
interest is namely ‘entailed in the intersubjectivistic premise: if individuals, as 
intersubjectively constituted, are intersubjectively vulnerable, it follows that the subjects’ 
interest in avoiding suffering entails the interest in freeing themselves from the social 
conditions causing their suffering’ (Deranty, 2011: 71). This intersubjective constitution 
of a subject has for its consequence the ‘communicative liquefaction of the ego’, which 
means that the subject constantly moves from inner and outer reality in order to explore 
and find new aspects of his or her identity (Petherbridge, 2013: 158). In this way, that is, 
understanding subjectivity in communicative terms, the subject’s possibilities are 
pluralised, as is his or her identity.  
 
As Pilapil (2013: 49) acknowledges, the violation of recognition can be a strong 
motivation for political resistance, but at the same time he warns that this link is not 
necessarily so direct and obvious. The creation and development of political resistance 
are very complex and to claim that personal experience of disrespect automatically leads 
to political resistance is a bit too far-fetched. Of course the feeling of being disrespected 
or denied recognition must not only happen to an individual but must be something that 
is felt on a group level. Only when a group of people is marginalised and they can find a 
way to express their suffering together and publicly can the collective demand for 
recognition begin. Pilapil (2013: 58) puts it well when he argues that the birth of political 
resistance depends on many factors and is a result of different actions, relations and 
structural possibilities: ‘engaging in political resistance cannot be regarded as the 
spontaneous effect of social or moral suffering. The emergence of any political struggle 
does not only depend on the existing political or institutional climate but also on the 
existential conditions in which political actors find themselves’.  
 
Honneth’s search for pre-theoretical emancipatory interest reflects his methodological 
commitment to intramundane or immanent transcendence. His form of transcendence 
in social immanence is the surplus of recognition that any society should attempt to 
achieve because it always fails at recognition in some regard – and such reasoning is not 
only theoretical in nature but also constitutes a political option (Deranty, 2011: 70). 
Here, the inseparability of theory and practice in critical theory are nicely exposed: 
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‘The “interest in emancipation” is therefore the practical interest of those who 
suffer from oppression, and also the shared practical interest, with specific 
theoretical implications, of the actual theorist. […] theory needs to be 
developed and judged according to the viability of its link to its ultimate 
ground, social reality and its emancipatory impulse. The validity of this link 
must be tested in both theoretical and practical terms’ (Deranty, 2011: 70). 
 
This interest in emancipation can occur in so-called post-traditional communities, 
where social goals and ideals can be contested on a horizontal level. Traditional societies 
were hierarchically organised which meant that the norms and values were set in a top-
down way. However, when a society is horizontally organised this means that everyone 
participates in constructing societal values. This consequently opens up the possibility 
for contesting the understanding of social norms, values and statuses – such horizontal 
extension of values can lead to either new kinds of oppression or to more individual and 
communal emancipation (Deranty, 2011: 71). And the second possible source or 
explanation for emancipatory interest lies in intersubjectivity. As mentioned before, 
intersubjectively constituted individuals are also intersubjectively vulnerable, meaning 
that it is in their interest to preserve their integrity and avoid suffering. 
 
The political aspect of Honneth’s theory has another important role. It does what 
previous critical theorists overlooked with their own paradigms: it is ‘true to the 
hermeneutics of injustice, that is, the full range of experiences of social suffering. It is not 
the conceptual deficiencies in Marx, Adorno/Horkheimer and Habermas that demand 
the establishment of a new paradigm, but their failure to respond accurately and 
exhaustively to the full range of social suffering’ (Deranty, 2011: 72). 
 
An important political aspect of Honneth’s critical theory is also the way in which he 
understands the role and characteristics of a community. Despite the commonalities he 
shares with communitarians, Yar (2003) emphasises Honneth’s shared ground with 
communitarian critics as well. He argues that the struggle for recognition arises from the 
subject’s experience of a lack of community, since a community offers subjects ‘a 
generalised social recognition of their selfhood, […] participation in the forms and 
practices of mutual affirmation and […] self-realisation’ (Yar, 2003: 123). Community is 
therefore of vital importance for subjects’ self-realisation. Such understanding of the 
community’s role could be perceived as communitarian, and to a certain extent it 
probably is, but at the same time it also speaks against conservative communitarianism. 
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If we illustrate this with an example that Yar (2003: 124) provides, we can see this quite 
clearly. Black people’s struggles and demands for the affirmation of their culture and 
history can be seen as the struggle ‘oriented toward the expansion of community as a 
practice of recognition, extending it into a more inclusive form which responds more 
fully to social subjects’ desire-for-selfhood’. As Yar observes, this goes against some 
communitarians’ belief that would see such political practice as something that threatens 
the coherency of a community. The point is that Honneth’s critical theory, based on 
recognition, offers an account of a community where solidarity, singularity and critique 
can coexist. Honneth’s understanding of communality, according to Yar (2003), is in 
short characterised by the following dimensions: empirical phenomenology; not denying 
particularity of subjects; and understanding community as a structure of multiple 
relationalities. 
 
Social solidarity in Honneth is understood in a similar manner, somewhere between 
liberal and communitarian theories (Pensky, 2011: 137). Modern societies cannot rely 
on religious or other imposed norms for social integrity anymore, but need to find ways 
for social integration elsewhere. Honneth understands solidarity as a sphere of 
recognition (esteem) and as an increasing expansion of the possibilities for personal self-
realisation and its corresponding demands for recognition (Pensky, 2011: 151). ‘The 
capacity to register the expansion of possible modes of life as a fulfilment of a justified 
normative expectation is itself more fully constitutive of a “shared set of social goals” 
than any number of efforts, well intentioned or not, to reanimate older ethical bonds’ 
(Pensky, 2011: 153).  
 
3.5 Honneth’s Methodological Approach 
 
As mentioned in the second chapter, a methodology for critical theory is a very 
important feature that needs to be carefully considered, because it gives critical theory a 
sense of credibility and provides it with a research programme. Honneth’s aim is to 
analyse society in such a way and with such concepts that we are able to understand the 
normative potential of socially oppressed groups. This shows Honneth’s main 
methodological objective ‘whereby not only the empirical but even the conceptual 
guidelines of critical social theory would be found in the experiences of social suffering 
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and injustice’ (Deranty, 2009: 101). Critical theory has always stressed the need for 
linking theory and practice (Forester, 1987), and this is reflected also in its methodology. 
We could therefore say that the tradition of critical theory relies on the same 
methodological standard, where ‘the theoretical relies on a practical interest and can in 
turn inform this interest towards its political realisation’ (Deranty, 2011: 85). Honneth’s 
method is teleological (Deranty, 2011: 75) and also reflective in reconstruction. The 
approach to solving any social theoretical problems involves the reconstruction of 
previous theoretical attempts at solving it – such a method implies a definition of 
scientific truth as the history of the errors that have led to it (Deranty, 2011: 75). 
Methodologically this means that one’s own position must be submitted to critical 
scrutiny with the understanding that it might be fallible. For this reason, Honneth’s 
reflective methodology is a form of immanent critique since the empirical and 
conceptual criteria used in reconstruction are constructed and accepted by theorists 
themselves (Deranty, 2011: 76). 
 
Honneth embraces the methodological turn that happens with the introduction of 
anthropology and sociology into historical studies. He (1996: 166) claims that such a 
form of historiography is able to perceive ‘more broadly and more accurately the 
normative presuppositions of the way lower social classes engaged in conflict’ and that it 
not only looks at the collective pursuit of interests. In this way, theorists obtain 
knowledge of everyday life’s struggles and the moral norms that are involved in those 
actions. Honneth (2002: 500) admits that his thinking was shaped by the methodological 
attitude of philosophical anthropology which takes an empirical approach in reflectively 
analysing the structures of the lifeworld.30 If struggle for recognition is to be seen as a 
critical framework for judging the ethical development of societies then we need a 
theoretically justified normative point of view that guides these struggles. Moreover, if 
such a normative point of view exists, it must point to an end-state that subjects caught 
up in struggles aim to achieve through their efforts to expand relations of recognition. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30 Honneth (2002: 501) sees the connection between philosophical anthropology and social theory in the 
normative conditions for social integration: ‘individuals can become members of society only by 
developing, via the experience of mutual recognition, an awareness of how rights and duties are 
reciprocally distributed in the context of particular tasks. In this way, the use of the concept of recognition 
allows the normative implications that are necessarily inherent in every social theory to emerge from both 
directions: from one direction, individual opportunities for a positive relation-to-self depend on conditions 
that are social in character, since they comprise normatively regulated forms of mutual recognition; from 
the other direction, a given society’s chance of meeting with the uncoerced support of its members 
depends on its ability to organi[s]e the relations of recognition in a way that enables the individual 
development of those positive forms of relation-to-self’. 
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Therefore, claims Honneth (1996: 171), the normative theory must clarify its 
methodological status in order to enable it to depict the hypothetical end-state – and this 
can be done with the concept of the good or ethical life. The good life consists of three 
patterns of recognition which are abstract and formal enough not to promote a specific 
idea of the good life. On the other hand, says Honneth (1996: 174), the three patterns 
still explicate well enough what a successful life is or at least better than the general 
claims of individual self-determination. Recognition in the realms of love, rights and 
solidarity provides intersubjective protection of an individual’s freedom, which allows 
the subject to realise his or her life-goals. These three patterns or relationships help us to 
identify the social pathologies. Since they are not ‘established institutional structures but 
only general patterns of behaviour, they can be distilled, as structural elements, from the 
concrete totality of all particular forms of life’ (Honneth, 1996: 174). Methodologically, 
Honneth identifies an empirical social pathology, and finds in it theoretical instances of 
recognition breaches which then point to structural impediments that lead to social 
injustices. Therefore, an interesting methodological aspect of Honneth’s critical theory is 
his method of connecting a theory of justice with the diagnosis of social pathologies 
(Honneth and Markle, 2004). He uses an ‘empirically informed phenomenology’ 
(Honneth, 2002: 500).  
 
The concept of immanent transcendence represents the core of the methodological 
structure (Strydom, 2011: 135) of also Honneth’s critical theory. He also thinks that the 
dialectical method of intramundane or immanent transcendence is the defining 
characteristic of critical social theory (Petherbridge, 2013: 11). He first uses the Hegelian 
method that reconstructs a normative standpoint immanent within a certain social 
practice but then goes beyond Hegel to locate in this standpoint the potential for 
transforming and transcending existing social roles within contemporary society 
(Honneth and Markle, 2004: 383). In this case, reconstruction mediates between 
immanent and transcendent, a process that can be called reconstructive explanatory 
critique (Strydom, 2011: 135–6). Honneth, too, ‘normatively reconstructs critical 
concepts which are then used to generate empirical investigations; empirical insights will 
in their turn inform and specify the reconstructively developed concepts’ (Pedersen, 
2012: 634). For instance, if Honneth’s critical theory claims that rights and needs of the 
marginalised (in whatever way) are not adequately recognised and realised, it is then 
making an empirical claim. However, such an empirical claim also gestures to a 
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normative one, in the way it implies that which ought to be. Reconstruction can achieve 
this through two forms of critique – the negative exposing and the positive disclosing 
critique. It first exposes what is wrong, and then offers solutions for it and discloses new 
possibilities of dealing with the issue. Therefore, reconstruction or reconstructive 
critique is somewhere between the empirical and transcendental, and never final 
because this move from immanent to transcendent needs constant revisions in order not 
to be dogmatic or too relativistic so that it can be in line with ethical laws. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has identified the main elements of Honneth’s critical theory. Taken 
together, these elements distinguish it from previous types of critical theory and set its 
distinct agenda and methodology. It begins with a different understanding of the social 
world, that is, it emphasises individuals’ self-realisation and therefore the ethical 
dimensions of our social lives. This means that it understands justice more broadly than 
simply in terms of principles of what makes something just/unjust. It seeks to identify 
those conditions under which human beings can flourish. In this way, such a theory can 
recognise social pathologies in places where before they were overlooked or not deemed 
important enough.  
 
Critical theory needs to possess a strong normative point of view that points to a 
desirable end-state, which Honneth’s theory does via a formal conception of ethical life. 
The latter can be achieved through the relations of recognition, which ensure an/the 
individual’s equality as well as particularity. A second strong element in Honneth’s 
critical theory is comprehension of the world in intersubjectivistic terms. These connote 
our mutual interdependence and dependence on one another, as well as the joint 
formation of our objective world. This already points to the political element of his 
theory, where the potential emancipatory interest can be located. These three 
dimensions of Honneth’s theory are interrelated and sometimes overlap. The normative 
can be found in the social and the political, the political can be located in the 
intersubjectivistic understanding of the social world, and so on. 
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The next chapter looks at one of the constitutive and most distinct methodological 
elements of Honneth’s critical theory, that is, the concept of immanent transcendence. 
Presupposing that cosmopolitanism and Honneth’s critical theory have a strong 
correlation in this concept, the next chapter will also look more closely at immanent 
transcendence in cosmopolitanism. 
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CHAPTER 4 
IMMANENT TRANSCENDENCE IN COSMOPOLITANISM 
 
‘Man’s position in the world is defined by the fact that in every dimension of his 
being and behavio[u]r he finds himself at every moment between two 
boundaries. This condition appears as the formal structure of our existence, 
filled always with different contents in life’s diverse provinces, activities, and 
destinies. We feel that the content and value of every hour stands between a 
higher and a lower; every thought between a wiser and a more foolish; every 
possession between a more extended and a more limited; every deed between a 
greater and a lesser measure of meaning, adequacy, and morality. We are 
continually orienting ourselves, even when we do not employ abstract concepts, 
to an “over us” and an “under us”, to a right or a left, to a more or less, a tighter 
or looser, a better or worse. The boundary, above and below, is our means for 
finding direction in the infinite space of our worlds’ (Simmel, 2010: 1). 
 
hereas the second chapter dealt with the concept of immanent transcendence 
in a more systematic way, this chapter will look at the notion of immanent 
transcendence and its meaning for the social and political world, and in connection to 
cosmopolitanism and transformation within the cosmopolitan imagination. Immanent 
transcendence is inherent to cosmopolitanism and it is something that underpins social 
change. In this chapter, I will explore what types of immanent transcendence can be 
found in critical cosmopolitanism and how they relate to certain social change, be it 
between subjects, the world or the self. 
 
This chapter will try to explicate the concept of immanent transcendence within critical 
cosmopolitanism, and try to show how it is manifested or expressed. The chapter begins 
with an exploration of the terms transcendence and immanent transcendence in a 
number of key philosophical and sociological texts. The second part of the chapter 
explores the substance of the concept of immanent transcendence, and it is followed by 
the third part, where the focus is on immanent transcendence within cosmopolitanism. 
Three types of immanent transcendence in the context of cosmopolitanism will be 
explored, which I call dialogical, disclosing and self-transcendent. The dialogical 
underpins critical cosmopolitanism and points to the growth of a moral sense and 
mutual recognition between human beings (Inada, 2008). The cosmopolitan condition 
W 
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emerges out of encounter, exchange and dialogue rather than by the assertion of 
predetermined truths (Delanty, 2012). It is therefore important to look at that 
transcendent aspect of cosmopolitanism which promotes the coexistence of different 
expressions of truths and thus creates the possibility of sharing the common ground of 
existence among previous strangers. The second type of immanent transcendence in 
critical cosmopolitanism, the disclosing, pertains to cosmopolitanism’s ability to expand 
the imagination and consequently our sense of reality. It is a way of seeing that 
illuminates and discloses formerly hidden aspects of the object. The third type is self-
transcendence or self-transformation, which means that a subject is capable of self-
scrutinising with regards to the Other, and going beyond or altering boundaries 
between the Self and the Other. This categorisation of immanent transcendence in 
cosmopolitanism is of course not fixed or final. There may be more types and the three 
mentioned here have porous borders, because each of them partly occurs also in the 
other two. For instance, without openness for dialogue, disclosing transcendence and 
self-transcendence would hardly be possible. 
 
4.1 Transcendence and Immanent Transcendence in 
Philosophical and Sociological Texts 
 
It was Immanuel Kant who first conceived of or invented the term transcendental 
philosophy. In his Critique of Pure Reason Kant criticises dogmatic metaphysics, on the one 
hand, and on the other tries to establish a positive doctrine of the a priori elements of 
human knowledge (Guyer and Wood, 1998: 5). Transcendental in this context thus 
means that which does not directly involve empirical cognition, but denotes the 
possibility of our experience of empirical objects by examining the mental capacities 
that one must possess in order to have any cognition of empirical objects at all (Guyer 
and Wood, 1998: 5). That is not to say that humans possess some sort of inborn 
knowledge that is common to all, but that our cognitive faculties play an important role 
in conceiving of material objects and are thus a part of experience. One cannot grasp an 
object only with one's senses; to fully understand and experience something, there must 
be some a priori cognition that is independent of experience:  
 
‘Now what is especially remarkable is that even among our experiences 
cognitions are mixed in that must have origin a priori and that perhaps serve only 
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to establish connection among our representations of the senses. For if one 
removes from our experiences everything that belongs to the senses, there still 
remain certain original concepts and judgements generated from them, which 
must have arisen entirely a priori, independently of experience, because they 
make one able to say more about the objects that appear to the senses than mere 
experience would teach, or at least make one believe that one can say this, and 
make assertions contain true universality and strict necessity, the likes of which 
merely empirical cognition can never afford’ (Kant, 1998: A2).  
 
For Kant, time and space are empirically real yet transcendentally ideal, which means 
that it is only from a human standpoint that we can speak of time, space and the 
spatiotemporality of objects. We can perceive or know these things not as they are in 
themselves but only as they appear under the conditions of our sensibility (Guyer and 
Wood, 1998: 7–8). This is Kant’s transcendental idealism.  
 
Simmel (2010: 9) argues that transcendence is immanent to life’s essence and 
constitutive of its being. The eternally felt conflicts in life are an indicator of the essence 
of life, as they demonstrate one capable of setting one’s own limits by reaching out 
beyond them: ‘life is at once fixed and variable; of finished shape, and developing 
further; formed, and ever breaking through its forms; persisting yet rushing onward; 
bounded and free; circling around in subjectivity, yet standing objectively over things 
and over itself’ (Simmel, 2010: 10). Life is made up of boundaries – boundaries that 
limit our lives but also boundaries that can be transgressed: ‘The inherent displaceability 
and displacement of our boundaries means that we are able to express our essence with 
a paradox: we are bounded in every direction, and we are bounded in no direction’ 
(Simmel, 2010: 2). We know31 the boundaries because we set them ourselves and as such 
they can be changed, moved, removed. They are not set in stone and do not only limit 
our lives but also direct us to search for life beyond them: 
 
‘Our imagination and primary apprehension stake our areas from the infinite 
fullness of reality and the infinite modes of apprehending it, probably so that the 
magnitude of stimuli that are thereby delimited suffices as a basis for our 
practical conduct. But this very reference to such boundaries shows that we can 
somehow step over them, that we have stepped over them. Concept and 
speculation, construction and calculation induce us to move beyond the world !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31 According to Simmel (2010: 2): ‘Yet the essential fluidity of our boundaries immediately implies or 
signifies something further: that we also know our boundaries as such – first the particular boundaries and 
then the general ones. For only someone who stands outside his boundary in some sense knows that he 
stands within it; that is, knows it as a boundary at all’. 
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that we have, so to speak, in sensible reality, thereby revealing this world to us as 
bounded, by enabling us to look at its boundaries from the outside. Our 
concrete, immediate life posits an area that lies between an upper and a lower 
boundary; but consciousness of this account depends on the fact that life has 
become more abstract and advanced, thus transcending its boundary, and 
thereby confirming the reality of a boundary. Life holds the boundary fast, 
stands on this side of it – and in the same act stands on the other side of it and 
views it simultaneously from within and from without. The two aspects belong 
equally to its establishment, and just as the boundary itself partakes of both its 
“this side” and its “that side,” so the unified act of life includes both boundedness 
and the transcendence of boundary, despite the fact that this, considered as a 
whole, seems to present a logical contradiction’ (Simmel, 2010: 3).  
 
I include this lengthy quote to show that immanent transcendence is indeed possible and 
that it is the very essence of our lives. Boundaries, once they are recognised, are at once 
transcended – if we recognise that there is this side, we at the same time acknowledge 
the other side. We do not simply stand within the boundary, but by virtue of our 
awareness pass beyond it: ‘That we ourselves know our knowing and not-knowing, and 
that we again know this more embracing knowledge, and its infinite potential – this is 
the real infinity of the mind’s vital movement. Every limit is herewith transcended, but 
of course only through the fact that it is set; that is, that there exists something to 
transcend’ (Simmel, 2010: 5). 
 
In relation to time, Simmel (2010: 8) also believes that life should not be understood as 
something that exists only in the present, but as something that forms a unity with the 
‘not-yet’ of the future. Human beings anticipate, have hopes, plan, and project far into 
the future and the development of their lives therefore largely depends on the possibility 
of imagining the future. Such temporal transcendence32 of the present or immanence is 
for that reason an essential part of life itself: ‘Its unique continuity is sustained outside of 
this separation – its past actually exists into its present, and its present actually exists out 
into its future. This mode of existence is what we call life’ (Simmel, 2010: 8). 
 
In the phenomenological/existentialist tradition, we can refer to Jean-Paul Sartre and 
Edmund Husserl whose notions of transcendence differ but can nevertheless be 
mentioned here as stemming from the same tradition. Husserl claims that an object is 
immanent if all parts are a part of a single conscious experience. On the other side, an !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
32 The meaning of temporal transcendence (Haynes, 2012) will be discussed later in the chapter. 
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object that is transcendent always possesses something or some aspects that exceed 
particular experience (Richmond, 2004: vi). Sartre follows Husserl’s claims but adds that 
Ego is also transcendent and that it cannot be completely perceived by the consciousness 
– Ego is not ‘an “inhabitant” of consciousness […] it is outside, in the world; it is a being 
in the world, like the Ego of another.’ (Sartre, 2004: 1). One type of transcendence is 
especially significant in the existentialist tradition, and that is self-transcendence. The 
latter is related to the individual’s freedom and becoming. It is a process of self-
surpassing and (limited) creativity, and the ability of the self to see itself and its situation 
as a project and a perspective of possibilities (Haynes, 2012: 88). To simply submit 
oneself to what already exists (to bare immanence) is in a sense ‘inhuman’, since it 
repudiates one’s freedom. Heidegger (in Chen, 2004: 51) claims that to strive for self-
transcendence is not just a wish to realise ourselves, but foremost an ontological 
condition of the authenticity of being: ‘In self-transcendence, a self is full of aspiration to 
a future and is a part of its future and its future is a part of its present’ (Chen, 2004: 51). 
Sartre’s claim is similar: he distinguishes between being-in-itself, which is identified with 
what is here and now, and being-for-itself, which is characterised by a lack of such self-
identification. The latter does not manifest itself as self-alienation but as the self’s 
relentless transcending of its present condition (Chen, 2004: 51). 
 
4.2 This-Worldly Immanent Transcendence 
 
The world in modernity faced an eclipse of the divine. The disenchantment of the world 
leads to upholding only the immanent, but to only speak of the world’s immanence can 
give rise to emptiness, meaninglessness and possible nihilism.33 If the silence of the 
imagination is reduced to a mere object, this potentially signals the collapse of the 
imagination in the face of that which we cannot transcend (Gosetti-Ferencei, 2010: 290). 
On the other hand, Gilles Deleuze (in Haynes, 2012) argues that there is only 
‘immanent Life’ and nothing exterior to it. He thinks that all transcendent concepts 
establish their standpoint out of immanence, from where they dictate what Life should 
be, and are therefore absolute and resistant to critique. But is it not true then that the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
33 Bellah (2011: 9) calls this ‘dreadful immanence’ and argues that transcendence is very much needed in 
individual’s life: ‘For the world of daily life seen solely as a world of rational response to anxiety and need 
is a world of mechanical necessity, not radical autonomy. It is through pointing to other realities, through 
beyonding, that religion and poetry, and science too in its own way, break the dreadful fatalities of this 
world of appearances’. 
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processes of imagination and aspirations for the better become very limited? Life in its 
immediacy cannot be truly lived without aspiring towards an ideal that is yet to be 
(Haynes, 2012: 15). The immanent and transcendent must therefore necessarily be 
conceived of as working hand in hand – without immanence, transcendence becomes 
too abstract, or even empty, and radical immanence stays on its own, which in ontology 
means the loss of ethics, the remaining of ‘an “is” without “ought”’ (Schwartz, 2004: x):  
 
‘While we have been told that there is no otherness that cannot be 
domesticated; nonetheless, […] the dimension of transcendence is 
reintroduced as a crack in immanence, a resistance to it, a primordial 
inconsistency, a resistance to symbolization. Even those who claim to be 
radical materialists rediscover transcendence in new guises: the postmodern 
notion of transgression, the phenomenological notion of the other, the 
scientific notion of the impenetrable mystery of an infinite universe, the 
aesthetic notion of excess, the psychoanalytic notion of subjectivity, the 
political notion of revolutionary ecstasy’ (Schwartz, 2004: viii). 
 
Immanent transcendence therefore holds a belief that we can transcend certain 
unfavourable material conditions ‘not by taking flight form the world, but by 
transforming it in ways that increasingly establish non-coercive relations between 
human beings, as well as between human beings and the wider environment’ (Haynes, 
2012: 9). The ‘immanent’ in immanent transcendence is therefore not radically material 
– in a strict naturalistic sense that does not allow for any other but earthly life – but 
entails transcendence in its materialism. Haynes (2012: 151) shows how three chosen 
thinkers (Gilles Deleuze, Luce Irigaray and Theodor Adorno) articulate through 
immanent transcendence a non-reductive materialism, where matter is always already 
more than just matter – ‘transcendence does not designate exteriority or discontinuity 
but a movement of becoming and excess inherent in matter’. Similarly, Schwartz (2004: 
xi) describes transcendence as ‘a delirious rupture in immanence, an erotic claim made 
by it, a gap in the Real, a question put to subjectivity, a realm of the impossible that 
breaks into possibility’. 
 
This is this kind of immanent transcendence that I am interested in in this chapter. I will 
call it this-worldly transcendence as opposed to an other-worldly one which could also 
be termed religious transcendence (especially in relation with Abrahamic faiths). This-
worldly, or immanent, transcendence entails a kind of standing back and looking 
beyond – that is, a kind of critical, reflective questioning of the actual and a new vision 
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of what lies beyond (Schwartz, 1975). By doing so, it undoubtedly has to posses a certain 
normative critical point of view, which cosmopolitanism certainly does. It therefore 
seems worthy to connect the two concepts, which seem to be almost naturally 
intertwined. The idea of immanent transcendence can be divided into two distinct types. 
First is relational immanent transcendence, which refers to ‘a material otherness that is 
specific, irreducible reality within the immanent whole’ (Haynes, 2012: 8). This type of 
immanent transcendence therefore acknowledges relations among people and is 
concerned with the social and the political. The second kind of immanent 
transcendence is temporal transcendence and it ‘denotes the power of becoming, a 
movement towards an open future: the new’ (Haynes, 2012: 8). This type reveals 
immanent transcendence’s dynamism and creativity. On the other hand, Schwartz 
(2004) offers a slightly different distinction of types of immanent transcendence: the 
vertical and the horizontal. The first one suggests leaving the immanent and 
phenomenal world and transcending into another one. While this could mean that 
immanence is denied, it is not completely. If one transcends into another world 
(metaphorically speaking), it means that the new world becomes immanent. 
Understanding vertical immanent transcendence in this way, such movement is only a 
passage from one world to another, which means that transcendence is not beyond the 
world (Schwartz, 2004: xi). The second sense of transcendence is horizontal. This type 
of transcendence is partly self-transcendence, which includes the realisation that we are 
incomplete and therefore grasping for possibilities. Furthermore, horizontal 
transcendence also includes ethical transcendence: here, the subject does not transcend 
his or her ego as is often the case in self-transcendence; rather, the subject is, in relation 
to the transcendent other, embedded in social life (Schwartz, 2004: xi). 
 
At first glance, transcendence might be thought of as something otherworldly or 
religion-related, even unintelligible and unattainable in the real world, and therefore 
insignificant for critical theory, which operates within social reality. Indeed, the term 
transcendence can also be dangerous: terrible ‘crimes have been committed in the name 
of transcendent principles – principles held beyond question, beyond critique – and 
even in the name of a transcendent God’ (Schwartz, 2004: vii). To avoid such atrocities, 
the hegemony of the West or any other argument without reason, we must reject any 
kind of transcendence of authority or logos (Schwartz, 2004). On the contrary, the 
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modern type of transcendence is understood as the ‘ground of humility’, be it in 
philosophy, politics, epistemology or ethics.  
 
As said, the term itself has a long history both in philosophy and theology, but in its 
more general sense it signals the beyond, ‘with the noun form of the term denoting a 
reality beyond the world – the transcendent – and the verb form denoting the activity of 
moving beyond – to transcend’ (Haynes, 2012: 1). It might seem that concepts of 
immanence and transcendence are intrinsically opposed; indeed, they could be thought 
of in this way. In the case of critical theory though, materiality and transcendence are 
rethought of in a way that allows for a denunciation of this opposition: ‘Matter may then 
be conceived as that which possesses its own power of becoming, of self-transcending’ 
(Haynes, 2012: 3).34 Immanent transcendence allows for changes in foundations for 
political, ethical, institutional and other social aspirations. Therefore, immanent 
transcendence does not simply mean some randomly imaginable unfulfilled goals and 
ideas. Following Honneth, Strydom (2011: 95) asserts that immanent transcendence is a 
prerequisite of critical theory’s fruitful endeavours. If one wishes to make critical theory 
successfully and validly engage in diagnosis and critique of a social pathology, then 
critical theory must be underpinned with a theoretical normative perspective. This can 
only be done through immanent transcendence – critical theory must identify a pre-
theoretical foothold in social reality and ‘root its theoretical and critical endeavour in a 
moment or movement of immanent transcendence transpiring in social life or the actual 
situation itself’ (Strydom, 2011: 95). 
 
This means that the concept of immanent transcendence entails a ‘going beyond’ that is 
rooted in the present and actual situation. But one must be careful: Sixel (1988: 32–3) 
shows how fundamentally different the notion of immanent transcendence is from 
merely ‘going beyond’. Whereas the latter only means a linear growth or movement, 
different from the present one, immanent transcendence leads to a qualitatively different 
future (Sixel, 1988; Desmond, 1995). Immanent transcendence means surpassing social 
contradictions or injustices by identifying possibilities in the present. Being in an in-
between state, that is, in the process of transition, which is a consequence of dialectics, is 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34 Strydom (2011: 96) similarly recognises that transcendent ideas present in all human forms of life are 
not completely transcendent, but that they point towards a state beyond the present, which could be 
realised. 
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not defined by being in opposition of the univocal and equivocal. Rather, it is a 
‘togetherness that demands thinking that is more than these two, and a sense of being 
that sees their togetherness differently, togetherness because each is ingredient in a more 
encompassing process of coming to be’ (Desmond, 1995: 145). With immanent 
transcendence, therefore, dialectics becomes pluralised in a way. In the case of 
immanent transcendence, the becoming processes are not of a mechanical nature: ‘In 
mechanical relations terms do not inherently have relations to other terms, nor is there 
any dynamism inherent in the terms that would drive them into relativity to other terms. 
The mechanical whole, rather aggregate, is a putting together from the outside of parts 
that are essentially outside each other’ (Desmond, 1995: 146). Rather, dialectics thinks 
of immanent transcendence as a more organic model: an organism implies that a new 
being has emerged which still retains its relativity to others but at the same time 
constitutes its own integrity (Desmond, 1995).  
 
It is therefore not difficult to understand why immanent transcendence has become the 
key concept of contemporary critical theory.35 It characterises critical theory and at the 
same time explicates its methodology: 
 
‘Immanent transcendence […] refers to accumulated historical potential in the 
form of socio-practical ideas of reason and cultural models that reflection in 
the form of critical disclosure makes or could make apparent so that the 
potential is or could be reali[s]ed to some degree through appropriate social 
practices. Such historically accumulated socio-practical reason does not 
exhaust itself in a mere ought, normative obligation or idea projected outside 
of existing society, however, but is emphatically regarded as always already 
operative in structuring social life by directing and guiding or potentially 
critically regulating social practices to some degree and in some way’ 
(Strydom, 2011: 135). 
 
Over and above empirical manifestations, immanent transcendence is regarded to be 
located at a deeper dimension of social reality, and not as simply as at the level of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35 Adam and van Loon (2000: 23) write: ‘As such, social theory has the capacity to connect science, 
technology, engineering and risk management to politics, media and economics. The critical function of 
social theory therefore does not stop with immanent critique, with critici[s]ing inconsistencies, empirical 
inadequacies, illogical conclusions and unverifiable hypotheses that constitute 'common sense', nor does it 
end with placing the full moral weight of informed political correctness behind the analysis. In the face of 
the risk society, social theory needs to redefine itself as an art of bridging, connecting, formatting as well as 
abstracting. This form of 'knowledge' allows political mobilization to team up with informed and sustained 
immanent critique, to broaden perspectives and articulate alternative interpretations; work on the 
multiplicity (collage) rather than the unity (narrative) of perspectives’. 
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unfulfilled goals that are present in actual social conditions (Strydom, 2011: 99). This 
means that immanent transcendence must not be understood only in terms of empirical 
phenomena, and that even the latter should be comprehended in theoretical terms: ‘For 
instance, Marx and various of his followers emphasised labour, Marcuse the human 
drives, Habermas language, and Honneth the anthropologically rooted moral-
psychological need for recognition’ (Strydom, 2011: 99). If cosmopolitanism or any 
other social theory wants to call itself a critical theory, it must understand immanent 
transcendence theoretically in a way that it locates the most suitable theoretical 
perspective within social reality.36 To give another example of immanent transcendence 
comprehended in theoretical terms, we can take a look at the critical theory of justice 
(Pereira, 2013). Immanent transcendence in this case can be found in the theoretical 
perspective of the ‘normative potential of equality’. Specifically, the latter is a part of 
immanence because it constitutes the everyday moral experience of subjects in the 
world. However, at the same time its character is also transcendent because the 
normative potential of equality transcends subjects’ experience by providing a critical 
point of view that criticises the actual situation and suggests the required social 
transformation needed in order to actually achieve equality.  
 
4.3 Immanent Transcendence in Cosmopolitanism 
 
Immanent transcendence within cosmopolitanism is not only possible but it is its 
constitutive part. It is also critical cosmopolitanism’s dynamic mechanism that does not 
turn cosmopolitanism into a passive sort of redemption or all-inclusive answer to the 
world’s plights, but continuously negotiates the actuality with what could be as well as its 
goals with what is possible and needed. Immanent transcendence faces up to and resists 
the hostile conditions and points towards resolution or redemption – not the kind that 
can arrive, though, because that could feed dangerous dreams of history being 
redeemed once and for all (Haynes, 2012: 82). Rather, the kind that can at least alter 
current conditions or relations for the better. The immanent transcendence in 
cosmopolitanism is understood similarly to that within critical theory – it is related to 
social transformation, that is, to pressure and plan change within existing social relations 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
36 This thesis posits that the theoretical perspective most suited to the context of cosmopolitanism is 
recognition. 
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and institutions. Transcendence is therefore understood as ‘a supersession of the given, 
the accepted, the familiar, or the weight of circumstance’ (Aboulafia, 2010: 3). 
 
I argue that cosmopolitanism is inherently related to the concept of immanent 
transcendence. The cosmopolitan imagination offers new ways of seeing the world, 
normatively as well as through people’s practices, solidarities, identities and ethics. In 
this way, it connects transcendent ideas and ethical, legal and political forces in actual 
experiences: ‘These dimensions represent the foundations for a new conception of 
immanent transcendence; it is one that lies at the heart of the cosmopolitan imagination 
in so far that this is a way of viewing the world in terms of its immanent possibilities for 
self-transformation and which can be reali[s]ed only by taking the cosmopolitan 
perspective of the Other as well as global principles of justice’ (Delanty, 2009: 3). 
Cosmopolitanism enables and undertakes the transformation of the social world, where 
new relations among the Self, the Other and the World develop: ‘This emphasis on the 
internal transformation of the social world highlights the relevance of cosmopolitanism 
as a form of immanent transcendence as opposed to an externally induced 
transcendence’ (Delanty, 2009: 53). Delanty (2009: 86–7) also identifies four dynamics 
that are part of the cosmopolitan imagination and which also show the capacity for 
immanent transcendence. These are: the capacity for the relativisation of one’s own 
culture or identity; the capacity for positive recognition of the Other which also involves 
self-transformation in doing so; the capacity for a mutual evaluation of cultures or 
identities, which includes critical dialogue; and, lastly, the capacity to create a shared 
normative culture.   
 
Just like critical theory, cosmopolitanism also ‘seeks to identify the potentials for 
emancipation immanent in the needs of subjects and aims to provide an analysis of 
contemporary society that apprehends its developmental possibilities’ (Browne, 2008: 7). 
It does not derive these potentialities from some otherworldly, religious or supernatural 
source that has little connection to social reality. From an analysis of contemporary 
society, it develops possible solutions to global confrontations with regards to existing 
social norms, relations and institutions. In other words, ‘cosmopolitanism understood in 
terms of immanent transcendence refers to an internally induced social change whereby 
societies and social agents undergo transformation in their moral and political self-
understanding as they respond to global challenges’ (Delanty, 2009: 251). It is important 
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to note that cosmopolitanism does not strive for changes only in the external social 
reality but it aims also at self-transformation of agents as well. Changes in society cannot 
be achieved without initial shifts in moral and political self-understanding (Delanty, 
2009). As such, cosmopolitanism is ‘a form of immanent transcendence whereby 
societies undergo change as a result of internal transformation as they respond to 
external and especially global challenges. It contains a strong ethical character and one 
that has a global frame of reference’ (Delanty, 2009: 89). Self-development calls for the 
development of a transcendental dimension within oneself, where the ‘transcendentally 
real self is not to be imported from heaven or religion’ (Giri, 2006: 1286). Such is reality 
as well as possibility in human lives as long as we keep establishing connections with 
others, and learn from them. Dialogue and communication play an especially significant 
part in making immanent transcendence happen. Immanent transcendence can be 
conceptualised as ‘an expansion in the communicative competence of society leading to 
societal transformation and subject formation’ (Delanty, 2009: 87). And 
cosmopolitanism is partly concerned precisely with this. It ‘concerns the broadening of 
horizons when one culture meets another or when one point of view is forced to re-
evaluate its claims in light of the perspective of an Other. The cognitive logic at work in 
this is essentially a communicative relation and unfolds in diverse ways through 
processes of immanent transcendence’ (Delanty, 2009: 254–5). 
 
There are at least three types of immanent transcendence in cosmopolitanism which will 
be more thoroughly considered. First is dialogical immanent transcendence, which can 
be seen as part of the relational transcendence that refers to ‘a material otherness that is 
specific, irreducible reality within the immanent whole’ (Haynes, 2012: 8–9). Dialogical 
immanent transcendence conveys a certain epistemological expression. The second type 
of immanent transcendence is disclosing, which concerns perception and the uncovering 
of previously hidden aspects of reality. And lastly, there is self-transcendence. This type 
of immanent transcendence concerns an individual or a culture. It involves surpassing 
given circumstances, reflexivity and/or self-transformation.  
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4.3.1 Dialogical Immanent Transcendence in Cosmopolitanism 
 
Dialogical transcendence certainly has an important function in cosmopolitanism. 
Duara (2014: 49) understands dialogical transcendence not in an ontological way but 
rather from a meta-epistemic point of view: as a mode of knowing that is structured by 
historical and social conditions. Dialogical transcendence is therefore neither radical nor 
religious and it allows for the coexistence of different expressions of truth. Truth does 
not emanate from a single source or individual moral authority. Transcendence does 
indeed need some foundation of ideas and values but not in the sense of an omnipotent 
God (Duara, 2014: 49). In the secular age of a disenchanted world, a type of 
transcendence must survive even though it is not as radical as it once was in the form of 
a metaphysical yearning for salvation on the part of human beings. Duara (2014: 55–6) 
identifies four common characteristics of dialogical transcendence, in which immanence 
and transcendence are not separated. Firstly, the truth is always negotiatory. The 
transcendent power is used for different immanent aims, which involve some 
expressions of truth that are tolerated, whereas the ‘higher truths’ are always questioned 
by those who do not establish them. Secondly, relationships in dialogical transcendence 
are ones of encompassment and tolerance. The third characteristic is cultivation and 
discipline, with which one can achieve greater transcendence.37 And, fourthly, the 
dialectic of immanence and circulation in dialogical transcendence gives significance to 
not only metaphysical but also a sociological perspective. However, the main feature of 
dialogical transcendence is the dialogical conception of truth – truth that is achieved 
through dialogue and different perspectives, and can always be challenged. 
 
How people treat and relate to each other in social and political settings lies in the midst 
of cosmopolitan ideas, values and projects. The communicative or dialogical dimension 
of cosmopolitanism is therefore one of its most important, if not its most constitutive 
part. The crucial prerequisite to the possible creation of and participation in a 
cosmopolitan society is an open and uncoerced dialogue, which Kant called 
cosmopolitan right (Held, 2005: 11). To be able to interact with others is not a question !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
37 If we take an example of Chinese worldly transcendence, cultivation and self-discipline play a major 
role in achieving the critical stance with which to assess the mundane world. Chinese immanent 
transcendence is in a sense always personal and socio-political – through awareness of discrepancy 
between the ideal world and the reality, and trying to surmount personal tension when attempting to 
maintain the harmony, one develops a critical attitude towards the existing social and political order 
(Eisenstadt in Bellah, 2011: 478–9).  
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of philanthropy but right, and it is the only way to realise peaceful community (Kant, 
1991: 172). Dialogue therefore plays an essential role in cosmopolitanism. The latter has 
never been about reductions on the one hand or totalisations on the other; rather, 
cosmopolitanism tries to mediate between such extremes and is led by the aim of 
dialogic universalism, which negotiates the moral and the political, the moral and the 
ethical (Benhabib, 2006: 19–20). Dialogical cosmopolitanism, following Mendieta (2009: 
243), is a type of epistemic and moral stance towards the world that is mindful of both 
its privileges and its limits, and which reflects on these from the standpoint of the Other, 
with whom it reaches to learn from and with. More concretely, cosmopolitanism’s 
exercise is aimed at reflecting on the moral status of persons, the conditions of agency 
and collective decision-making, to name a few (Held, 2005: 16). And to be able to reflect 
on these issues, ‘ground rules for communication, dialogue, and dispute settlement are 
not only desirable but essential precisely because all people are of equal moral value and 
their views on a wide range of moral–political questions will conflict’ (Held, 2005: 16). 
The so-called principles of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitanism’s essence are built 
precisely on such premises of democratic dialogue.  
 
The gist of dialogical immanent transcendence comes close to the meaning of 
Gadamer’s concept of the ‘fusion of horizons’ (Gadamer, 2013). Like in the process of 
the fusion of horizons, so too in dialogical transcendence the presence of the Other is 
essential to the process of communication. Understanding something or finding its 
meaning cannot result in a single truth but is always the result of a multiplicity of 
interpretations and therefore requires dialogue: ‘The fusion that produces a new thing 
cannot take place without the other that stands before us and through whose presence 
our prejudices are called forth, put into play, and revised. Coming to an understanding 
with another is the only way my own prejudices can become known to me and the only 
way that they can be transformed. The other is both an obstacle, in that he exposes the 
limits of my grasp of something, and also the means by which a new understanding of it 
emerges’ (Walhof, 2006: 581). Coming to such understanding is crucial to envisaging a 
cosmopolitan community that is based on dialogue. The purpose and the result of such 
a dialogue with others is the need to understand (and not the need for consensus as is 
the case with Habermas), with this understanding taken to mean a way of seeing things 
‘in a new and shared light’ (Jordaan, 2011: 2374). 
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4.3.2 Disclosing Immanent Transcendence in Cosmopolitanism 
 
Just like in Rilke’s poetry, immanent transcendence here is not religious or about 
longing for an other-worldly realm that arrives after death (or some other final event). 
Rather, it is ‘a crossing of horizons between perception and imagination or imagination 
and reality, by the disclosure and inventions of which […] the more traditional notion of 
transcendence is usurped in distinct ways’ (Gosetti-Ferencei, 2010: 275). Such immanent 
transcendence aspires to go beyond and at the same time stay within ordinary 
experience. In her article, Gosetti-Ferencei (2010) traces immanent transcendence in the 
poetry of Rainer M. Rilke and Wallace Stevens, and finds out that through criticism of 
the modern world and resistance to it they both expand our sense of reality. They do so 
through poetry and opening up our sense of the present beyond immediate time and 
space, and by imagining the loss of subjective boundaries (Gosetti-Ferencei, 2010). They 
‘entertain the possibility that a creative understanding of reality feeds back into the life 
of perceptive understanding, drawing out its poetic potential and transforming reality’s 
configurations’ (Gosetti-Ferencei, 2010: 279). To rethink and re-imagine ordinary 
perception in this way, that is, through illuminating (poetic) contemplation that changes 
reality from material to subtleness, means to understand it as a disclosing aspect of reality 
that is usually not available to us. Imagination and reality do not exclude each other; 
rather, they are interdependent. The creation of something new draws from the 
everyday world and in such a way stays connected to it: ‘Yet in order to perceive 
imaginatively, […] the outward looking and the inner seeing must converge, 
overcoming the parallax between perception and imagination, and in such convergence 
the light must be both self-illuminating and derive from elsewhere’ (Gosetti-Ferencei, 
2010: 283). Such perception or ‘standing back from the world’ (Gosetti-Ferencei, 2010) 
means that the viewpoint is still immanent to the world and that it comes from this 
world. The new is not something completely novel though – it is only an aspect of the 
world that has been for some reason previously hidden but that nevertheless transcends 
the world. Poets interconnect immanent and hidden aspects of the world through poetry 
and thus reinstate a world that is ‘always already more than mere substance’ (Gosetti-
Ferencei, 2010: 281).  
 
World-disclosure or a disclosing critique defines the tenet of the epistemological 
character of world-openness (Delanty, 2012: 40). Disclosure means new ways of seeing 
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the world or seeing it from different viewpoints, which is the core idea of 
cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitan outlook urges us to learn from others, to see things also 
from their perspective, and especially to come to the realisation that we do not live only 
in one world but many different worlds (Rumford, 2008). Cosmopolitanism’s task is 
therefore to facilitate or guide the emergence or recognition of a new world, and it can 
do so only by being receptive to the present and attentive to the present world’s hidden 
aspects. There is a certain normative expectation that requires us always to aspire to the 
‘not yet’: 
 
‘we are obligated in some indeterminate sense to bring about the new 
beginning, obligated to help give “new form” to our form of life by 
apprehending the present in which we live as a time of “birth and transition.” 
Meeting that obligation requires that we apprehend precisely those possibilities 
within the present upon whose reali[s]ation the new form of the world 
depends. This attentive stance toward the present supposes a complementary 
stance of anticipatory openness toward the future, to how things might 
otherwise be. In taking such a stance, however, one is likely to discover that 
getting into the right relation to one’s time may mean living and thinking “in 
contradiction” to one’s time’ (Kompridis, 2006: 5). 
 
In this lies cosmopolitanism’s disclosing immanent transcendence. To reimagine 
perception through the cosmopolitan imagination means to disclose the critical agency 
of the material. Or, as Delanty (2009) puts it, the cosmopolitan imagination is a kind of 
normative foundation of a critical social theory that makes possible new ways of seeing 
the world: ‘Such forms of world disclosure have become an unavoidable part of social 
reality today in terms of people’s experiences, identities, solidarities and values. These 
dimensions represent the foundations for a new conception of immanent transcendence; 
it is one that lies at the heart of the cosmopolitan imagination in so far that this is a way 
of viewing the world in terms of its immanent possibilities for self-transformation and 
which can be realised only by taking the cosmopolitan perspective of the Other as well 
as global principles of justice’ (Delanty, 2009: 3). 
 
4.3.3 Self-Transcendence in Cosmopolitanism 
 
As was mentioned earlier, self-transcendence is especially significant in the existentialist 
tradition, where it is related to the individual’s freedom and becoming. Besides 
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existentialism, ancient Cynics and their cosmopolitanism espoused a similar viewpoint 
with regards to self-transcendence. Their attitude towards the world and external 
circumstances was that of radical individual freedom, surpassing the arbitrary systems 
and retaining their individual freedom of the soul: ‘Of this “community” they claimed to 
be citizens: citizens of the cosmos, at home here and everywhere because they were 
radically at home with their present selves. Anarchists, democrats, cosmopolitans, kings: 
all of these in a way, but most of all (to adapt Nietzsche’s phrase) “free spirits, very free 
spirits”’ (Desmond, 2008: 208). Self-transcendence is therefore a process of self-
surpassing and (limited) creativity, and the ability of the self to see itself and its situation 
as a project and a perspective of possibilities (Haynes, 2012: 88). To simply submit 
oneself to what already exists (to bare immanence) is in a sense ‘inhuman’, repudiates 
one’s freedom and it is a moral failing.38 Nevertheless, self-transcendence is of course 
not just limited to existentialist thought. Transcendence and subjectivity are inherently 
connected: the former structures the latter, ‘for the beyond is within the subject’ 
(Schwartz, 2004: ix). As mentioned before, self-transcendence is a project of the 
horizontal transcendence of grasping our possibilities (Schwartz, 2004). To realise one’s 
own inherent potentialities is to have the capacity to transcend the given circumstances 
and thereby transform oneself, which is at the same time also a process of self-
determination (Aboulafia, 2010: 5).  
 
Self-transcendence is thus connected to reflexivity and self-reflexivity, which together 
are a kind of presupposition of self-transcendence. A central focus of reflexivity or self-
reflexivity is the awareness that every social and cultural order is to a certain extent 
arbitrary and this awareness is accompanied by a sense of ambivalence towards that 
order (Eisenstadt, 1995: 339; Fuchs, 2000: 80). This entails the capability of a certain 
mental distance from the culture or society that one inhabits, and an awareness of 
others. It also entails a contestation of assumptions about oneself and one’s social and 
political setting.39 As Eisenstadt (2003: 30) claims, such questioning of the given is closely !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38 In the same fashion and following Sartre’s argument about the need for self-transcendence, Simone de 
Beauvoir claims that women are trapped in their bodies and that means being confined to immanence (or 
lost to immanence) if they succumb to their own feminineness which make them unable to achieve 
transcendence (freedom) (Haynes, 2012: 89).   
39 Eisenstadt (2003: 30) says: ‘The reflexivity in the modern program focused not only on the possibility of 
different interpretations of the transcendental visions and basic ontological conceptions prevalent in a 
society or societies, but came to question the very givenness of such visions and of the institutional 
patterns related to them. It gave rise to awareness that many such visions and patterns existed and that 
such visions and conceptions can indeed be contested’. 
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connected to two components of modernity: the recognition that there are many 
possibilities to undertake a great variety of roles beyond any fixed or ascribed ones; and 
the recognition that one belongs (or can belong) to wider translocal communities. This 
all leads to the greater autonomy of human beings. Such autonomy involves several 
changes: reflexivity and exploration; active construction; and mastery of nature and of 
society. It also involves the autonomous participation of members of society in the 
constitution of social and political order (Eisenstadt, 2003). 
  
Cosmopolitanism can also be understood as a mode of self-transformation ‘which occurs 
when individuals and groups engage in concrete struggles to protect a common 
humanity and become more reflexive about their experiences of otherness’ (Nowicka 
and Rovisco, 2009: 6). This means that a subject is capable of going beyond or at least 
modifying boundaries between the self and the Other. It is the capability to scrutinise 
the self ‘with regards to the ways one positively engages the otherness of other cultures 
and people, and to the ways one is committed to the building of a more just world in 
conditions of uneven globali[s]ation’ (Nowicka and Rovisco, 2009: 6). Immanent 
transcendence is a part of the cosmopolitan imagination precisely insofar as it is ‘a way 
of viewing the social world in terms of its immanent possibilities for self-transformation 
and which can be reali[s]ed only by taking the cosmopolitan perspective of Other as 
well as a global principles of justice’ (Delanty, 2012: 41) into account. The struggles of 
cosmopolitan self-transformation can take many forms. They can be observed at the 
individual level, how a subject discloses and develops his or her ‘cosmopolitanness’; or 
they can be studied from an institutional and structural point of view, that is, how 
certain contexts and settings facilitate or restrict cosmopolitan self-transformation. 
Cosmopolitanism therefore contains self-transformation or self-transcendence whenever 
there is self-confrontation in terms of individuals examining their identity, culture, 
membership, and subjectivity. Of course, one of the characteristics of cosmopolitanism 
as a process of self-transformation is its communicative dimension (Delanty, 2012: 42). 
The self or the culture undergoes transformation in the light of the encounter with the 
Other, and this transformation can take on different forms: multiculturalism, re-
orientation in self-understanding, or re-evaluation of cultural heritage and identity 
(Delanty, 2012: 42). 
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Simmel’s (2010: 1) quote in the beginning of the chapter – ‘The boundary, above and 
below, is our means for finding direction in the infinite space of our worlds’ – also points 
to the significance of boundaries in immanent transcendence, which is the same in 
cosmopolitanism. Even though borders are not an obvious choice for studying 
cosmopolitanism since the latter is supposed to be all about a borderless world, borders 
understood in a broad sense can be seen as ‘key cosmopolitan sites’ (Rumford, 2012). 
Borders should not be looked at as something that divides but as connectivity tissues and 
mobility patterns. They should not be understood in the sense of official and fixed state 
borders that draw unequivocal lines between two groups of people or political entities. 
Borders help us realise or require us to recognise that we are always global and local, self 
and other, individuals and members of communities, outsiders and insiders: 
‘Cosmopolitanism is about relativising our place within the global frame, positioning 
ourselves in relation to multiple communities, crossing and re-crossing territorial and 
community borders’ (Rumford, 2008: 14). What borders do for people (or how they 
utilise them) is that they facilitate people’s connectivity to different communities, distant 
collectivities or transnational networks, and therefore act as a connective tissue. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Immanent transcendence is a concept that points to ‘the beyond’ or ‘not yet’ of the 
existing world and it is an integral part of critical theory. There are different kinds of 
immanent transcendence. We can classify them into horizontal/vertical with regards to 
the ‘direction’ of transcendence, or temporal/relational, which concerns 
transcendence’s characteristics with regards to the object of transcendence. In this 
chapter, the concept was explored in different philosophical and sociological texts, its 
meaning was pinpointed, and it was linked with cosmopolitanism. It was argued that we 
could distinguish between three different types of immanent transcendence within 
cosmopolitanism: dialogical transcendence; disclosing transcendence; and self-
transcendence. These three types are not fixed and completely independent categories; 
rather they are distinguished here for the purposes of showing the creativity of 
immanent transcendence. They were also distinguished for another reason: each type of 
immanent transcendence has a different effect in the phenomenological, that is, the 
social and political world. In this chapter the three types were only introduced; in the 
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next three chapters they will be considered in detail, where applications will be made for 
each of them. 
 
The next chapter will look at the concept of recognition more closely and make a 
connection between cosmopolitanism and recognition. In this way, a strong connection 
between Honneth’s critical theory will be made and at the same time enhanced since 
the relationships of recognition will be cosmopolitanised. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RECOGNITION AND COSMOPOLITANISM 
 
The struggle for recognition is […] a central feature of our lives, from our personal 
relations, through to our interaction with social and political institutions. We cannot 
make sense of social conflicts, and the way our embeddedness in the social world gives 
rise to moral and ethical dilemmas, without understanding the way in which our 
sensitivity to recognition orients us in the world’ (McBride, 2013: 8). This chapter will 
explore the concept of recognition. Judging from McBride’s quote, recognition (and 
consequently our struggle to achieve it) seems to be one of the central concepts to our 
understanding, interpreting and changing the social world we inhabit. The concept of 
recognition has recently also become dominant in academic scholarship, especially in 
fields of political theory/philosophy, social theory and critical theory. Its scope is vast; 
the issues that the notion of recognition influences and which are studied include 
bestowing of human rights, protection of multiculturalism, enhancement of self-
realisation, ensuring equality among people – the list goes on. These are just a few 
examples of social and political matters where recognition plays or can play a central 
role in their being thought about. These issues and the reasons for desired recognition 
are manifold – and such is also the concept of recognition. There is no uniform 
definition of recognition, and perhaps that is one of its advantages since it resonates with 
recognition’s character – it is, namely, never final, definitive or conclusive. It is always 
open to be contested, re-granted, earned or anticipated. Just as human relations can 
never be absolutely definite or conclusive, so recognition, too, always makes 
indeterminate claims (Kompridis, 2007). This is partly because no suffering can be 
completely and adequately articulated, and partly because recognition claims comprise 
of so many different elements – claims that are intertwined with justice, our identities, 
various goods that are pursued, and the context of a situation.  
 
It is therefore no surprise that so many theorists have tried to pin down recognition’s 
meaning. Among contemporary theorists there has been a lively debate especially 
between Fraser and Honneth (2003) – the former emphasising recognition as a matter 
‘ 
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of identity (although not limited only to it), and the latter disagreeing that recognition is 
only a sort of psychologically informed account of identity, and arguing instead that it 
should be seen as related to social status and a part of justice. Whereas in this case, the 
discussion was more or less binary (a disagreement about justice being either about 
recognition and/or distribution), some scholars turn to other possible meanings of 
recognition. For instance, Kompridis (2007) explores recognition in connection to 
freedom and emphasises the need for a more pluralistic and contextualist account of 
recognition. Patchen Markell (2003) turns to the politics of acknowledgment rather than the 
politics of recognition and argues for the renunciation of an “identity” characteristic 
(positive or negative) when talking about recognition/acknowledgement. Sybol Cook 
Anderson (2009) re-actualises Hegel’s conception of recognition in line with 
emancipatory demands and liberal principles, and shows how it surpasses the 
shortcomings of both Honneth’s and Kymlicka’s understandings of recognition. All 
these and other conceptions of recognition testify to the fact that recognition is a 
dynamic idea that, from Hegel onwards, has still not exhausted its potential for social 
and philosophical research.40 What we are particularly interested in here is how this 
concept is used in critical theory, and later on in cosmopolitanism. 
 
Therefore, this chapter will not trace the historical evolution of the concept but, rather, 
it will focus on contemporary theorising in connection to critical theory. The first part of 
the chapter focuses on Axel Honneth’s formation of recognition, and the second part 
will show its shortcomings through other authors’ understanding of the concept with a 
special emphasis on recognition’s critique from a global perspective. In this way, we will 
try to enhance the existing meaning of recognition in a way that will most pertinently 
appeal to cosmopolitanism. The goal is therefore to find a meaning of recognition that 
connects to cosmopolitanism in the most suitable way, and to see in what ways 
cosmopolitanism can enrich recognition theory. Such conception of recognition will 
form a paradigm of critical cosmopolitanism.  
 
 
 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
40 For an overview of recognition’s meaning and controversies see, for instance, Iser (2013). 
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5.1 Honneth’s Conception of Recognition 
 
Honneth’s critical social theory is grounded in the concept of recognition, which is a 
normative underpinning of social criticism. Recognition is not a unified concept; it 
possesses manifold meanings and can be used in many different social contexts. For 
instance, Honneth (1997) emphasises that justice is not only about the redistribution of 
goods, but also requires the inclusion of normative claims made by subjects.41 Its 
meaning is therefore not definitive, not even in Honneth’s account of it. He is aware of 
this (1997) and the numerous contexts recognition is used in: in feminist theory, 
discourse ethics, communitarianism, and so on. Recognition is used within such various 
moral perspectives and it is precisely because of this that justification as to ‘the moral 
implications underlying each of the various forms of recognition’ is needed (Honneth, 
1997: 19). Whether there is a core to all these different situations that can be found in 
recognition is something that Honneth tries to find out. 
 
Honneth’s theory of recognition stems from early Hegel’s Jena lectures42 and he follows 
these ideas and naturalises them together with moral-psychological claims about the 
intersubjective constitution of the self. Honneth (1996: 132) tries to answer the following 
question: ‘how is it that the experience of disrespect is anchored in the affective life of 
human subjects in such a way that it can provide the motivational impetus for social 
resistance and conflict, indeed, for a struggle for recognition?’. His conception of 
recognition therefore consists of a few different things: recognition is the source of 
emancipatory movements or actions; it accounts for the moral progress of a society; and 
it provides individuals with freedom and means for self-actualisation. So, recognition 
can impact upon several things at once: it is not only an acknowledgement of an 
individual’s or group’s particular claims to identity, it also stimulates social change and 
contributes to the moral development of society. Furthermore, it is also a paradigm of 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41 He (1997: 17) claims that it is evident that ‘the moral quality of social relations cannot be measured 
solely in terms of the fair or just distribution of material goods; rather, our notion of justice is also very 
closely linked to how, and as what, subjects mutually recogni[s]e each other’. 
42 Honneth follows Hegel’s early work because he thinks that Hegel does not develop the ideas pursued in 
his early works, any longer in his later ones. As Honneth (1996: 63) says: ‘neither the intersubjectivist 
concept of human identity, nor the distinction of various media of recognition (with the accompanying 
differentiation of recognition relations), nor, certainly, the idea of a historically productive role for moral 
struggle – none of these ever again acquires a systematic function within Hegel's political philosophy’. 
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critical theory that offers productive access to the emancipatory potential of everyday 
social reality.  
 
Honneth’s theory posits that people must also want to acquire a positive practical 
relation-to-self. If such positive relation-to-self is taken away from someone or gets 
distorted for some reason, this means that the person has been disrespected or denied 
recognition. Such misrecognition affects the practical relation-to-self of a person, which 
in other words means that it affects an individual’s personal integrity in the sense that it 
can be transformed into moral injury. Honneth distinguishes between three types of 
practical relations-to-self (self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem) and consequently 
three patterns of recognition relationships – love, rights, and solidarity – that make the 
mentioned practical relations-to-self possible at all. 
 
5.1.1 Self-Confidence and Love 
 
The first pattern of intersubjective recognition is love. According to Honneth (1996: 
107), this relationship of recognition is the fundamental one in enabling a person to 
acquire basic self-confidence. In other words, love, and recognition that stems from love, 
make possible a positive relation-to-self called self-confidence. Self-confidence in this 
context does not mean thinking highly of oneself or one's own capabilities; rather, it is 
connected more with a person’s ability to express needs and desires without feeling fear 
of rejection. Honneth does not use love in a romantic sense but tries to use it in the most 
“neutral” way possible. He follows Hegel in designating love relationships as primary 
ones that are established among members of a small group and that offer people first 
relationships of reciprocal recognition. Through such relationships, a person learns 
about concrete others and their own dependence on them. For this reason, Honneth 
posits the intersubjective experience of love as a precondition for further developments 
of positive relation-to-self. In developing what love relationship means for recognition 
theory, Honneth mostly draws on object-relations theory and follows Donald W. 
Winnicott’s and Jessica Benjamin’s psychoanalytical ideas. He (1996: 95–107) shows 
that love as a particular relationship of recognition ‘makes the success of affectional 
bonds dependent on the capacity, acquired in early childhood, to strike a balance 
between symbiosis and self-assertion’. This means that through relationships of love, a 
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person learns to recognise and consider other people, and at the same time preserve his 
or her own integrity and singularity. 
 
The disrespect or misrecognition in the sphere of love therefore pertains to an 
individual’s physical integrity. Violations such as rape, physical abuse and torture are 
the utmost severe denials of the first pattern of recognition and causes of degradation of 
a person’s sense of self. Such forms of disrespect not only cause physical pain but also 
make a person feel that they are losing the autonomy of their body and therefore their 
basic self-confidence.43   
 
5.1.2 Self-Respect and Rights 
 
The second pattern of recognition is legal recognition and the sphere of rights. Legal 
relations are very different to those of love. Again, self-respect, which legal recognition 
enables, does not pertain to some self-glorifying condition, but refers to the dignity of 
every human being. A person understands others and himself or herself as legal subjects 
that bear rights and duties in a shared community. This means that every subject 
possesses the same legal and moral status as everyone else in that system or community. 
An analogy can be made with love – just as in love relationships, children acquire the 
self-confidence to express their needs and desires, so, too, in legal relationships subjects 
acquire ‘the possibility of seeing their actions as the universally respected expression of 
their own autonomy’ (Honneth, 1996: 118). Rights enable the development of such self-
respect.44 The conditions in the social world must therefore be such that they enable 
rights to be granted equally to everyone – ‘only then will the individual legal person be 
able to see in them an objectivated point of reference for the idea that he or she is 
recogni[s]ed for having the capacity for autonomously forming judgements’ (Honneth, 
1996: 119). In this section, Honneth (1996: 110–14) also explicates a distinction between 
self-respect and self-esteem. Even though they are both instances of some sort of respect, 
the former applies to a universal respect that is granted to people in virtue of their !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43 As Honneth (1996: 133) writes: ‘[T]he suffering of torture or rape is always accompanied by a dramatic 
breakdown in one’s trust in the reliability of the social world and hence by a collapse in one’s own basic 
self-confidence’. 
44 Honneth (1996: 119) argues: ‘It is, of course, only with the establishment of universal human rights that 
this form of self-respect can assume the character associated with talk of moral responsibility as the 
respect-worthy core of a person’. 
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humanity, and the latter to those instances of respect that pertain to particular 
characteristics of that person. Legal respect is therefore a type of respect that ‘on the one 
hand, is supposed to be detached from feelings of liking and affection and yet, on the 
other hand, can actually influence individual behaviour’ (Honneth, 1996: 110). On the 
basis of such respect, people recognise each other as moral agents (bearing moral 
accountability) and bearers of rights and duties. As van Hooft (2010: 41) notices, there is 
more at issue here than purely a legalistic/procedural affirmation of equality – there is 
reconciliation between the liberal ideal of autonomy and the communitarian ideal of 
mutuality, as well as reconciliation between minimalist and procedural conceptions of 
justice. 
 
Of course the scope of legal recognition has changed throughout history. Rights have 
evolved, their range has expanded, people have struggled for new universal rights, and 
more and more people have been included into relationships of moral recognition. 
However, this unfortunately does not mean that this type of recognition is settled once 
and for all. There are still misrecognitions happening on a daily basis that undermine 
people’s sense of self-respect and their moral autonomy. 
 
5.1.3 Self-Esteem and Solidarity 
 
The last pattern of Honneth’s conception of recognition is solidarity. In such 
relationships of recognition, the specific qualities and abilities of an individual are 
recognised. Therefore, what is actually recognised is each individual’s particularity. If 
legal recognition acknowledges people’s equality, this type of recognition cherishes their 
unique characteristics. In Honneth’s (1996: 122) words: 
 
‘this form of recognition demands a social medium that must be able to 
express the characteristic differences among human subjects in a universal 
and, more specifically, intersubjectively obligatory way. This task of mediation 
is performed, at the societal level, by a symbolically articulated – yet always 
open and porous – framework of orientation, in which those ethical values and 
goals are formulated that, taken together, comprise the cultural self-
understanding of a society. Such a framework of orientation can serve as a 
system of reference for the appraisal of particular personality features, because 
their social ‘worth’ is measured by the degree to which they appear to be in a 
position to contribute to the reali[s]ation of societal goals.’ 
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The problem with evaluating someone’s achievements or abilities in this way can be that 
such evaluation depends on those values that are prevalent or set up in a specific system 
or community and that do not recognise its members’ contributions symmetrically. For 
instance, capitalism upholds profitable activities and the certain traits of people that are 
needed to achieve that, whereas those activities and people that do not produce profit 
are not recognised and can therefore be oppressed. In order to avoid such corporately 
attributed esteem, Honneth places esteem in ‘the horizon of values of a particular 
culture’ (Anderson in Honneth, 1996: xvii) so that values can be created together and in 
open contestation. In this way, values are pluralised. Solidarity makes it possible for 
someone to attain self-esteem, but solidarity here is not understood in an affectionate 
way. Relationships of esteeming one another are instances of solidarity because ‘to 
esteem one another symmetrically means to view one another in light of values that 
allow the abilities and traits of the other to appear significant for shared praxis’ 
(Honneth, 1996: 129). And this means that solidarity is not just toleration of someone 
else but felt concern for what is individual and particular about the other person 
(Honneth, 1996: 129). It means to acknowledge and praise an individual’s achievement, 
which is not an attainment of that individual’s private goals, but an acknowledgement of 
an individual’s contribution to a realisation of society’s values. This means that societal 
values need to be pluralised so that the recognition can be distributed more 
symmetrically and not predetermined with only some, prevalent ethical values in that 
society. Of course, this means that in modern societies there is constant tension and 
cultural conflict (Honneth, 1996: 127) in which the intersubjective value-horizon is 
constantly questioned and re-adjusted. 
 
To sum up, Honneth’s conception of recognition comprises of three distinct patterns of 
recognition (love, rights and solidarity) that, if properly realised, enable humans to 
flourish, the development of the individuals identity and the progression of ethical life. 
These are also intersubjective conditions for an individual’s self-realisation, which is a 
precondition for their participation in a society. In other words, if we are to live in a just 
society, we must recognise each other’s singularity, autonomy and particularity 
(Anderson, 2009: 86). Honneth’s concept of recognition is also a form of behaviour, ‘a 
specific kind of attitude or action’ (Honneth: 1997: 503). Or, as he defines it later 
(Honneth, 2002: 513), ‘we are to understand ‘recognition’ as a behavioural reaction in 
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which we respond rationally to evaluative qualities that we have learned to perceive, to 
the extent to which we are integrated into the second nature of our lifeworld’. 
Recognition is therefore an action, behaviour, or phenomenon; and it is a normative 
response that enables moral progress, social change and self-realisation. It works both on 
an individual as well as a societal level, and both on empirical and normative level. 
 
5.2 Globalising Recognition 
 
Even though Honneth’s concept of recognition has been widely theorised, its 
application to global relations has been relatively scant. There are two possible ways of 
thinking about recognition on a global level. First, we can look at how the concept of 
recognition itself can be ‘globalised’, that is, how patterns of recognition could be 
transnationally extended in order to better respond to global claims of justice (Heins, 
2008). Second, we take recognition as it is and explore what it can do for existing 
theories of global justice. The two approaches differ significantly; whereas the first 
changes the characteristics of Honneth’s concept, the latter keeps it as it is (more or less) 
and applies it directly to theories of justice. In this chapter, the first approach will be 
used in order to show how recognition patterns can be cosmopolitanised. I believe that 
recognition theory can gain a lot by letting cosmopolitanism broaden it, since it has not 
really incorporated a more global aspect yet and is therefore considerably unapt as a 
tool for analysing global phenomena and justice. 
 
Schweiger (2012) uses the second approach, that is, he develops the recognition-based 
concept of global justice. He claims that a critique of social conditions needs a relative 
form of recognition, which means not absolute, ahistorical standards. However, at the 
same time he argues that this relative understanding of recognition rests on an absolute 
core of recognition which is truly universal. This absolute core of recognition is ‘the idea 
of undistorted self-reali[s]ation as the universal element of a good life’ (Schweiger, 2012: 
87). In this way, claims for recognition or global justice can be made in every society 
and in a variety of circumstances. 
 
Honneth (2012) himself deals with an international dimension of recognition in studying 
the moral element of international relations, that is, recognition between states. In this 
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case, the subjects are states that grant each other (legal and moral) recognition. The 
state as a subject is very different to subjects like individuals or groups/movements. A 
state does not need to obtain respect in the same way as individuals do, and what 
individuals or groups demand is much clearer than in the case of states. Therefore, the 
direct conceptual transfer of recognition is quite difficult when it comes to states because 
we cannot speak about their mental or psychological needs but rather their national 
interests, foreign policy and so on. Because nations are not homogenous entities, to be 
able to elaborate on and differentiate between demands for recognition, recognition 
“claims” need to be understood as very vague and up to politicians to be able to 
interpret.45 Such justification provides international relations with normative impetus: 
‘If it is true that states can only define their international relations with the help of 
narratives of justification that contain a credible and convincing interpretation of the 
population’s interests in collective self-respect, then “political” relations of recognition at 
the international level indirectly take on decisive importance as soon as we seek to 
reduce conflicts between states’ (Honneth: 2012: 147). So, ‘needs’ and claims of a 
population can and do influence also political recognition among states. Foreign policy 
is formed on the basis of what citizens want and desire for their security and prosperity. 
And at the same time, states exercise also an indirect influence on how other states 
legitimise their own foreign policies, because they are able to influence public opinion 
from abroad: ‘The diverse tools used to signal recognition or disrespect constitute a 
means for casting doubt upon other states’ narratives of justification by demonstrating a 
divergent view of those states’ collective identity’ (Honneth, 2012: 149). 
 
Heins (2010) tackles the question of internationalising the critical theory of recognition 
in a similar manner. Specifically, he (2010: 149) questions the premise ‘that recognition 
theory is all about ‘natural’ persons instead of ‘artificial’ persons such as states or 
peoples’. In order to include people as subjects in recognition theory he combines 
Rawls’ international theory with Honneth’s theory of recognition. He argues that the 
subject's need to belong to a people is particularly strong and does not disappear in 
modern societies. Rawls shows that the desire to belong to a people is based on strong !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45 According to Honneth (2012: 147): ‘What is decisive is not the type of recognition for which a certain 
population “actually” strives, but how political actors and rulers interpret its respective moods. The sense 
of a collective ‘We’ among the population, which will always have an influence on the definition of foreign 
policy objectives, is not an empirical but a hypothetical quantity. It arises when disordered and presumed 
expectations and moods are formed into a collective narrative that makes a certain type of international 
stance appear justified in the light of past humiliations or desired recognition’. 
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expectations about how members of a community conduct themselves in relation with 
each other (Heins, 2010: 163) and therefore the subject of a people or a state is 
important for recognition theory – it shows that a people is not an artificial abstraction 
but ‘refracted in the consciousness and habitual responses of individuals’. Unlike 
Honneth (2012), Heins (2010) also argues that patterns of recognition (apart from love) 
can be directly applied also to a people.46 Heins also claims that recognition of a people 
is similar to the recognition of minority groups in democratic societies, but that there are 
two major differences. First, a people do not seek a positive evaluation of their way of 
life from the outside; and second, they usually do not request funds from outsiders in 
order to be able to preserve the community. 
 
Both Honneth and Heins frame their arguments in relation to the state, though. Staples 
(2012) shows that Honneth’s over-reliance on the state in his conception of recognition 
(and especially the attainment of self-respect where the state is the main guarantor) 
obscures political obstacles to recognition. This is particularly well seen in the case of 
stateless people: ‘In the state system as a whole, political recognition is contingent on 
deeply particularist structures of power. By introducing a normative conception of the 
state into his theory, Honneth risks a slide back into the problem faced by the stateless, 
as reconstructed by Arendt, in which the state is the gatekeeper of full personhood’ 
(Staples, 2012: 105). For this and other similar reasons, it is necessary for recognition 
theory to obtain greater global impetus. 
 
5.3 Recognition and Cosmopolitanism 
 
As we have seen, recognition has been theorised to a certain extent also on a global or 
international level but mostly in the sphere of global justice and the state system, and 
not in connection to cosmopolitanism per se. Before focusing on how cosmopolitanism 
enhances the conception and theory of recognition, it will first be helpful to highlight the 
similarity between the two. The way recognition and cosmopolitanism work (or the kind 
of logic that is behind them) is namely particularly alike and related. To borrow from !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46 ‘Seeking and valuing membership in a people can be translated into already existing forms of 
recognition: the principle of esteem that justifies differential rewards based on merit for the cooperative 
members of society as well as of the principle of respect geared to expectations of equal treatment within a 
community of citizens’ (Heins, 2010: 163). 
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Fine’s (2007) characterisation of the cosmopolitan outlook,47 its main characteristic is 
that it changes the status quo in many different respects. The same could be said for 
recognition within critical theory. Recognition as a paradigm of critical theory also does 
not leave the existing social world unchanged once it has been used for the critique of 
those conditions. Furthermore, the cosmopolitan outlook consists of theoretical, 
empirical and normative levels and it changes the status quo on all of these levels: 
 
‘It confronts the boundedness of the methodological approaches of the social 
sciences not least through its critique of ‘methodological nationalism’. It refuses 
to accept the restricted understanding of our age in terms of essentialising 
particularisms (e.g. Germanness, Britishness, Jewishness) but rather explains 
national peculiarities through the general structural developments of modernity 
and the inter-subjective relations in which these particulars are inserted. It 
resists the reduction of either politics or science to a moral point of view that 
demonises the Other as it idealises the Self’ (Fine, 2007: 134–5). 
 
Recognition, too, works on all three mentioned levels and it also changes the status quo 
on all of those levels as well. Theoretically, it advances older paradigms of critical theory 
with a paradigm that is grounded in the existing social world and in everyday 
experiences of people, and which is able to proceed not just from procedures but from 
the real, moral experiences of people. Furthermore, recognition offers a normative 
foundation for social criticism, enhances the ethical dimension of human relations and 
societies, and fulfils normative conditions for social integration. Last but not least, 
recognition is also an empirical phenomenon in the social world and a type of action 
that changes peoples’ relations and behaviour, affirmations and attitudes, as well as the 
political and social landscape of a society. 
 
Burns (2013) explores the connection between cosmopolitan political thought (Hegel) 
and contemporary recognition theory (Honneth). He first compares the historicity of 
both theories, that is, Honneth’s recognition theory and Hegel’s philosophy of history. 
Honneth’s theory is historical (although not completely and solely historical) in the sense 
that it is characterised by particularity (ethics) and universality (morality). Furthermore, 
it incorporates the idea of normative progress. And, moreover, the struggle for 
recognition induces historical changes and development. However, it is not clear that ‘in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
47 He (2007: 134) defines cosmopolitan outlook as ‘a way of seeing the world, a form of consciousness, an 
emerging paradigm of sociological analysis’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’s interpretive moment’, whereas 
cosmopolitan condition is an existing social reality. 
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Honneth’s theory of recognition the idea of the end of history […] could be associated 
with that of a cosmopolis or world-state’ (Burns, 2013: 79). Burns (2013: 80) further 
argues that Honneth does not envision his theory of recognition to be used on a global 
level and that therefore ‘Hegel […] is arguably of greater contemporary relevance that 
[…]  Honneth’. Although this is to a certain extent true, this thesis will try to show that 
it is possible to use recognition theory also in the context of cosmopolitanism and that it 
is a useful concept that should be incorporated into cosmopolitan theory. 
 
Delanty (2009: 87) and Stan van Hooft (2010) are to my knowledge the only authors 
that make a direct link between cosmopolitanism and recognition. Van Hooft uses the 
concept of recognition and its three patterns to expand on an understanding of justice as 
well as cosmopolitanism. He insists that cosmopolitanism should not only be understood 
as everyone possessing fundamental human rights, because bonds between people are 
richer than just the duty not to violate each others’ rights. Therefore, justice as well as 
cosmopolitanism (or cosmopolitan justice) should take into account the aspect of 
relationality which can be done by integrating the concept of recognition into the 
existing understandings of justice theories and cosmopolitanism. In this way, a liberal 
understanding of freedom as non-violation of rights can be complemented with a more 
communitarian understanding that takes into account also solidarity bonds between 
people. The scope of justice consists of fulfilling three spheres of recognition: self-
confidence (love), self-respect (rights), and self-esteem (achievement). 48  Recognition 
theory combines what is good and what is right – that is, both moral and ethical 
standards of justice. What cosmopolitanism ‘gains’ with the incorporation of recognition 
theory is a more substantive character. In this way, it is not only about the equal moral 
standing of each individual but also about a wider scope and profounder understanding 
of what justice necessitates. Or, in other words, ‘this wider form of cosmopolitanism 
allows us to urge that a fuller range of human needs and capabilities be included in 
economic development goals and made the object of the care and political struggles of 
the world’s peoples’ (van Hooft, 2010: 46). 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
48 ‘Justice consists in obtaining what one needs in the context of love and care, being accorded equal 
treatment before the law, and being given social status in ways that one deserves. In each case, justice 
consists in being accorded the appropriate kind of recognition’ (van Hooft, 2010: 44). 
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We have now seen that recognition is able to enhance cosmopolitanism, but can it also 
be the case the other way around? Can cosmopolitanism be used in order to enhance 
recognition theory? Honneth himself says that his recognition theory is not very useful 
on an international level. But despite that or even precisely because of that, 
cosmopolitanism can and should be integrated into recognition theory in order to make 
it ‘useful’ for application on a global level. The main challenge is therefore to theorise 
‘cosmopolitan extensions’ of the three recognition patterns: love, rights and solidarity – 
that is, to provide them with a cosmopolitan aspect. In his article, Heins (2008) aims to 
broaden recognition theory by adding transnational extensions to the recognition 
principles of love, rights and solidarity. He strives to identify global equivalents to these 
three principles but discovers that on a global level they are backed only by weak 
institutions (unlike on the state level where there are already established institutions that 
let people realise their recognition needs). He does not seem to have any problem with 
transnationalising the recognition principles of love and rights but is reluctant when it 
comes to extending solidarity on a global level. Love is ‘scale-neutral’, he claims, and, 
besides personal forms of ‘transnational love’ such as transnational marriages, there are 
also non-personal forms of love that involve larger groups of people. He (2008: 147) 
speaks about the ethic of brotherliness or a love ethos that describes ‘an attitude of 
impersonal helpfulness or devotion to a “neighbo[u]r” in need, the term “neighbo[u]r” 
here being understood typically in the broadest possible sense as including people who 
are socially very distant or who have come from faraway places’. In the case of legal 
recognition, it is relatively easy to internationalise human rights because it has already 
been done with numerous declarations, institutions and human rights regimes. 
However, in the case of solidarity it is not so clear what counts as a contribution to a 
common good on a global level (Heins, 2008). He sees the transnational extension of 
solidarity especially in expanding market access and benefit-sharing, where such 
contributions to the social reproduction of global society are made within binding 
treaties and agreements between international subjects. In another article that has 
already been mentioned earlier, he (Heins, 2010: 163) thinks that belonging to a people 
can be integrated into an existing pattern of recognition: ‘the principle of esteem that 
justifies differential rewards based on merit for the cooperative members of society as 
well as of the principle of respect geared to expectations of equal treatment within a 
community of citizens’. He sees peoplehood as a special subject that ‘forms the interface 
between the domestic and international’ (Heins, 2010: 163).  
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As these examples of scholarship show, there are either connections made between 
recognition theory and global justice or the recognition patterns are 
extended/internationalised; however, there are only two authors (van Hooft, 2010; 
Delanty, 2009) that directly enhance cosmopolitanism with recognition theory. What I 
want to show now is the opposite: that also recognition theory can benefit from the 
integration of cosmopolitan thought into its three patterns of recognition. Therefore, it 
will be shown how the three patterns work on a cosmopolitan level. 
 
The recognition principle of love – and the corresponding positive relation-to-self of 
basic self-confidence – is perhaps the most difficult pattern to cosmopolitanise or to be 
integrated into cosmopolitanism. The reason for this lies in its moral-psychological 
character, which is difficult to reconcile with in cosmopolitan thought. To reiterate, 
Honneth (2007: 138–9) defines the first relationship of recognition as such where an 
individual’s ‘needs and desires are of unique value to another person’. Therefore, for 
such a kind of recognition, care and love are the concepts that correspond to it in moral 
philosophy. Looked at from the opposite perspective, misrecognition or moral injuries in 
this sphere happen when a person is robbed of his or her physical well-being. Examples 
of such loss of recognition are murder, torture, rape and any other physical abuse 
(Honneth, 2007: 136). Could an equivalent be found in cosmopolitanism that 
corresponds to this type of recognition? One that recognises a person’s singularity and 
attributes to him or her self-confidence in order that they can express their needs and 
desires? The concept of care instead of love can also be found in cosmopolitanism. In 
cosmopolitanism, a stranger is not an abstract individual but a singular human being. 
What is more,  
 
‘the cosmopolitan claims to aim as much at caring for her actual fellow citizen 
of a particular nation […] as at caring for any other individual in the world. 
The equali[s]ation – or symmetry – of the object of care and the stranger leads 
to the identification of the object of care and the stranger, which is the same as 
the provider of care. The cosmopolitan individual cares for any other 
individual in the world – there is no absolute stranger for this care’ 
(Karagiannis and Wagner, 2013: 151). 
 
In this way, the cosmopolitan extension of the recognition pattern of love manifests itself 
in recognising love or care not only to members of one's closest groups, but even to 
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strangers. Being singular, just like in recognition theory, means being an individual 
person but that can become like this only in connection with others. 
 
Another way to look at this pattern of recognition and to extend it in the manner of 
cosmopolitanism would be to look at misrecognition. Does cosmopolitanism respond to 
(physical) violence? Yes, it does; such response is even one of its main characteristics. To 
cite Fine (2006: 49; my emphasis) again: ‘While cosmopolitanism is usually understood 
as a reference to a worldly legal and institutional order, the cosmopolitan outlook is also 
a mode of understanding the world, an ethic of responsibility and an ongoing exercise of political 
judg[e]ment in the face of violence’. Here, cosmopolitanism also shares a point of connection 
with critical theory. Namely, both of them share a concern with war and violence and 
are seen as a response to them (Delanty, 2012: 43). Cosmopolitanism reminds us of the 
atrocities done in the twentieth century and is a response to them. Therefore, ‘[t]he 
cosmopolitan outlook is the attempt to keep both moments firmly in view: not only the 
experience of violence in the modern age but also the normativity of its non-acceptance’ 
(Fine, 2006: 51). 
 
The second pattern of recognition is legal recognition and the corresponding rights that 
belong to each individual. It is almost self-evident already to claim that cosmopolitanism 
envisions as well as actualises the world in which human rights are the effective 
standards of justice. But one must be careful with such (wishful) thinking. Even though 
human rights can be said to be inherent to the idea of cosmopolitanism, the latter, first 
of all, is not only about human rights but has other agendas as well. Secondly, we must 
not abandon the critical potential of cosmopolitanism. Therefore, in the context of 
rights, cosmopolitanism can and should warn us against ‘the temptation that faces the 
cosmopolitan imagination […] to turn itself into an endorsement of the existing order of 
human rights without a corresponding critical analysis of the roots of contemporary 
violence’ (Fine, 2009: 8).49 
 
‘From a cosmopolitan point of view we do not defend human rights as a 
natural law substitute for a post-traditional age, nor do we reify the legality of 
human rights in the juridical sense of the term. But because we do not turn the !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49 See also Nascimento (2014) who claims that cosmopolitanism does not necessarily reduce human rights 
to state-centric and liberal approaches, but is compatible also with contextual sensibilities, contemporary 
global challenges and critical theory. 
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idea of human rights into an absolute, we also do not suffer the disillusionment 
that may arise when it becomes apparent that it is not absolute. Our 
endeavour is to create what I would call a ‘‘human rights culture’’ – one that 
allows us to understand human rights as one element in a larger system of 
right, an emergent form of subjectivity in a global age, and to make political 
judg[e]ments in a way that neither over-values nor de-values its subject matter’ 
(Fine, 2009: 20). 
 
Cosmopolitanism can also enhance the second pattern of recognition in such a way that 
human rights are not only something given by the state. As mentioned before, Staples 
(2012) warns against this risk in the case of stateless persons, who find themselves to be 
without the possession of rights because they do not belong to any of the states. 
Membership, and hence the right to have rights, should not be limited to national 
citizenship. Membership should be interpreted, and this is especially so in the case of 
human rights, more widely, in order to include asylum seekers, refugees, immigrants, 
newcomers, and others in existing polities (Benhabib, 2004). What cosmopolitanism 
then does for legal recognition is to expand the understanding of a political community 
in which membership is understood much more broadly than solely in terms of 
nationality. 
 
According to Brunkhorst (2005: 3), solidarity is not the other of justice but the 
democratic realisation of individual freedom. In the context of cosmopolitanism, 
solidarity is sometimes understood as being highly associated with cosmopolitanism, and 
sometimes it is argued that solidarity and cosmopolitanism are incompatible or less 
compatible than solidarity in smaller communities where membership and belonging 
are more easily defined (Pensky, 2007). However, tying solidarity only to the notion of 
membership can be problematic because a member can undoubtedly very fast become a 
non-member when circumstances change. Throughout history, many people have been 
displaced and deprived of their national community, for instance. It is therefore 
important to look at the kind of solidarity that does not take identity markers for its 
main standpoint, but, rather, to look at how solidarity is thought about in the context of 
cosmopolitanism.  
 
In the case of the third pattern of recognition, solidarity, it can be given a cosmopolitan 
aspect and is not necessarily only limited to smaller groups or communities. 
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Cosmopolitan solidarity50 is a political principle, and it is connected to the political and 
not to the emotional or personal realm: ‘Principles work by inspiring action from outside 
the self, not from within, as motives do. They are general and thus cannot give specific 
goals, but they allow us to judge any particular action. The principle shares a common 
meaning with action in that it arises through the performing of the action’ (Parekh, 
2008: 115–16). Cosmopolitan solidarity is not mercy but a modern combination of 
freedom and politics. It is as radical and fundamental as freedom or equality. It moves 
beyond the terms of the identity politics debate and stems from the condition of 
plurality. Unlike compassion, it also acknowledges plurality and guards it. Cosmopolitan 
solidarity is political by nature and it is distinctively intersubjective in character. This 
means that it is neither subjective nor objective but constructed through our actions, 
thinking and judging. It is created in struggle and belongs to society, not to the 
individual (Fine, 2012). Political understanding of plurality is therefore very important 
for cosmopolitan solidarity. Cosmopolitan solidarity also surpasses the identity debate 
but at the same time does not also stem exclusively from non-identity. In order for 
cosmopolitan solidarity to remain political it must act in accordance with plurality and 
with the realisation that we live together with other people. 
 
It was Arendt who saw solidarity that is based on the fear of causing pain or global 
destruction as negative solidarity. Solidarity can be meaningful in a positive way only if 
it is combined with political responsibility (Arendt, 1968: 83). Positive solidarity can 
follow two distinct directions: it can either follow the path of the superficial unity of 
mankind and homogenisation; or it can follow the path of communication and action 
which in turn enables the creation of a solidarity that acknowledges our shared human 
condition whilst respecting the key features of this condition: plurality, diversity and 
difference (Arato and Cohen, 2010: 168). It is clear by now that the community of 
solidarity is never pre-given but always created in struggle. Such social movements are 
always fighting to achieve justice, social and political rights, and at the same time trying 
to combine the logic of justice with that of solidarity (Benhabib, 2011: 189). According 
to Kurasawa (2004), cosmopolitan solidarity comes into existence through ways of 
discursively mediated socio-political action. It is ‘a transnational mode of practice 
whereby actors construct bonds of mutual commitment and reciprocity across borders !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50 Cosmopolitan solidarity will be more closely explored in the next chapter as a part of cosmopolitan 
ethics. 
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through public discourse and socio-political struggle’ (Kurasawa, 2007: 160). Kurasawa 
(2004) takes alternative globalization movements (AGM)51 as an example of a form of 
global solidaristic politics. Through such movements we come to understand ‘that social 
bonds with distant others are not solely derived from normative principles or 
institutional arrangements, since they must also be constructed out of public discourse 
and socio-political struggle’ (Kurasawa, 2004: 236). Kurasawa further claims that what 
is especially interesting about the AGM is its world-view, which is deeply rooted in the 
right to cultural difference and the idea that strength lies in diversity. The AGM does 
not try to adopt the perspective of a single group as representative of the whole and the 
diversity of its membership makes such generalisations practically impossible (Kurasawa, 
2004: 241). Cosmopolitan solidarity seen as action can thus be characterised by three 
features: it is necessarily dialogical because it is formed through a communicative 
exchange and the mutual recognition of different actors; it is a publicly practiced; and, 
lastly, as social action it is transnational in scope (Kurasawa, 2007: 169). The example of 
AGM clearly shows that cosmopolitan solidarity is not a set of subjective or attitudinal 
dispositions to other human beings but a political project that tackles structurally-
produced sources of inequality and global injustices that block the exercise of individual 
and collective capabilities and flourishing human potential (Kurasawa, 2011). It draws 
attention to the existence of a worldly sensibility from below in particular, grounded in 
ordinary ways of thinking, acting and participating. 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the first part, this chapter outlined Honneth’s theory of recognition. It then analysed 
some of the criticisms of it from a global perspective, before, finally, trying to show that 
the three patterns of recognition can and do entail cosmopolitan aspect. Honneth’s 
theory of recognition understands the concept of recognition as a form of action and 
behaviour with a normative underpinning of social criticism as well as an empirical 
phenomenon in the social world, and also as a means available to an individual for self-
realisation and their consequent ability to participate in a society. However, what is 
missing is a more global characterisation of recognition that could then be applied also !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
51 Kurasawa (2004) gives the examples of the 1994 Zapatista rebellion in the Chiapas region of Mexico; 
Seattle protests that played a part in the collapse of World Trade Organization negotiations in 1999; and 
the massive protests against the US-led invasion of Iraq. 
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to contemporary global challenges. And this is where cosmopolitanism can enhance it. 
With ascribing each pattern of recognition a cosmopolitan aspect, it was shown that 
cosmopolitanism works well together with recognition and even enhances it in order to 
be more apt for use at a global level. With its specific ethics and agenda, 
cosmopolitanism can complement recognition theory and make its critical potential 
even stronger. 
 
The questions for further research remain: does cosmopolitanism possess these or 
similar elements as well? How does it understand the social world? How does it find 
social pathologies and how does it constitute its own justice? The next chapter will deal 
with cosmopolitanism’s normative foundations and its capacity for solidarity. 
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CHAPTER 6 
THE NORMATIVE FOUNDATIONS OF CRITICAL 
COSMOPOLITANISM: TOWARDS THE CONCEPT OF 
COSMOPOLITAN SOLIDARITY 
 
‘[…] in which differences, of the Other, of 
Others, the Other of the Others, develop to 
with-one-another and also to shared insight’. 
(Gadamer, 1999a: 8) 
 
thics concerns the vast pool of ideas about how to live. People have always needed 
ethics and its standards, because we live with one another and relate to each 
other. We need those standards to assess our obligations to others and to society, and to 
know what other people’s duties to us consist of. Unlike morality, ethical ideas do not try 
to merely separate the good and the bad. If it were for morality the world would consist 
of merely black and white; ethics sees the world in colour. There is no one answer to the 
question of how to live our lives. Ethics concerns the question of how to lead a good life, 
which of course varies from society to society. Therefore it does not offer some kind of a 
prescription or a blueprint. In order not to be given in advance and thus be biased, 
ethics must entail using faculties to judge and guide actions with reference to principles 
that surpass the deliberation of individuals in particular communities (Devenney, 2004: 
163). Finding an ethical theory that could be deemed universal is difficult, but both 
recognition theory and cosmopolitanism endeavour to sketch and realise this ambition 
in their pursuit of justice. Ethics, justice and critical theory are all inextricably 
connected. Ethics can help us build a more just world, and even though justice is such a 
disputed and incomplete concept or phenomenon, nevertheless it plays a very critical 
role in achieving a better world. Justice ‘sustains its critical function for the present 
precisely because it is not exhausted by its determination’ (Bankovsky, 2012: 2). One 
could argue similarly about ethics. 
 
Ethics’ essential concern pertains to concepts such as freedom, rights, community, self-
realisation, recognition, human nature, rationality, happiness, justice, equality and so 
E 
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on. These, sometimes contradictory, elements of ethics and the way they are 
systematised construct the ethical climate of a society and tell us what is the best way to 
live. Ethics guides us in the way we handle interpersonal relations and build our political 
world. It is therefore essentially concerned with human relatedness and consequently 
also solidarity.52 But ethics, like any other belief system that deals with human relations 
and the organisation of the human world, is susceptible to being misused for ideological 
or other purposes. As Parker (1998: 5) warns: ‘It is reasonable to concede that ethics can 
be ideological […]. Ethics can be unconsciously masculinist or bourgeois, unwittingly 
privileging a certain sort of gender-biased conception of autonomous rationality or 
certain class-biased conceptions of social order’. Besides being ideological, ethics can 
also be judgmental, or, in other words, moralistic. However, despite the fact that ethics 
can be distorted in a way that can privilege or degrade certain groups of people, it is still 
necessary to retain it and to foster it, because only with a strong ethical vocabulary is it 
possible to ‘articulate the humanly destructive impulsions that can lurk precisely in the 
thirst for righteousness’ (Parker, 1998: 7). For this reason it is tremendously important to 
develop such an ethics that can express solidarity, is universal in character and fair in its 
deeds.53 
 
There are many types of and approaches to ethics. From the first systematic treatment 
of ethics in Western philosophy, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, which belongs to the field 
of virtue ethics, to utilitarianism, consequentialism, distributive justice, and normative 
ethics, which I am most interested in. Normative ethics upholds substantive moral 
claims about a just society. It is a branch of ethics that tells us what is right and good, 
and discusses norms of behaviour and organisation (Sher, 2012: 237). Cosmopolitanism 
as a normative theory extends the claims about a just society to a global level. Linklater 
(2007: 20) asks, can cosmopolitanism ‘achieve neutrality between rival ethical !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52 Émile Durkheim understands solidarity in a functional way, that is, as something that holds people 
together. He sees it as a form of social cohesion that is based upon the dependence individuals have on 
each other (Durkheim, 1960). As society progresses, solidarity becomes based on some sort of a functional 
interdependence between people of different occupations. Division of labour produces social cohesion and 
solidarity because it creates a system of rights and duties, which link them together in a durable way 
(Durkheim, 1960: 406). 
53 Manners (2008) sees the European Union as such a normative power that is capable of achieving a 
more just, cosmopolitical world. He claims that through its principles and objectives (sustainable peace, 
social freedom, consensual democracy, associative human rights, supranational rule of law, inclusive 
equality, social solidarity, sustainable development, and good governance), the EU must lead a 
transparent normative ethics ‘that accommodate the social rights and perceptions of the member states 
with those of the EU and its citizens, together with the universal individual rights of non-Europeans, no 
matter where one might live’ (Manners, 2008: 60). 
Chapter 6: The Normative Foundations 
of Critical Cosmopolitanism 
!
- 114 - 
traditions’? Can it locate ethics somewhere between communitarianism and liberalism, 
for instance? In this chapter, I will try to develop critical cosmopolitanism’s ethical 
stance. In the first part of the chapter, I will look at critical theory, particularly Axel 
Honneth’s recognition theory, and the way it conceptualises good life, that is, what is the 
underlying ethics that guides it in pursuit of social justice. In this way, it will be possible 
to compare it to critical cosmopolitanism’s sense of ethics, which will be the topic of the 
second part of this chapter. The focus of the third part of the chapter will be on the 
concept of cosmopolitan solidarity, where the principles of cosmopolitan ethics can be 
applied best and be most visible. 
 
6.1 Good or Ethical Life in Recognition Theory 
 
Critical theory’s underlying aim or purpose is a concern for social justice. It is therefore 
inherently normative, trying to bring about emancipation for subjugated persons and to 
make the world a better place. Critical theory therefore never only moralises, that is, 
engages in moralistic criticism where it would try to firmly separate the good from the 
bad. In what it tries to achieve, it is unavoidably guided by certain norms that are 
immanently formed. Critical theorists avoid using external moralising principles or 
scientific methods, and have therefore developed their own method of critique, 
immanent criticism, which was discussed in previous chapters. In order to change the 
social conditions for the better, critical theory needs to provide a vision of a good life. 
This vision needs to be thick and consistent in order to be able to efficiently criticise the 
pathologies in societies. But how does one come up with the ‘right’ conception of a good 
life? How does a society or an authority form this notion? As Geuss (2004: 131) warns, 
there is no simple empirical path to these answers. One cannot just conduct a poll and 
seek an answer in people’s feelings and thoughts. In fact, he argues that ‘[t]he 
conception of the good life in question is supposed to be the one really embedded in a 
historical formation of society, not whatever people think is the good for people in their 
society’. On of the ways this can be achieved is through dialectical thinking, the task of 
which is to contrast the state of reality with what the latter could be in better 
circumstances.54 However, because the tradition of Critical Theory is so broad, it is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
54 ‘One important task of Critical Theory, then, is to extract from such traditional conceptions both 
positive images of the good life and negative images of lives that are not good, to translate them into a 
form which brings out as clearly as possible those parts of them that are no longer merely utopian, but 
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difficult to identify one and only one vision of good life that critical theory supposedly 
proposes. Different theorists have had different ideas about how the world could or 
should be changed and therefore they have had different ideas as to what counts as good 
life. 
 
Honneth (1996: 171) uses the designations of good life and ethical life interchangeably. 
In any case, he wishes to develop such an understanding of ethical/good life that would 
not be tied to any ‘particular, historically unique visions of the good life’ (Honneth, 
1996: 173).55 In trying to avoid being biased and in determining an impartial moral 
standpoint, Honneth follows Hegel. The latter, like Honneth, does not think that a 
moral standpoint should be completely abandoned but instead that it should be freed of 
its abstractness (Honneth, 2014: 818). Honneth, too, creates the conception of good life 
within the social world. For him it stems from relationality among people, and he 
therefore posits intersubjectivity as a precondition to forming such a conception: ‘The 
intersubjectively obligatory conception of the good life – to which one has, as it were, 
become ethically accustomed – can only be construed as giving all members of the 
community the opportunity to determine their way of life for themselves, within the 
framework of the rights accorded to them’ (Honneth, 1996: 90). What Honneth 
understands to be leading a good or ethical life in a society is for each individual to be 
able to reach self-realisation. This does not mean that everyone is free in an unlimited 
sense since the rights that are given to us bound the actions of us all. Society’s task 
therefore is to expand this spectre of rights in such a way as to ensure the individuals’ 
chance to achieve self-realisation. 
 
In establishing a formal conception of ethical life, the three patterns of recognition (love, 
rights and solidarity) play the most important role. They are appropriately abstract and 
formal in order not to adhere to any particular idea of the good life. On the other hand, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
could actually be reali[s]ed, and to compare our present society with those images. This confrontation is a 
critique of our present. Dialectical thinking critici[s]es existing institutions, practices, or states of affairs 
simply by contrasting what they are with what they could be, and are in some sense striving to be but are 
not’ (Geuss, 2004: 133). 
55 On why we cannot build a model of ethical life that would be acceptable for the generations to come, 
Honneth (2014: 822) says that individual’s inclinations and outlooks change and therefore the ethical 
norms once intersubjectively accepted can lose their motivational power and their objective validity. 
Therefore, ethical life must not be something set in stone but historically open in order to allow for the 
norms to change and gain acceptance in different historical and societal contexts. 
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however, their content is also not empty nor too abstract to be applied to societal life. In 
Honneth’s (1996: 174) words, they are:  
 
‘detailed enough to say more about the general structures of a successful life 
than is entailed by general references to individual self-determination. The 
forms of recognition associated with love, rights, and solidarity provide the 
intersubjective protection that safeguards the conditions for external and 
internal freedom, upon which the process of articulating and realizing 
individual life-goals without coercion depends. Moreover, since they do not 
represent established institutional structures but only general patterns of 
behaviour, they can be distilled, as structural elements, from the concrete 
totality of all particular forms of life’. 
 
The concept of good or ethical life therefore includes all those intersubjective 
prerequisites that make the self-realisation of any person possible at all.56 Ethical norms 
must be mutually accepted and upheld in order for them to be valid. And because 
people’s preferences change, and are not the same as others’ in the first place, ethical 
norms have to always remain open to contestation. Again, Honneth (2014: 823) is 
following Hegel: ‘We saw that on Hegel’s view, merely given, habitually practised norms 
are transformed into ethical obligations when the participants in the relevant practice 
mutually accord each other the authority to hold their respective actions to certain 
fundamental standards’. Therefore, Honneth thinks that the ethical sphere and 
institutionalised moral action are necessarily established in connection to the relations of 
mutual recognition: 
 
‘Thus there can be no ethical sphere, no institutionalised domain of moral 
action, that is not anchored in relations of reciprocal recognition. This 
individual empowerment gives each participant the right to cite reasons that in 
light of a collectively shared norm speak against one person’s or several other 
persons’ particular way of putting that norm into practice. Generally speaking 
it is therefore part of the everyday exercise of an ethical practice that despite 
the emergence of shared habits, the application of the standards inherent in !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
56 Honneth (2014: 819) writes: ‘Each act of recognition consists in according to one or several other 
persons the authority to judge the normative aptness of one’s own actions. In offering recognition, the 
recogni[s]ing agent ‘infringes on’ his ‘self-love’ insofar as he now knows himself to be bound by the norm 
with respect to whose application he has granted the other agent or agents a say. Thus on Hegel’s account 
a practice deserves the label ‘ethical’ only if a group of persons, which may vary in size, follows a norm to 
which each among them may in principle appeal to evaluate the actions of one of the other participants. 
This condition excludes both unilaterally enforced interactions and action from mere routine, and only 
when the condition is met does social reality exhibit the interplay of self-determination and normative 
obligation that Kant thought could be understood only as an isolated act of reflection removed from 
everyday practice’. 
Chapter 6: The Normative Foundations 
of Critical Cosmopolitanism 
!
- 117 - 
the practice remains subject to contestation since there is a continual stream of 
novel objections and reservations’ (Honneth, 2014: 823). 
 
This ethical stance of recognition theory therefore envisages a different kind of justice 
than mere fair distribution of goods. Because it is based on intersubjectivity (each 
person's consideration of another, and vice versa) relationality, and the ever-present 
interdependence among beings, the justice it purports to cannot be based only on the 
materiality and utilitarianism of the exchange of commodities. The normative aim of 
recognition theory is not the eradication of material inequality anymore, ‘but the 
avoidance of humiliation or disrespect’, where central categories become dignity and 
respect (Honneth, 2004: 351). Such social justice is plural because ‘subjects in modem 
societies are reliant in their identity formation on three forms of social recognition, 
founded in the sphere-specific principles of love, of equal treatment in law and of social 
esteem’ (Honneth, 2004: 358). 
 
It would be a difficult task to try to designate Honneth’s or recognition theory’s ethics as 
deontological, utilitarian (consequentialist) or even as virtue ethics. The Good for 
Honneth is the possibility of the individual to achieve self-realisation, which is a broad 
term that encompasses everything from being able to participate in society to feeling 
content. In this sense, it adheres to some sort of a utilitarian, if not even consequentialist, 
ethics since it strives to realise the end goal and with it the Good in life. On the other 
hand, we could say that the ethics on which recognition theory is based also fits in well 
with deontological theories, which emphasise our duty to fellow human beings. Because 
consequentialist theories sometimes allow anything in order to attain the Good (the 
Good before the Right), they need to be balanced with deontological ones. Recognition 
theory does precisely this. The pursuit of the good is equal to the duty not to disrespect 
anyone. So, besides its normativity, recognition theory also displays characteristics of 
deontological and utilitarian ethical theories.  
 
Honneth (1996: 91) admits that such a formalistic conception of ethical life does not 
explain why people would feel the motivation to be in solidarity with others. 
Consequently, there needs to be some sort of incentive in order for people to feel the 
need to act in solidarity with others. Such a positive motivating force in a society could 
be an orientation to shared goals and values. To recognise somebody in the spirit of 
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concern or solidarity, one needs to possess the common experience that warns them 
against certain threats. Possessing knowledge about what the threats might be also 
means possessing knowledge about what is the good life within this community 
(Honneth, 1996: 91). In this way, the orientation towards shared goals and values makes 
it possible to exercise solidarity and also social integration. Honneth believes that 
negative solidarity has already linked us together, but what is missing in societies is a 
more positive type of solidarity. He sees the answer in commitment to realising shared 
values and building a good life. Of course there are competing views about how viable 
this is – liberalists argue for a more individualistic approach, and communitarians put 
community and shared values before the individual. For Honneth, solidarity is not 
something that one does for someone else out of sympathy or friendliness. He sees it as 
part of a more general societal climate where common values are identified in a way 
that everyone can contribute to realising them and are therefore able to acquire self-
esteem. 
 
6.2 Critical Cosmopolitanism’s Ethics 
 
When we talk about the ethics of world politics or global affairs, it is important to 
distinguish between two approaches that I will be trying to combine in order to 
overcome the shortcomings of each of them. There are many opposing camps when it 
comes to discussions about cosmopolitan or global ethics. These include, for instance, 
cosmopolitan vs. communitarian57 or normative vs. realist debate. But, as Brassett and 
Bulley (2007) point out, we need to go past these totalising dichotomies and not settle 
just for one of the options. They think that in the mutual engagement of the 
cosmopolitan and critical perspectives on ethics in world politics there is a chance of 
moving beyond such dichotomies.58 Whereas the cosmopolitan approaches to ethics 
usually emphasise suffering and builds its ethics around it, critical approaches take into 
account relationality59 and future-orientation. Critical cosmopolitanism’s underlying 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57 Jones (1999), for instance, explores the debate between cosmopolitans and communitarians in the area 
of international distributive justice. 
58 They see a connection in suffering. Cosmopolitan approaches try to expand the scope of what is 
thought as meaningful suffering (or to expand our ethical concern), whereas critical approaches warn how 
assumptions of ethics can in fact produce the ethical limits of a problem. 
59 See, for instance, Vaughan-Williams’ (2007) relational view of singularity. 
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ethics tries to combine the two approaches. It does not abandon the notion of suffering, 
nor does it lack critical engagement with social ontology and relations among people. 
 
Honneth’s recognition theory is founded on a universalistic and formal ethical theory. 
The ethics of critical cosmopolitanism is similar in some respects yet a bit different. 
Cosmopolitan ethics is most commonly understood as the rejection of ‘arbitrary 
distinctions with regard to which persons have equal moral standing’ (Franceschet, 
2005: 114). Such formulation pertains mostly to legal recognition, though. Just like in 
Honneth’s approach, cosmopolitanism offers a more substantial approach to ethics, the 
kind that is linked to justice and therefore obligation. There is of course evidence of 
some cosmopolitan ethical values present in the everyday world community, but, as 
Shapcott (2010) calls it, this is nothing but the spirit of charity. The true ethics of 
cosmopolitanism is found in its doctrine of obligation. It is also true that cosmopolitan 
ethics is about treating others with respect and the idea of a common human 
community (Shapcott, 2010), but critical cosmopolitanism as an analytical tool needs 
additional characteristics explained. 
 
I argue that critical cosmopolitanism’s sense of ethics consists of three distinct 
characteristics that separate critical cosmopolitanism from cosmopolitanisms, which 
may contain some ideological traits. Critical cosmopolitanism’s sense of ethics and 
therefore justice is premised on the belief that there can be no blueprint for a certain 
way of life or the good life. Something that is good for somebody could be oppressive for 
someone else. Therefore, critical cosmopolitanism tries to judge each social situation in 
its particularity and remain impartial – not neutral in the sense of not adhering to any of 
the existing beliefs but resorting to judgement, moderation and stemming from the idea 
of human interrelatedness and interdependence. Critical cosmopolitanism is not a 
totalising, prescriptive set of ideas that are outlined in advance and applied to the social 
world. It does indeed consist of principles and beliefs but it is not dogmatic in its 
treatment of social reality. Its critical dimension condemns certain social and political 
situations but what is the ground on which it does so? What makes critical 
cosmopolitanism ethical and a critical analytical tool? Which are those attributes that 
must always be a part of its analytical and critical method? I claim that these are 
moderation, judgement and singularity. With these three traits, critical cosmopolitanism 
analyses and criticises the existing social world. 
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6.2.1 Mediations and Moderation 
 
Critical cosmopolitanism does not reduce norms, principles, and justice to the ‘right’ 
ones. It does not proclaim the correct kind of life. It also does not serve any particular 
interests except those of social justice, moral inclusion and an ethical commitment to the 
improvement of the world. Benhabib (2006), too, understands cosmopolitanism in a 
similar manner. In order to retrieve dialogic universalism, which is one of the 
undertakings of (critical) cosmopolitanism, one must not resort to totalisations but seek 
mediations – to combine seeming opposites, to shed new light on a matter from a non-
standard perspective, to seek new ways of engaging with and understanding the world: 
 
‘Unlike communitarians who reduce the demands of morality to those claims that 
are deemed valid by specific ethical, cultural and political communities, and 
unlike realists and postmodernists who are skeptical that political norms can ever 
be judged in the light of moral ones, I will insist on the necessary disjunction as well as 
the necessary mediation between the moral and the ethical, the moral and the political. The task 
is one of mediations, not reductions. How can one mediate moral universalism 
with ethical particularism? How can one mediate legal and political norms with 
moral ones? Such a strategy of mediation is crucial to reclaiming dialogic 
universalism. Cosmopolitanism then is a philosophical project of mediations, not 
of reductions or of totali[s]ations’ (Benhabib et al., 2006: 19–20). 
 
Critical cosmopolitanism’s ethical position is therefore somewhere in the middle or 
between two or more extremes. However, although a middle position can sometimes be 
perceived as meek, critical cosmopolitanism is not at all a passive or submissive position. 
It is a position of constant activity of judgement and trying to evade the tyranny of 
absolutes. It is also not a purely philosophical procedure. It is not sterile but takes into 
account humanness. Just like Camus (2000) says when he describes a rebel – a rebel 
does not act in a sterile manner and pursue sterile goals but does so also because of his 
or her own passion, feelings, love. Comparably, critical cosmopolitanism also does not 
advocate sterile norms but, rather, allows for the humanness that is inevitably a part of 
our decision-making, our desire to change the world and to revolt. Delanty (2009: 14–
15) similarly claims that cosmopolitanism should be understood as an orientation, 
allowing for our imagination to change and orient itself according to the social 
circumstances. Critical cosmopolitanism, just like Honneth’s concept of recognition, 
strongly takes into account people’s experiences and their feelings, observations, and 
perceptions. 
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Moderation is therefore a sort of rebellion. In order to avoid extremes, which we all so 
easily fall into, there needs to be constant rebellion, contestation, and questioning. Thus, 
there exists a continuous tension in order to retain that middle position and not to fall in 
into either of the two extremes. As Camus (2000: 264–5; my emphasis) so eloquently 
writes: 
 
‘[…] excess is always a comfort, and sometimes a career. Moderation, on the 
one hand, is nothing but pure tension. It smiles, no doubt, and our 
convulsionists, dedicated to elaborate apocalypses, despise it. But its smile shines 
brightly at the climax of an interminable effort: it is in itself a supplementary 
source of strength. […] Moderation is not the opposite of rebellion. Rebellion in 
itself is moderation, and it demands, defends, re-creates it throughout history 
and its eternal disturbances. The very origin of this value guarantees us that it 
can only be partially destroyed. Moderation, born of rebellion, can only live by 
rebellion. It is a perpetual conflict, continually created and mastered by the 
intelligence. It does not triumph either in the impossible or in the abyss. It finds its 
equilibrium through them. Whatever we may do, excess will always keep its place in 
the heart of man, in the place where solitude is found. We all carry with us our 
places of exile, our crimes, and our ravages. But our task is not to unleash them 
on the world; it is to fight them in ourselves and in others’. 
 
Cosmopolitanism, too, is a kind of moderation and (therefore) a rebellion. Dissent is a 
foundation of cosmopolitanism (Carauș, 2015: 20). Such cosmopolitanism is not 
grounded on something given but on something that constantly moves – it presumes ‘a 
perpetual withdrawal of the ground of any political power/authority and, indirectly, of 
any ground. The human being as conceived through dissent is not an entity fixed once 
and for all but is reaffirmed through an endless questioning of the given. Through such 
questioning, dissent keeps open the possibility of “true” universality and 
cosmopolitanism and points to the human subject’s fundamental indeterminacy and 
openness’ (Carauș, 2015: 20). Critical cosmopolitanism is therefore post-foundational, 
defying the foundations that are supposed to regulate the social world, and trying to find 
some balance in the midst of ever-moving and changing social conditions. 
 
6.2.2 Judgement and the Common World 
 
A big part of critical cosmopolitanism and its methodology represents the faculty of 
judgement. The capacity for independent judgement is crucial for critical cosmopolitans 
because, as was stated immediately above, critical cosmopolitanism does not rely on 
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stable foundations that would offer answers in each situation. The capacity to judge 
independently or reflectively must therefore come from our shared world and values, 
and then be applied to a particular situation. Judging is a very worldly activity which 
acknowledges and at the same time establishes our common world. It recognises 
plurality and allows for it, and is very public in character. 
 
Thinking independently is of course connected to the faculty of judgement, because the 
two supplement each other in an important way. Judgement needs thinking to be able to 
come into existence in the first place, and thinking needs judgement in order to be 
revealed in the world instead of being abstract and detached from it. So, there is a major 
difference between the two – thinking is private and dwells on matters that are not 
present to our senses, whereas judgement always deals with actual phenomena and 
particular things nearby (Fine, 2008: 161). Judging involves autonomous thinking but it 
must be done publicly: ‘thought without public expression and response loses its way. 
To think is also to be prepared to think things through with others’ (Deutscher, 2007: 
xiii). It was Arendt who took Kant’s cosmopolitan conception of enlarged thought and 
used it to illuminate the shift from experience to critique which means a change from 
thinking privately to thinking from a public standpoint (Disch, 1993: 682). Thinking 
allows judgement to get rid of pre-established, conformist principles and thoughts, and 
helps an ‘individual to judge for him or herself instead of being carried away by the 
actions and opinions of the majority’ (d’Entrèves, 2000: 249). Similarly, Steinberger 
(1990: 812) claims that the exercise of political judgements corresponds to a specifically 
political form of thinking in the presence of other subjects. The presence of others is 
therefore very important when it comes to judging the world. Judgement can be validly 
exercised only if a subject thinks representatively, which means only when he or she 
looks at matters from the perspective of everyone else. To be able to do so, one must 
always exercise judgement in the public common world, where subjects get an 
uncoerced opportunity to discuss their thoughts with others (d’Entrèves, 2000: 253–4). 
Put differently, judging necessitates ‘worldliness’ which means cultivating an interest in 
worldly matters and other people, alongside with the capacity to appropriately assess 
their viewpoints (Benhabib, 2003: 191). 
 
Therefore, judgement is plausible only when it gains the support of a plurality of 
autonomously thinking individuals. The sources for judgement cannot be of a 
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transcendental nature because transcendental standards are already a matter of 
judgement and are themselves established on intersubjectively derived criteria (Parekh, 
1981: 89). Judgement of the world must come from within that world and is therefore a 
worldly action. It ‘reflects a commitment to the world insofar as it implies a concern 
with worldly conditions. Judging requires the presence of others to whom one can 
appear and with whom one can “visit” and, moreover, judg[e]ments are made about 
worldly phenomena’ (Taylor, 2002: 163). I believe that critical cosmopolitanism 
contains similar forms of judgement – the latter should always be about the world and 
activities in the world. The criteria for judging in the spirit of cosmopolitanism should 
not be fixed or transcendental but built in public and within the context of that 
particular phenomenon. The normativity of critical cosmopolitanism is therefore not 
principle-based because principles change, they can be biased and they are not 
applicable to every particular social or political situation. The normativity of critical 
cosmopolitanism is judgement-based (Ferrara, 2007). Reflective judgement is a way of 
assessing the state of an identity’, which means that in order to avoid the ethical or 
political dominance of one group over another, for instance, the issue should be judged 
‘from the standpoint of the affirmation of the identity of humankind, the one which by 
definition encompasses all other identities in conflict and cannot be transcended’ 
(Ferrara, 2007: 63). 
 
‘Our reflective endorsement of what is reasonable, however, only starts from our 
parochial self-conception, but by no means remains hostage to it. The 
contribution of others within the common exercise of public reason may change 
our self-conception by pointing to new and as yet unexplored alternatives. The 
reasonable then is inherently a critical and transformative force. Within its 
implicit claim to fit more exemplarily than the alternatives with our shared 
premises and (since fit cannot be understood in merely logical terms) within its 
implicit claim to better fit with our sense of who we could be at our best, is 
embedded a potential critique of the “actual acceptance” of norms, institutions, 
policies, and so on – a critique not based on principles that transcend who we 
are qua political community but on the authenticity of a modern identity in 
which we partake qua free and equal citizens respecting each other’ (Ferrara, 
2007: 61). 
 
It is interesting to see what role judgement plays also in cosmopolitan solidarity. 
Chouliaraki (2012) sees judgement and imagination60 as preconditions for cosmopolitan !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60 Chouliaraki (2012: 92) sees imagination of the Other as crucial to solidarity, with this imaginative 
mobility making it possible for the voices of vulnerable people to be heard. 
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solidarity. Through judgement, helping the vulnerable or those in need becomes ‘a 
matter of public justification rather than private preference’ (Chouliaraki, 2012: 90). In 
the previous chapter we have already seen why this is so important. Solidarity must not 
(just) come out of private feelings of pity and compassion. It must have a public 
justification. Judgement makes it possible for solidarity to become a question of the 
social values that induce action and to problematise human vulnerability as a question 
of global injustice, collective responsibility and social change (Chouliaraki, 2012: 91).61 
 
6.2.3 Relationality and Singularity 
 
The normative underpinning of critical cosmopolitanism must take into account one 
more characteristic of the social world in order to be able to judge and criticise human 
relations and institutions. The social world is not comprised of independent, isolated 
human entities. We are all interrelated and interdependent upon each other. We have 
to talk about a shared reality and to understand that it imposes obligations upon us. Our 
obligations are to creating the conditions that make life possible, not to life itself, and 
these conditions are both our political responsibility and the matter of our most vexed 
ethical decisions (Butler, 2009: 23). In order to create these conditions to make life 
possible, we must be aware of the relationality that characterises our common world. 
Cosmopolitanism is essentially related to the common, shared world. The cosmopolitan 
common world is intersubjectively built, and it is a world of plurality and mutual 
engagement. It is not only a world in which we collectively face the same destiny and 
problems; it must also be understood in a positive way – it is built by us, political and 
ethical responsibilities stem from it, and men and women are conditioned by it. The 
cosmopolitan subject cannot be completely ‘rootless’, that is, to exist without any sense 
of belonging. Being rootless would not only mean that we do not feel any kind of 
belonging to anyone or any place, but also that we are completely detached from the 
common world and unable to relate to other people. We therefore need to look at 
human beings and how they relate to each other from a different aspect, one that does 
not presuppose any membership or non-membership of any kind of political, religious !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
61 Chouliaraki (2012: 91) says: ‘It is by carving out the communicative space wherein the radical plurality 
of these standpoints becomes the object of politics, that is to say the object of public deliberation and 
collective judgement, that agonistic solidarity may be able to galvani[s]e the sensibilities of Western 
publics towards other-oriented, rather than self-oriented, expressions of solidarity’. 
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or other entities except humanity as such. But how is this possible? We need to 
understand that what we all share is the (bodily) precarity of our lives and the 
consequent interdependence and interconnectedness among people. If we accept such 
understanding, then we can characterise relations between people as being primarily 
marked by interdependence without essentialising or making false generalisations and 
universalisations.62 
 
Such ethical and political relationality must also presuppose a certain type of 
subjectivity. Vaughan-Williams (2007) posits that if we want to achieve a more critical 
approach in cosmopolitan ethics, we should understand subjectivity in relational terms. 
This relational view of subjectivity is called, following Jacques Derrida, singularity. 
What exactly singularity means is difficult to identify. It is not identical, as Vaughan-
Williams (2007: 116) writes, to citizen, political subject or even human being: ‘Derrida 
opens up the possibility of conceiving ethico-political relations between all forms of life, 
irrespective of conventional distinctions such as citizen/non-citizen, human/animal, 
and so on. Such categorisations are far from somehow stable, natural or neutral’. But 
the “usefulness” of such a concept lies precisely in its openness. As soon as singularity is 
defined in positive, negative or any other way, it looses its singularity and is therefore 
not singular anymore. On the other hand, Vaughan-Williams (2007: 116) believes that 
for something or someone to be singular ‘it has to be, even in a very minimal way, like 
something – or indeed everything – else’. Therefore, nothing can be absolutely or purely 
singular because we would not even be able to recognise it (Thomson in Vaughan-
Williams, 2007: 116). What does this mean? It means that singularity cannot be 
understood on its own, but must always be seen ‘with or in relation to the other 
singularities that make it singular’ (Vaughan-Williams, 2007: 116). Singularity captures 
individuality and plurality at the same time. Such a conception of subjectivity is similarly 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
62 Butler (2009: 13–14) writes: ‘Precariousness implies living socially, that is, the fact that one's life is 
always in some sense in the hands of the other. It implies exposure both to those we know and to those we 
do not know; a dependency on people we know, or barely know, or know not at all. Reciprocally, it 
implies being impinged upon by the exposure and dependency of others, most of whom remain 
anonymous. These are not necessarily relations of love or even of care, but constitute obligations toward 
others, most of whom we cannot name and do not know, and who may or may not bear traits of 
familiarity to an established sense of who “we” are. In the interest of speaking in common parlance, we 
could say that “we” have such obligations to “others” and presume that we know who “we” are in such an 
instance. The social implication of this view, however, is precisely that the “we” does not, and cannot, 
recogni[s]e itself, that it is riven from the start, interrupted by alterity, as Levinas has said, and the 
obligations “we” have are precisely those that disrupt any established notion of the “we”’. 
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thought of in connection to the cosmopolitan subject in anthropological writings. There, 
the cosmopolitan subject, or Anyone as Nigel Rapport (2012b) calls him or her, also 
possesses a singular value in the sense that they are both individualistic as well as 
universal, everyone possessing singularity, and therefore human: 
 
‘“Anyone” is distinct from both “Everyman” and “homo sacer” in that it 
collapses the distinction between zoë and bios. The human individual does not 
need to be or do any particular thing – whether engage in conventional 
exchanges or do good in conventional ways – in order to accede to a full 
humanity. Being human is Anyone’s birthright. It is not the place of others to 
define what activities or what ideologies Anyone needs to practise in order to 
exhibit human dignity. Nor, indeed, can anyone else define for Anyone what 
dignity feels like or how it is to be interpreted: this is something that Anyone 
must know for himself or herself. Anyone’s humanity precisely is this capacity 
to feel, interpret and come to know for himself and herself. Anyone’s 
birthright, it might be said, is his or her futurity: the capacity to define the 
human in the context of his or her individual life. The tie between Anyone and 
humankind – microcosm to macrocosm – is immanent and irreducible’ 
(Rapport, 2012b: 4). 
 
However, the difference between Rapport’s and Vaughan-Williams’ (or Derrida’s) 
account of singularity is that the former does not think that engagement with others is a 
prerequisite to being or becoming singular. But then how will the subject attain that 
humanness which comes with singularity if not also by interacting with other 
singularities? 
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6.3 The Concept of Cosmopolitan Solidarity 
 
And if I cried, who’d listen to me in those angelic  
orders? Even if one of them suddenly held me 
 to his heart, I’d vanish in his overwhelming 
presence. Because beauty’s nothing 
but the start of terror we can hardly bear, 
and we adore it because of the serene scorn 
 it could kill us with. Every angel’s terrifying. 
So I control myself and choke back the lure   
of my dark cry. Ah, who can we turn to, 
 then? Neither angels nor men, 
and the animals already know by instinct 
we’re not comfortably at home 
 in our translated world.  
 
R. M. Rilke, Duino Elegies, The First Elegy (Rilke and Poulin, 1977) 
 
As in the first line of Rilke’s Duino Elegies, so too we must sometimes ask ourselves: And 
if I cried, who'd listen to me in those angelic orders? That is to say, who would help one in one’s 
time of need? Help them, but not subsume them under our being. Help them, but not 
make them vanish in pity? Thus, are angels, or those who can help, capable of 
responding according to a stranger’s cry of need? This is a widespread dilemma in a 
world where everyone is a stranger to each other and, to a certain extent, to oneself as 
well. This part of the chapter deals with the idea of cosmopolitan solidarity, a concept 
that tries to reconcile strangeness and relatedness in spite of the oft-alienating world, on 
the one hand, and a too personal one, on the other. Today’s world of mass societies is 
becoming increasingly characterised as apathetic, if not insensitive. Contemporary 
economic and social crises, the rise of extreme right movements, the proliferation of 
ethnic and religious conflicts, oppressed peoples’ suffering, and the clash of global 
ideologies all call for stronger solidarity, including ‘solidarity among strangers’, as 
conceived of by Habermas (2001: 16) – a kind which surpasses the borders of 
conventional nation-states. Although there is wide-ranging academic research on the 
notion of solidarity (Stjernø, 2004; Bayertz, 1999; Rorty, 1989; Sturm, 1998; 
Brunkhorst, 2005; Pensky, 2008; Hechter, 1987; Turner and Rojek, 2001), much less 
scholarship has been dedicated to studying the concept of cosmopolitan solidarity (Fine, 
2012; Kurasawa, 2004; Wilde, 2013; Derpmann, 2009; Jabri, 2007; Stevenson, 2006; 
Ward, 2013). Our interconnected world, which inevitably draws attention to our 
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commonalities, calls for a sense of solidarity that is able to transcend physical and 
mental boundaries, while still remaining committed to (cosmopolitan) ideas and using 
them as guidance for action. 
 
They way cosmopolitan solidarity is conceptualised here focuses on the way people 
relate to each other, engage with the Other, and understand themselves and the world. 
A concept of cosmopolitan solidarity is one that will take into account the differences 
among people but still be able to hold people together. Or, in the words of Brunkhorst 
(2005: 4–5), ‘the concept of solidarity – and here we connect to Durkheim – is rooted 
“not in community [Gemeinschaft], but is an inherent element of society [Gesellschaft].” 
Solidarity dialectically combines opposites, contradictions, and differences. The 
difference, heterogeneity, and fragmentation that “can still be held together” are the 
“criterion for solidarity”’. Cosmopolitan solidarity is substantiated by three 
characteristics that express a cosmopolitan disposition: engagement with otherness and 
respect for difference; acknowledgement of the common world; and (self-)understanding. 
These three characteristics make for an understanding of solidarity that is particularly 
apt for conceptualising cosmopolitan solidarity.63 
 
As David Hoy (Hoy and McCarthy, 1994: 257) observes, solidarity is a difficult notion. 
On the one hand, it can be seen as a form of an ‘admirable social ideal’. On the other, it 
can be taken as fundamentally exclusive. More specifically, with each affirmation of we, 
them becomes a necessary ramification. It is therefore no surprise that solidarity is a 
concept held in suspicion especially when it is thought of in connection to 
cosmopolitanism which tries to avoid a discriminating categorisation of people or 
universalisation of one ideal: ‘On epistemological grounds, many doubt that there is a 
shared, universal human nature that could provide common ground among diverse 
human communities and individuals. And when solidarity does seem to emerge, it is 
often interpreted as either a contingent confluence of individuals with a shared cultural 
or ethnic inheritance, or an enforced uniformity that merely gives the impression of !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63 In comparing national and cosmopolitan solidarity, I would emphasise three main differences. First, 
national solidarity is in a way pre-given, that is, we are connected to and in solidarity with each other 
because we share the same nationality. Nationality is the common denominator that can work in either a 
positive or negative way if it turns into extreme nationalist sentiments. Second, national solidarity is 
backed by strong institutions that can ensure it gets realised and fairly ‘distributed’. And third, national 
solidarity does usually not acknowledge the common world that we live in since it is limited in scope in 
terms of the groups of people it concerns. 
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solidarity’ (Cladis, 2005: 386). It is perhaps for reasons like these that it becomes difficult 
for one to envisage a form of solidarity that could be called cosmopolitan. Ideally, 
cosmopolitan solidarity should, in accordance with cosmopolitanism’s claim to the equal 
moral status of all human beings, consider everyone with an equal eye and not form 
binary camps. Such solidarity would be guided by the idea of cosmopolitanism, which 
lies, as Fine (2007: x) argues, in the belief that humanity must face common difficulties 
together and that this is the way that people create communities with others. However, 
this appears to be an arduous, if not an impossible, task.  
 
The concept of solidarity is both prescriptive and descriptive. It describes the network of 
communal relationships from which we originate and that define who we are, and it 
prescribes our moral and political obligations towards this network (Capaldi, 1999: 39). 
However, solidarity is a modern and highly contested concept. It can be appraised from 
a moral, political, institutional or social perspective; it can be related to emotion, 
struggle, politics, or norms. Despite its manifold connotations, one thing is clear: 
solidarity imposes a moral and political obligation on us to promote the well-being of 
other fellow men and women. According to Brunkhorst (2005: 3), solidarity is not the 
other of justice but the democratic realisation of individual freedom, and thus not a 
mercy but a right. As such, it is inherently intersubjective in character because it must 
be constructed in struggle, but also in collaboration, with others, and therefore it does 
not belong only to the individual: ‘Solidarity is developed through communicative 
action and the ability to take the role of the “other(s)”. […] Thus, solidarity means a 
readiness for collective action and a will to institutionalise it through the establishment 
of rights and citizenship. It is normally expressed through relating to others who are 
engaged in struggle’ (Stjernø, 2004: 326).  
 
What about cosmopolitanism? It can be understood as ‘a way of being in the world, a 
way of constructing an identity for oneself’ (Waldron, 2000: 227) as well as ‘a form of 
consciousness that involves an understanding of the concept of cosmopolitanism and a 
capacity to deploy this concept in imaginative and reflective ways’ (Fine, 2007: xiii). 
Cosmopolitanism thus concerns the Self and a way of being in the world, and if this is 
the case then it inevitably also includes the Other. Cosmopolitanism is therefore 
unavoidably about relations to others, which means that it always tries to negotiate and 
incorporate the viewpoints of others. Thus, it is in the relationship between the Self, the 
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Other and the World that cosmopolitanism comes into play (Delanty, 2009: 14–15). As 
mentioned earlier in the chapter, Delanty understands cosmopolitanism to be an 
orientation which permits the subject to distance him- or herself from their own 
viewpoint and ‘requires in some way a problematisation of one’s own assumptions as 
well as those of the Other’ (Delanty, 2009: 16). One’s ability to self-problematise, be 
reflexive and distanced from one’s own customs and outlook that exemplify the 
cosmopolitan imagination.  
 
We live in a world of ‘interrelated foreignness’, asserts Gadamer (1999a: 4), and in this 
situation we need to ask ourselves what an avowed solidarity should be. When Gadamer 
talks about solidarity, he first turns to the idea of friendship conceived by the ancient 
Greeks. Even though one cannot equate friendship to solidarity, there are certain 
connections between them which can illuminate the nature of solidarity and where it 
stems from. Of course, we cannot argue, and nor would we want to, that friendship 
among all people or citizens of the world is possible or even desirable. But there are 
certainly links between the two notions, and therefore it is useful to explore them in light 
of how Gadamer develops the notion of solidarity from the concept of friendship. So, 
one cannot talk about Gadamer’s account of solidarity without thinking about the 
notions of friendship and otherness as well. The latter two concepts are inherently 
connected to solidarity as understood by Gadamer. In a short essay, titled Friendship and 
Solidarity (1999a), where he deals with the question of solidarity most comprehensively 
though still not entirely consistently, he begins with a discussion of how the ancient 
Greeks thought about the idea of friendship. He writes, ‘it is worth it to make clear how 
we all share in both, in friendship and solidarity, and that we have to defend this 
inseparableness’ (1999a: 4–5). However, even though he posits that there are undeniable 
similarities between friendship and solidarity, he does not want to equate them. There 
are of course drawbacks to tying friendship with solidarity – such a move can even be 
questionable. For instance, our friends (or ‘I’ as a friend) can indeed value our 
distinctiveness but at the same time, can also be blinded or overwhelmed by their 
admiration and love for us to the point of glossing over our wrongdoings. Gadamer is 
aware of this but tries to find an underlying base that makes friendship among strangers 
possible in the first place. The question is not how it is possible to be united with another 
person but how to relate to them without also be subsumed under their being. Gadamer 
(1980: 8) asserts that ‘the question of friendship is aimed at uncovering what the just 
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community is’. Thus, there are three important characteristics of friendship that (can) 
translate also into solidarity, and that, as I will argue, express a certain cosmopolitan 
sensibility. These are: engagement with otherness and consequential respect for 
difference; the common world and interdependence; and (self-)understanding.  
 
Gadamer holds that the characteristics of friendship translate also into solidarity. The 
first characteristic of friendship that can also be found in solidarity is that of a certain 
engagement with others and otherness, and a resulting respect for difference. The way 
Gadamer conceptualises the Other and otherness is especially relevant and interesting 
in the light of cosmopolitanism. As said earlier, he explicitly states that friendship is not 
based on ‘like finding like’ and, rather, that the opposite is true. This shows that it is not 
necessary to establish a shared identity in order to build friendship or solidarity with 
another person or group. Cosmopolitanism works in a similar manner. It tries to avoid 
the ‘postmodern identification of universalism as such with the suppression of difference 
and exclusion of the Other’ as well as the ‘modernist identification of the universal with 
some socially selected particular’ (Fine, 2007: 135). To understand solidarity as it is 
comprehended by Gadamer, and especially by way of its first characteristic, it is perhaps 
useful to look at it in relation to the idea that stands in opposition to it. Take, for 
instance, Richard Rorty’s (1989) understanding of solidarity. Gadamer rejects Rorty’s 
conception of solidarity because it is still tied to the recognition that we all share certain 
characteristics (Walhof, 2006: 575): ‘For Rorty solidarity is the consequence of 
identification; it proceeds from a knowledge that those included in the “us” have 
something in common. This is what allows Rorty to advocate the creation of new, 
broader forms of solidarity. Contrastingly, Gadamer counter-argues that, we cannot 
create solidarities because they are not the consequence of a consciousness of 
similarities’ 64  (Walhof, 2006: 575). Gadamer’s political thought allows us to 
conceptualise solidarity and otherness without making the Other the same as us or 
leaving the Other completely other (Walhof, 2006: 569). Gadamer rejects solidarity 
based on the identification and the expansion of ‘us’, which is Rorty’s approach. For 
Gadamer, solidarity is connected to practice, which means using reason to make choices 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64 Solidarity, for Gadamer, is ‘a form of world experience and social reality that one cannot plan for by 
forced objectification or produce through artificial institutions. For, on the contrary, solidarity precedes all 
possible concerns and effects of institutions, economic systems, judicial systems, and social mores, sustains 
them, and makes them possible’ (Gadamer, 2002: 123). 
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and to ‘identify with the universal’ (Gadamer, 1998: 48).65 He disconnects solidarity 
from any necessary grounding in pre-existing affinities such as religion and nationality 
(Warnke, 2012: 8). To be in solidarity with others does not mean that we recognise 
others as being like ‘us’ but that we recognise them at all – that we see them as distinct 
others with specific differences that pick them out from an undifferentiated homogeneity 
(Warnke, 2012: 11). It is a form of recognition, just as human rights are a certain social 
form of recognition and are therefore relational (Fine, 2012).  
 
In solidarity, as it is conceptualised by Gadamer, one therefore acknowledges the 
identity of both the concrete as well as the generalised other in a very cosmopolitan 
manner. Seyla Benhabib (2011) claims that in order to recognise a being that is entitled 
to rights one needs to acknowledge both standpoints. She (2011: 69) argues that if 
someone recognises another person because they are alike in some sense, then the first 
person denies that the other is an individual and unique. On the other hand, if someone 
grants recognition to another because the latter is so different, then the former denies 
their common humanity. This is precisely where Gadamer’s conception of solidarity 
excels and shows its cosmopolitan merit: the Other is not perceived of as only a 
generalised other, that is, abstracted from individuality and integrated into boundless 
togetherness, but also as a concrete other, respecting their differences and individuality. 
A sense of togetherness is, however, just as important for Gadamer: ‘the task of learning 
to recogni[s]e the common in another and in something different, is more pressing than 
ever. In our ever smaller world, cultures, religions, customs, and values of the most 
different variety are encountered. It would be an illusion to think that only a rational 
system of utilities, so to say, a religion of world economy, could regulate human 
coexistence on this constantly smaller planet’ (Gadamer, 1992: 219). 
 
The acknowledgement of a common world or life together is the second characteristic of 
solidarity. Solidarity is a presupposition of life together, of that ‘self-evident 
communality which alone allows for the common establishment of decisions which each !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65 Gadamer (1999b: 116) writes: ‘It remains uncertain whether some future world culture will succeed in 
overcoming all distances and relativities, unifying the moral concepts and moral systems of humanity in 
one common ethos, perhaps in view of the ecological crisis or the danger of atomic war that threatens the 
future of all humanity. But it seems clear that only then will it become possible for practical philosophy to 
communicate the universal validity of its insights to the normative consciousness and its concretion in the 
consciousness of each person. This would return practical philosophy to its ancient privilege of not merely 
recognizing the good, but demanding it as well’. 
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considers to be correct in the areas of moral, social, and political life’ (Gadamer, 1992: 
218). The interconnectedness of people and their relations in today’s world testify to the 
fact that we can no longer conceive of other people as essentially other, separated from 
us in fundamental ways. Given this global interconnectedness, detachment is no longer 
a viable option. On the contrary, a lot can be gained from taking a critical attitude that 
begins from, rather than denies, acknowledged connectedness and dependence 
(Kompridis, 2011b: 270). This is where cosmopolitan solidarity is relevant – it 
acknowledges interdependence among people and the responsibility we have towards 
others while simultaneously disclosing alternatives that differ from the actual condition. 
The importance of the common world for cosmopolitan solidarity is therefore 
indisputable. It is conditioned by it and at the same time cosmopolitan solidarity builds 
it. Cosmopolitan solidarity has an inherent connection to the common world because 
only in this common world do people have a vested interest in the honour and dignity of 
all human beings. It is world-building. It provides a means by which a relationship can 
be established between people who suffer and people who decide to remove this 
suffering, by establishing a community of interest with the oppressed (Reshaur, 1992). 
Solidarity makes us put aside our private interests and participate in a non-
hierarchically structured common world (meaning that all can participate, not only the 
powerful, wealthy or unharmed) (Parekh, 2008: 120). The common world relates people 
and so it is not only a setting for rational debate and decision-making but also a setting 
for the development of solidarity (Calhoun, 2002: 148). Cosmopolitan solidarity not only 
transforms the existing social conditions, it also creates a common world between people 
in a political way. By confronting the existing norms, institutions and conditions, both 
cosmopolitanism and solidarity not only passively describe what might be wrong and 
what can be improved, but at the same time they also point to another possible form of 
social living. That is to say, they create a new world. 
 
Another matter in relation to the common world that we also share should be stressed. 
Namely, together with the ontological point of departure of with-one-another also 
comes that of for-one-another which means that not only do we live with other people 
but that this also produces certain obligations that we have to one another: ‘Life 
together can be established on no other basis than binding solidarities’ (Gadamer, 1998: 
111). We cannot claim that one can rely completely on oneself or the other way around, 
that one is entirely dependant only on others. It is the same with solidarity: ‘the tasks 
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presented to us are to be just as much one with oneself and to be united with Others’ 
(Gadamer, 1999a: 12) which means that one needs to rely on their own self-knowledge 
as well as lean on and learn from Others. We should therefore not try to include more 
people under the notion of us but strive to recognise them and change the norms that 
allocate this recognition so disproportionately. To understand our shared reality 
imposes an obligation upon us and ‘invites a more robust universali[s]ing of rights that 
seeks to address basic human needs’ (Butler, 2009: 28–9). Cosmopolitanism is essentially 
related to the common world. The cosmopolitan common world is intersubjectively 
built, and it is a world of plurality and mutual engagement. 
 
Thirdly, a certain type of understanding, self-understanding and mutual insight underlie 
both solidarity and cosmopolitanism. Like friendship, solidarity is similarly revelatory. 
We certainly live in the age of anonymous responsibility, a term that Gadamer (1999a: 
4) borrows from Karl Jaspers, and this age, thanks to the way it is being organised, leads 
to a world of ‘interrelated foreignness’. Gadamer suggests that solidarity frees individuals 
from such anonymity by exposing their particularity to others with whom they are 
engaged in common endeavours (Warnke, 2012), which is very similar to Honneth’s 
understanding of solidarity. This commonness or common world that we build together 
refers not only to the second characteristic of solidarity, but also to the third since it 
enables us to get to know one another, build understanding and challenge our own self-
understanding: ‘Those with whom we are in solidarity are no longer faceless to us nor 
are we any longer faceless to them. […] Freed from obscurity as an indistinguishable 
part of an undifferentiated bulk, we become distinct individuals for one another and 
recover the ability to act in concert’ (Warnke, 2012: 10). However, this process is also 
complemented by the deepening and changing of our self-knowledge and self-
understanding. As Gadamer (1999b: 139) puts it, ‘one begins to feel and recogni[s]e 
oneself. What is thus communicated is not just sentiment or disposition; it signifies a real 
embedding in the texture of communal human life.’ How does this express a 
cosmopolitan outlook? According to Delanty (2009: 77), ‘[r]ather than find 
cosmopolitanism embodied in a supra-national identity, it makes more sense to see it 
expressed in more reflexive kinds of self-understanding’. Cosmopolitanism concerns 
changes in self-understanding and self-problematisation in light of the encounter with 
Others. This means that ‘cosmopolitanism perspective does not simply involve accepting 
the views of the Other but requires in some way a problemati[s]ation of one’s own 
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assumptions as well as those of the Other’ (Delanty, 2009: 16). Without mutual criticism 
and self-problematisation, cosmopolitanism loses its force and becomes reduced to the 
mere condition of diversity’ (Delanty, 2009: 16). It seems that Gadamer’s conception of 
solidarity is imbued precisely with this kind of cosmopolitan standpoint on self-
understanding and encounter with the Other. Furthermore, although not explicitly 
stated, a specific understanding inspires and underlies Gadamer’s conception of 
solidarity, which accentuates its cosmopolitan sensibility. Understanding, according to 
Arendt (2005: 308), is ‘the specifically human way of being alive; for every single person 
needs to be reconciled to a world in which he was born a stranger and in which, to the 
extent of his distinct uniqueness, he always remains a stranger’. Gadamer’s solidarity 
and engagement with otherness are not attempts to understand something 
unquestionably or in a scientific manner, but precisely an attempt to understand which 
is ‘clearly, and perhaps primarily, also a process of self-understanding’ (Arendt, 2005: 
310). Understanding is closely connected to judging, and when one consciously decides 
to act in solidarity, and authentic solidarity must always be conscious (Gadamer, 1999b: 
11), one unavoidably makes judgements. And this must be done in a cosmopolitan spirit, 
that is, it ‘must have a universal and timeless validity over and beyond its origins’ (Fine, 
2007: 126). Or as Arendt (1992: 75–6) writes,  
 
‘One judges always as a member of a community, guided by one’s community 
sense, one’s sensus communis. But in the last analysis, one is a member of a world 
community by the sheer fact of being human; this is one’s “cosmopolitan 
existence”. When one judges and when one acts in political matters, one is 
supposed to take one’s bearings from the idea, not the actuality, of being a 
world citizen and therefore, also, a Weltbetrachter, a world spectator’. 
 
Judgement and understanding do not happen from nowhere, because one is always 
situated in one’s own community, which is also something emphasised by Gadamer and 
the field of hermeneutics. But nevertheless, this community can be a world community 
and reason’s identification with the universal.66 The presence of the Other is essential to 
understanding Gadamer’s account. The fusion of people’s horizons that produces 
something new cannot occur without the Other that ‘stands before us and through 
whose presence our prejudices are called forth, put into play, and revised’ (Walhof, 
2006: 581). To engage with the Other and come to an understanding with him or her is !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
66 Reason here does not imply its infallible power, but the capacity of ‘not blindly insisting on what one 
holds true, but engaging critically with it’ (Gadamer, 1998: 48). 
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the only way to reveal (to oneself and others) and change one’s own prejudices: ‘The 
other is both an obstacle, in that he exposes the limits of my grasp of something, and 
also the means by which a new understanding of it emerges’ (Walhof, 2006: 581). Such 
understanding is crucial for envisaging a cosmopolitan community which is based on 
dialogue. The purpose and the result of such a dialogue with others is the need to 
understand (and not the need for consensus as is the case with Habermas), with this 
understanding taken to mean a way of seeing things ‘in a new and shared light’ 
(Jordaan, 2011: 2374). 
 
Conclusion 
 
Critical cosmopolitanism does not prescribe abstract standards of morality or some sort 
of a metaphysical ethics. There is no predetermined set of mores or ideal moral order 
that could guide and judge our actions, but critical cosmopolitanism’s ethics nevertheless 
needs to stem from somewhere: the foundation for its ethical considerations always 
comes from an awareness of the condition of plurality and of our shared world. In 
dealing with ethical considerations, one must always assume a cosmopolitan existence 
and therefore judge and act according to our shared condition and predicaments. Such 
ethics is moderate in its character and it understands subjectivity in terms of singularity, 
that is, that each individual exists only in plurality with others. In contact with others, an 
individual must not only embrace acknowledgement of the Other but also self-
problematisation, self-criticism, self-understanding and therefore self-transformation. 
Approaching ethics in this way leads to concern for human dignity and a cosmopolitan 
solidarity that presupposes understanding and engaging with the Self, the Other, and 
the World. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CRITICAL COSMOPOLITANISM’S UTOPIANISM AND 
WORLD-DISCLOSING CRITIQUE 
 
‘It is self-evident that the times in which we live have become inhospitable 
to the practice of critique – especially to self-critique. Closely observed, all 
models of social and cultural criticism, regardless of normative or 
methodological orientation, bear the marks of this inhospitality. What I 
am speaking of is a dimly perceived process of self-restriction and 
accommodation, at once the outward adjustment to new conditions and 
an unrecogni[s]ed expression of normative despair. In short: resignation 
to the contracting space of possibilities; resignation to the thought that 
our possibilities might be exhausted, that the future may no longer be 
open to us, no longer welcoming’. (Kompridis, 2006: 245) 
 
hen we think about cosmopolitanism as critical theory and about its ontological 
implications, one form of critical theory seems especially pertinent. That is the 
idea of critique as world-disclosure as developed by Nikolas Kompridis (2006).67 He 
argues that such a critical theory recognises conditions that obscure or foreclose our 
potentials and perceives itself as a possibility-disclosing practice. It is more pluralistic 
than its predecessors and primarily concerned with ‘disclosing novel forms of thought 
and action that might make possible a more productive practical orientation towards the 
future’ (Sinnerbrink, 2011: 1054). Such critique is also underpinned with a strong sense 
of utopianism which has been to a certain extent lost in previous critical theories and 
especially in the ever-sceptical postmodernism. Understanding cosmopolitanism as 
critique in this way means two things: firstly, that the idea of critical theory as world-
disclosure enhances cosmopolitanism’s existing critical orientation because it engages 
with the world in a manner of understanding and not the pursuit of scientific 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67 This type of world-disclosing critique seems to be similar to yet a bit different from Honneth’s 
understanding of world disclosure. Honneth understands world disclosure as a thick, multi-layered, 
totalising description of society that does not set any ideals but nevertheless shows us society’s injustices 
and erroneous beliefs. Similarly, Seel (1994: 77) argues that world-disclosure takes place ‘when changes in 
our access to a field of reality are accompanied by changes in fundamental conceptions about the 
phenomena of this reality’. This means that it opens up reality by making a whole field of phenomena 
known. ‘In this case, world disclosure [is] a genuine revelation of a new thing and a new view at the same 
time’ (Seel, 1994: 77). 
W 
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knowledge;68 and, secondly, that cosmopolitanism importantly supplements such a 
critical theory because it provides it with a normative direction. 
 
This chapter will look at critique as a world-disclosing practice and its important 
utopian underpinning. The first part of the chapter will analyse the contemporary 
concept of utopia with an emphasis on its critical and transformative characteristics. The 
second part of the chapter will then discuss the meaning of world-disclosure for 
contemporary critical theory and how this enhances critical theories that understand 
critique only as a process of revealing the truth. In the third part, cosmopolitanism is 
linked to utopia, and in the last part of the chapter it is argued that critical theory must 
renew its utopian impulse in order to avoid nihilism. 
 
7.1 Sociological and Critical Concepts of Utopia 
 
Utopia is a well-contested concept. Despite perhaps a common understanding of this 
concept or at least one of the sociology dictionaries’ (Subberwal, n. d.: U5) definition of 
utopia as an image that is ‘considered to be so far drawn from the reality that it can not 
be a realistic guide for the future’, this section is about utopia being considered as 
feasible or at least something that we can strive for. Another dictionary (Burden, 2003: 
716) depicts it more appropriately for our use, though it still does not present utopia’s 
full capacity: ‘Utopian thought appears to flourish during times of social insecurity and 
the breakdown of established authority. Utopias often reflect the boundaries of 
possibility established by an existing society, including its productive capacity, its 
conception of the extent of the malleability of human nature and the relative emphasis 
given to the public sphere as against the private’. Yes, utopias do reflect on what is 
possible, but what is their function? Are they only hopes and wishes that might one day 
get realised and for which until then we patiently wait? 
 
Very often utopias are understood in terms of a non-existing yet ideal place. But, as 
Couton and López (2009) argue, utopia should not be conceived of in such spatial terms 
since one of its constitutive tropes is precisely the opposite, movement. It is therefore no !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
68 This is not to say that a conservative position must be taken up; understanding does not mean to simply 
acknowledge the world as it is but to look at it from a critical perspective (which is very closely related to 
Kompridis’ (2006) notions of receptivity or reflective disclosure that will be discussed in this chapter. 
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surprise that ‘contemporary utopian thinking has been concerned with signifying the 
transcendence of the encaging places of modernity’ (Couton and López, 2009: 101). 
The authors also emphasise that utopia today is a processual mode where movement 
plays an important part. Couton and López (2009) connect this processual mode of 
contemporary utopia with an emphasis on movement to global and free mobility, and 
call it ‘utopia of itinerancy’. Such utopia that stems from movement rather than a 
physical place, envisages a detachment of an individual from place but also an 
emergence of alternative subjectivities – postnational citizens with cosmopolitan 
subjectivity. As Rothstein also (2003) suggests, it is the quest or the process that matters. 
Utopias should be pursued, worked for, and since they are visions for the existing world, 
they also provide us with a programme, ‘giving direction and meaning to the idea of 
progress’ (Rothstein, 2003: 3). However, such a programme does not mean that utopia 
should prescribe a remedy or even that there is only one utopia.69 Utopia must remain 
flexible in the sense of not becoming an outline of humanity’s future, because ‘problems 
come up when the utopian dream is treated as the model against which the real is 
sternly judged’ (Rothstein, 2003: 19). Utopia should adapt to the real world not the 
other way around. It must always stem from the world, remain in the world and 
transform it within possible means. This is close to the sociological conception of utopia, 
which understands utopia as the motivation for people to exercise agency and shape or 
change history (Starkey, 2012: 24). Similarly, Bloch (1996: 12) claims that utopia stems 
from the here and now, the materiality that surrounds us:  
 
‘Utopian consciousness wants to look far into the distance, but ultimately only 
in order to penetrate the darkness so near it of the just lived moment, in which 
everything that is both drives and is hidden from itself. In other words: we 
need the most powerful telescope, that of polished utopian consciousness, in 
order to penetrate precisely the nearest nearness. Namely, the most immediate 
immediacy, in which the core of self-location and being-here still lies, in which 
at the same time the whole knot of the world-secret is to be found’. 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
69 Mannheim (1998: 224) writes that there can be antagonisms between different kinds of utopias and that 
they have to change and adapt to the social processes which presuppose them: ‘[…] conditioned by the 
social process, there develops a relative departure from the utopia at many points and in various forms. 
This process, which has already a dynamic quality of its own, is accelerated even further in its tempo and 
intensity by the fact that different coexistent forms of utopian mentality are destroying one another in 
reciprocal conflict. Such a reciprocal conflict of the various forms of the utopia does not necessarily lead 
to the annihilation of utopianism itself, for struggle in and by itself only heightens the utopian intensity’. 
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Utopia has another important constitutive characteristic: its critical capacity.70 Moylan 
(in Lancaster 2000: 111) argues that utopia with its critical characteristic challenges and 
weakens hegemonic structures of political power and at the same time fights for 
emancipation and warns against totalising visions. Or, in the words of Lancaster (2000: 
11): ‘Critical utopias are not blueprints for ideal societies, but expressions of the 
aspiration for human fulfillment towards which our political practice should always be 
directed’. They are not plans for ideal societies anymore but ‘rather a tool for criticism 
in the present’ (Lancaster 2000: 112). Cosmopolitanism, too, is not a plan for a perfect 
global society but a critical tool as well. With regards to the attainability of utopian 
critical projects, it must be said that they have a strong connection both to the past and 
the present and can therefore be used to imagine the possible future in a feasible 
manner since they are grounded in the reality of both past and present.71 Utopia must 
be understood as a critical framework ‘within which concepts are contested and 
alternative ways of life explored through the perspective of the ironist’ and that ‘provides 
a context in which to develop thoughtful, positive political projects without succumbing 
to foundationalism or radical relativism’ (Lancaster, 2000: 118). 
 
Utopia or utopian counter-narratives also possess subversive and transformative 
capabilities (Moyaert, 2011). They make explicit and public a differentiated perspective 
and thus challenge the shared framework of orientation and homogeneity and uncover 
victims of such hidden ideological violence.72 ‘It is a struggle to break open society’s 
closed ideological discourse that denies them full membership in society by preventing 
them from contributing to the symbolic order and society’s self-understanding’ 
(Moyaert, 2011: 99). Utopian counter-narratives uncover such injustice and challenge 
the status quo, but at the same time also offer alternatives. Therefore, they do not only 
uncover truth but also propose transformation. What is missing in Honneth’s critical 
theory of recognition is precisely such critically utopian analysis of his recognition !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
70 As McLennan (in Couton and López, 2009: 96) argues, critical thinking is inherent in utopianism: 
‘[C]ritical thinking is an “actually existing” practice of utopia, since every aspiration to greater levels of 
equality and respect within civil society implies consciousness of a better ordering of identities and 
relations. Utopia is thus implicit in every particularist group claim that is couched in the languages of 
inclusion, justice or aspiration’. 
71 Lawson (2008: 882) calls such utopias ‘realistic utopias’ that function through analysis of the present 
and past and therefore ‘build from history to mid-range abstractions rather than universal utopias which 
work from general abstractions to events on the ground’. 
72 By ending ideological violence, Moyaert (2011: 98) means not to merely ‘maintain structures of 
privilege just by letting a few more people in but rather to plurali[s]e society’s symbolic order without 
losing the perspective of a common social vision, enabling the relation of solidarity’. 
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relationships. Honneth’s solidarity, the relationship of esteeming one another, or even 
the relationships of legal equality, are indeed inclusive but Moyaert (2011: 92) argues 
that mere integration with granting certain rights is not enough: ‘Recognition becomes 
dependent on the willingness of the other to reproduce the already existing value pattern of 
the society’. This is problematic if a minority, for instance, wishes to integrate into a 
society but does not want to relinquish their cultural particularity or risk for the latter 
not to be fully recognised. Honneth does not really offer any solutions for that and this is 
where utopian narratives become important. They envisage a different kind of future, a 
‘transformation of the symbolic order so that the relations of solidarity can be expanded 
in a more inclusive direction’ (Moyaert, 2011: 93). In this way, recognition theory’s 
emancipatory potential becomes much greater. Honneth does not take into account the 
predominance of ideological and symbolic violence that results from symbolic 
imagination, which is monocultural. Therefore, utopia plays an important role in 
advancing Honneth’s recognition theory. As (Moyaert, 2011: 101) aptly writes: 
 
‘utopian narratives are emancipatory narratives that mediate between 
particular group identities and universalistic moral claims, providing new 
frameworks that allow those who are not members of the group to expand 
their own self-conceptions and their definitions of civil society. That is why 
utopian narratives have the power to both perform identity claims and 
institutional transformations. Utopian narratives are no end in themselves. 
Their final goal and purpose is transformative action. They are told to bring 
about change’. 
 
7.2 World-Disclosure, Utopianism, and the Future-Orientation of 
Critical Theory 
 
In the previous section we saw that utopia possesses a critical dimension, but it is also 
the other way around: utopia is also critical theory’s constitutive part. Benhabib (1986: 
226) emphasises the so-called anticipatory-utopian dimension of critical theory, which 
provides for a normative aspect of a critique:  
 
‘When explicating the dysfunctionalities of the present, a critical social theory 
should always do so in the name of a better future and a more humane society. 
The purpose of critical theory is not crisis management, but crisis diagnosis 
such as to encourage future transformation. A critical social theory views the 
present from the perspective of the radical transformation of its basic structure, 
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and interprets actual, lived crises and protests in the light of an anticipated 
future. In its anticipatory-utopian capacity, critical theory addresses the needs and 
demands expressed by social actors in the present, and interprets their 
potential to lead toward a better and more humane society’. 
 
A critical theory that acknowledges and uses its utopian character is a world-disclosing 
critique. If we are to focus on the implied idea of disclosure also within 
cosmopolitanism, then we must consider how and in what ways critical theory and 
world-disclosure are intertwined. Following Honneth’s (2000: 123) claim, a critique can 
be understood as a type of world-disclosure when it attempts to change our value beliefs 
by invoking new ways of seeing and by revealing facts that were previously not 
perceived in social reality. Similarly, Kompridis (2006: xi) follows Martin Heidegger’s 
idea of disclosure or world-disclosure by calling for an alternative understanding of 
critical theory ‘that, in recognition of the various ways in which conditions of modernity 
obscure or foreclose our possibilities, conceives [of] itself as a possibility-disclosing 
practice’. Both cosmopolitanism and critical theory have the ability to see things in light 
of possibilities and both of them can be characterised as being open to as well as 
engaged with what is disclosed (Kompridis, 2006: 34). In critical theory, this requires 
both a reflective responsiveness to historical experiences as well as the ability to see 
something that is familiar or even taken for granted from a new perspective (Kompridis, 
2006: 19). In a similar manner, cosmopolitan social theory reconstructs the history and 
traditions of social theory anew in terms of its universalistic concept of society, the 
recognition of differences within a universalistic frame, and the critique of 
methodological and political nationalism (Fine, 2007: x). This is one of the most 
important methodological features and claims of cosmopolitanism since it engages in 
understanding and criticising the world precisely from the perspective of universalism, 
which presupposes a single subject, that of humanity. This does not mean that it 
subsequently eradicates all difference. To the contrary, it acknowledges all forms of 
difference and at the same time conceptualises them as internal to the substantive unity 
of all human beings (Fine, 2007: x). The conception of cosmopolitan social theory that is 
used in this thesis in connection to critical theory understands ‘social relations through a 
universalistic conception of humanity and by means of universalistic analytical tools and 
methodological procedures. Its simple but by no means trivial claim is that, despite all 
our differences, humankind is effectively one and must be understood as such’ (Fine, 
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2007: xvii). I believe that this normative and methodological component of 
cosmopolitanism can further enrich understanding of critical theory as world-disclosure. 
 
Critical theory and the practice of critique should be above all comprehended as a 
possibility-disclosing practice. Achieving or uncovering truth should not be the goal of 
critique as it is not science or purely theoretical reason (Kompridis, 2006: 251–2). The 
main aim of critique is disclosure of possibilities, but, as previously said, such disclosure 
is not the revealing of a single truth or a quest for finding the truth: ‘Disclosure is not 
truth itself, but enables truth to emerge in reflection, in second-order discourses about 
the disclosures themselves’ (Bohman, 1994: 93). Therefore, disclosure and truth in 
criticism are not identical. On the contrary, disclosure means questioning or revaluating 
the truth in different cultural settings: ‘In the process of world disclosure, doubts about 
the truth of previously held beliefs lead to corrections of previously adopted positions 
and attitudes and compel us to redefine rightness in confrontation with new insights’ 
(Seel, 1994: 77). Therefore, focusing solely on some kind of truth would even be 
counterproductive for possibility-disclosing practice, which retains its focus on many 
different interpretations and revaluations of the ethical and social worlds. By doing this, 
it can stimulate new kinds of thinking, new hopes and normative beliefs. It therefore 
involves learning – learning not only about our surroundings in a factual manner, but 
mostly learning about ourselves, our self-perception and self-understanding, our worldly 
sensibilities and what possibilities we have for action (Kompridis, 2006: 137). Like 
learning, disclosure also necessitates the autonomy of an agent who is able to enter the 
dialogical relations with others and change the conditions for their action (Bohman, 
1994: 95). 
 
The most valuable function of disclosing practice is that it requires from us to think 
anew and try seeing things as well as ourselves in a new light. However, this new stance 
from which we think does not come from nowhere; rather, it must be such that it 
elucidates both the past and the present, so that the problem that we are dealing with 
becomes illuminated with understanding as to how to continue and whether this new 
stance answers the need to do so (Kompridis, 2006: 13). A critique assesses the existing 
conditions and in doing so it is illuminated by our past experiences as well as our future 
hopes. In the processes of world-disclosure we therefore experience a re-orientation 
twice: ‘with regard to the standards of orientation as well as with regard to that which is 
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grasped, discovered and regulated by these standards. World disclosure is not simply like 
the appropriation or learning of a new language for things which we already know; 
rather, it is like learning a new language for things not yet known’ (Seel, 1994: 77). 
World-disclosure should therefore not be sought outside this world but must be found in 
our everyday practices.73 The everyday here is not understood to be something that we 
already entirely know. It is thus important to search in the familiar everyday for those 
instances that have not yet been discovered and are as yet unfamiliar to us. The 
extraordinary in the everyday exists; we just need to uncover it, make it visible and use 
it. But in order to be able to do that, we must reorient and therefore refind ourselves. 
What Kompridis (2006: 113–14) means by the reorientation is that we get refocused on 
the everyday and the familiar in a way that we discover something that we do not yet 
know or are familiar with. It means to get reoriented to the eventual everyday, which is 
connected to our existing everyday yet distinct from it. It is in the existing practices that 
we must discover the new and re-find ourselves. According to Kompridis (2006: 113-
14), world disclosure is best accomplished by critical theorists if they speculate about it 
by way of everyday practice as opposed to mulling over it in a sphere that is 
disconnected from everyday life. This, for him, is a venture that looks at the everyday 
with new eyes, recognising that the ordinary is combined with extraordinariness.  This 
way, the practice of world disclosure becomes more pregnant with ‘meaning and 
possibility’. 
 
When we speak about the concept of world-disclosure, we can distinguish two different 
kinds or levels of disclosure as was already briefly mentioned in the first chapter. To 
reiterate, at the first level the disclosure refers to the act of disclosing of an already 
interpreted, symbolically structured world, within which we always already find 
ourselves. At the second level, and this concerns us more in this thesis, the disclosure 
points to new meanings and their previous hidden dimensions (Kompridis, 1994: 29). It 
is no surprise why cosmopolitanism links so well with the notion of (world) disclosure. 
The second level of world-disclosure seems especially pertinent to the discussion. 
Specifically, it is linked to ‘a more reflexive conception of how our shared practices, 
linguistic interpretations and conceptual mappings can be as much world-making as world-
revealing’ (Sinnerbrink, 2011: 1055) and as such closely related to cosmopolitanism’s !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
73 Bohman (1994: 95) argues that critique best captures the ‘Janus-face of disclosure’ since it points to new 
possibilities, but always in relation to the limits of existing possibilities of meaning and expression. 
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ability of world-making. Cosmopolitanism is a mode of world-disclosure and as such 
‘offers critical social theory a normative foundation that makes possible new ways of 
seeing the world’ (Delanty, 2009: 3). 
 
Such world-disclosure is inherently connected to utopia. Kompridis (2006: 251–2) 
argues that such critique is necessarily utopian. This utopianism does not mean that the 
critique sets a definite utopia for which it then strives, but that it remains open and 
depends on this openness in order to be susceptible to the possibilities that the future 
holds. Critique is therefore a practice of receptivity and reflective disclosure (Kompridis, 
2011a: 1068). Receptivity here is not taken to mean passive reception of whatever is 
happening around us. It is also not pure openness or mere sensory experience. No, 
receptivity, which has to be a characteristic of every critical theory, is a normative 
attitude and relationship that stresses and requires a relation of obligation between 
oneself and the Other as well as between one’s existing and subsequent, possible self 
(Kompridis, 2011a: 1066). Receptivity carries a sense of obligation because it forces us 
to make ourselves more comprehensible through trying to be so to the Other. By 
responding to the Other’s normative demands, we make an effort to better understand 
ourselves, others and things that surround us. This means that receptivity is an 
inherently reflective activity that demands agency and self-transformation. Kompridis 
(2011a: 1066–7) also argues that besides such conscious receptivity there is also a ‘pre-
reflective’ receptivity that is constantly happening in the background, and also serves as 
world-disclosure. But such pre-reflective receptivity does not disclose the world to us 
fully, only selectively. For this reason, we must employ a reflective kind of receptivity in 
order to find and acknowledge the previously excluded persons, things and occurrences, 
and take on the normative demands that they impose on us and that we impose on 
them. 
 
The idea of disclosure importantly transforms critical theory into ‘a more pluralistic 
form’ of critique which does not deal with the procedures for validating conventional 
rational practices and norms, but is concerned ‘with disclosing novel forms of thought 
and action that might make possible a more productive practical orientation towards the 
future’ (Sinnerbrink, 2011: 1054). In its primary sense, world-disclosure refers to the 
conditions of intelligibility and possibility (Kompridis, 2011a: 1074). Here, possibilities 
are not understood in the same way as certainties, rather, they are something that come 
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with normative demands to which we must respond (Kompridis, 2011a: 1076). Critique 
must abolish the overpowering scepticism which rules so many postmodern theories. 
Scepticism can be good and useful to a certain extent if it can initiate doubt but not 
leave us in its grip. For, what constant scepticism does is annihilates all hope. We were 
once much more hopeful about the future and possessed a much broader choice of 
possibilities than we do now. But how do we then continue our pursuits and what do we 
renew if the future seems to be hopeless? Critique must therefore possess utopian 
content, it must be utopian in order to bring back that hope and open up the horizon of 
possibilities. This is because critique is not scientific since it does not search for the one 
and only possible truth. The truth is not the aim of critique and neither should it be 
because critique loses its utopianism this way. Critique therefore aims at reflectively 
disclosing the possibilities where its recipients can verify these only retrospectively 
(Kompridis, 2005: 332). This means that critique is inevitably utopian because it 
‘depends on the openness and receptivity of the future to utopian thought – to the 
genuine possibility that things might be otherwise than they are’ (Kompridis, 2005: 332). 
 
Critique’s task should not just be to uncover the truth, that is, to show that something is 
disguised as something else and that it is causing oppression, for instance. Critique needs 
to do that, but at the same time also identify a novel normative and interpretive stance, 
‘in light of which what is familiar is defamiliari[s]ed, seen again, as if for the first time’ 
(Kompridis, 2005: 334–5). In its character, it needs to be world-disclosing and therefore 
transformative and not just ironist (Kompridis, 2000). The goal of critique is reflective 
disclosure which uncovers meanings and possibilities and causes self-decentring. The 
latter is ‘an activity that involves a normative transformation of sensibility and belief’ 
and it is a kind of learning activity that necessarily involves an interaction with others, 
which then causes self-correction or self-transformation (Kompridis, 2005: 337). 
Therefore, critique should become less and less identified with universality and all-
knowing reason because of the circumstances of pluralism and diversity that we face in 
today’s world. It must acknowledge this and make its task more about encountering 
others, self-transformation and transformation of collective sensibilities and beliefs. 
Kompridis (2005: 339) accurately argues that the practice of critique should be 
normatively committed to the second speaker, since ‘it is in the voice of the second 
person, not in the voice of the first, that critique must speak’. Because of this, Kompridis 
(2005: 340) designates such a critique as ‘intimate’, based on recognition, and ‘a practice of 
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critical dialogue that aims to preserve and renew trust, and to facilitate commitment to 
ongoing processes of cooperative problem solving’. Cosmopolitanism works in a similar 
manner, invoking a sense of openness, and cosmopolitanism’s orientation towards 
world-openness transpires in the relationship between Self, Other and World (Delanty, 
2009: 14). The world is a frame of reference for interactions between Self and Other 
that makes it possible for both Self and Other to initiate self-transformative and self-
reflexive moments. 
 
7.3 Possibility Rather Than Validity: An Enlarged and Pluralistic 
Conception of Reason 
 
Utopia can lead to the conceptual formation of ideal societies, but such idealism may be 
another man’s totalitarianism. Postmetaphysical thinking tries to avoid the trappings of 
metaphysical theories, which can promote totalising thinking that aims at the one and 
the whole (Habermas, 1992: 33), and can be in this way very absolutist and conclusive. 
It recognises the shortcomings of human knowledge and reasoning, and offers the 
establishment of standards for judgement and action without resorting to 
foundationalism or pre-existing truths. According to Habermas, postmetaphysical 
thinking is substantiated by four, closely interrelated characteristics: procedural 
rationality; situating reason; linguistic turn; and deflating the extraordinary. 
 
The first characteristic of postmetaphysical thinking is its procedural rationality. 
Metaphysical issues can no longer be resolved by resorting only to religion or religious-
like, totalising thought. They must be approached with the willingness to communicate 
on the basis of reason, which unites human beings and possesses authority for them 
(Reder and Schmidt, 2010: 10). Without communication such issues can become 
fundamentalist and absolutist. Reason that moves from metaphysical thinking to a more 
communicatively facilitated postmetaphysical reason must therefore find its place 
somewhere between ‘natural’ reason and autonomous morality. Habermas proposes a 
so-called procedural rationality which can no longer ‘guarantee an antecedent unity in the 
manifold of appearances’ (Habermas, 1992: 35). Such rationality does not depend 
directly on preceding moral values anymore but tries to build a social order where social 
agents are guided by mutually recognised good reasons: ‘In this way, reason specifies a 
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“procedure” […] for testing claims of whatever kind. Yet reason is not merely formal 
but, in its characteristic unconditionality, has substantive import, for its form contains 
the foundation of freedom and morality and the concrete development of its universal 
(thus still formal) content must take its orientation from itself and is always subject to its 
own critical verification’ (Schmidt, 2010: 61). Reason or philosophy must not claim 
privileged access to a predetermined truth, but must embrace the ‘fallibilistic self-
understanding and procedural rationality of the empirical sciences’ (Habermas, 1992: 
38). 
 
The second feature of postmetaphysical thinking is situating reason. This development 
was brought about by the historico-hermeneutical sciences (the humanities) (Puntel, 
2012: 7), which go against the foundationalism of thought.74  ‘The extramundane 
position of transcendental subjectivity, to which the metaphysical attributes of 
universality, supratemporality, and necessity were transferred, initially collided with the 
premises of the new cultural sciences’ (Habermas, 1992: 40). Habermas (2003: 84) wants 
to detranscendentalise the Kantian rational subject or reason in a way that is connected 
to linguistic turn, which is the third characteristic of postmetaphysical thinking and will 
be discussed later. Situating reason is the effect of such a process in which the knowing 
subject is detranscendentalised: the finite subject exists in the world without completely 
losing its world-constituting spontaneity (Habermas, 2003: 84). This means a shift to a 
new paradigm, that of shared understanding, which presupposes a type of reason that is 
embodied in communicative action. Language does more than just open horizons of 
different worlds in which subjects find themselves. It also forces the subjects to their own 
independent accomplishments, to an innerworldly practice oriented towards validity 
claims, ‘a practice in which projected world-disclosing meanings are subjected to an 
ongoing test in which they can prove their worth’ (Habermas, 1992: 43). The pragmatic 
function of speech is thus to bring conversers to a mutual understanding and to establish 
intersubjective consensus. This function has a priority over its function of denoting the 
way the world is (Finlayson, 2005: 33). Finlayson (2005: 34) also argues that Habermas 
does not reject the truth-conditional theory of meaning, but denies that it represents a !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
74 Habermas (2010) argues: ‘Finally, with the emergence of the humanities since the early nineteenth 
century, a historical thought, which devalues – up to a point – even the transcendental approaches, forced 
its way through. Furthermore, the results of hermeneutics confront us with a split in our epistemic access 
to the world: the lifeworld that discloses itself to our understanding only as (at least virtual) participants in 
everyday practices, cannot be described from the natural-scientific perspective in such a way that we are 
able to recogni[s]e ourselves in this objectifying description’. 
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general account of meaning – Habermas argues instead that meaning and 
understanding are best approached through an analysis of the pragmatic function of 
speech.75  
 
The third characteristic of postmetaphysical thinking is the so-called linguistic turn in 
philosophy that paved the way for postmetaphysical thinking, and enabled situating 
reason in the first place. By such designation of philosophical reorientation it is not just 
meant that a turn to language has occurred and that at the same time a turn away from 
the philosophy of consciousness has transpired. The transition resulted in advantages 
both in method and contents, as well as in moving on from the problem of toing and 
froing between metaphysical and antimetaphysical thinking, that is, between idealism 
and materialism (Habermas, 1992: 44). Philosophy of consciousness labels a very broad 
philosophical domain that can be described in a few characteristic ideas (Finlayson, 
2005: 28–30): Cartesian subjectivity; metaphysical dualism; subject-object metaphysics; 
foundationalism; first philosophy; social atomism; and society as a macro-subject. These 
are the characteristics that postmetaphysical thinking tries to avoid or to appropriate in 
such a way that their trappings are eschewed. More specifically, philosophy of 
consciousness holds the view that the world is a totality of objects standing over and 
against a plurality of thinking and acting subjects, where the latter are not seen as being 
part of the world in which they function (Finlayson, 2005). Furthermore, according to 
Finlayson (2005) such philosophy is characterised by foundationalism, which refers to 
the epistemological quest for certainty and that grounds knowledge in sense data. 
Theory over practice is another postulate of the philosophy of consciousness. 
Specifically, the task of philosophy according to metaphysical thinking is to establish the 
criteria of correct knowledge. Habermas (1992: 32) compares such reasoning to a kind 
of religion that prescribes salvation: ‘Each of the great world religions stakes out a 
privileged and particularly demanding path to the attainment of individual salvation 
[…]. Philosophy recommends as its path to salvation the life dedicated to contemplation 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
75 Habermas (2003: 101) writes: ‘As finite minds, we have no way of foreseeing changes in epistemic 
conditions; hence we cannot rule out that a proposition, no matter how ideally justified, will turn out to be 
false. Despite these objections to an epistemic conception of truth and even after abandoning 
foundationalist justifications, the idea of a process of argumentation that is as inclusive as possible and that 
can be continued at any time has an important role in explaining “rational acceptability,” if not “truth.” 
As fallible, situated beings, we have no other way to ascertain truth than through discourses that are both 
rational and open-ended’. 
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– the bios theoretikos’. Not only is such access to truth, proposed by metaphysical thinking, 
closed to many, but it also makes a theory absolute and self-justifying. 
 
The last characteristic of postmetaphysical thinking is deflation of the extraordinary, 
which deals with the diminishing superiority of theory over practice. Habermas (1992: 
34) asserts: 
 
‘The classical precedence of theory over practice could no longer hold up against the 
mutual dependencies that were emerging ever more clearly. The embedding 
of theoretical accomplishments in the practical contexts of their genesis and 
employment gave rise to an awareness of the relevance of everyday contexts of 
action and communication. These contexts attain a philosophical status in, for 
example, the concept of a lifeworld background.  
 
Philosophy must therefore abandon its privileged access to truth and the redeeming 
substance of theory (Habermas, 1992: 48).76 It must stay connected to social reality and 
thus preserve access to epistemic reality by considering the everyday practices of 
subjects. These practices cannot be described only from a theoretical point of view or 
objectified by natural sciences. A balance must be found, because scientific knowledge is 
fallible and knowledge, generally, cannot stem from only one source. There is no 
knowing subject in general (Chernilo, 2013: 267), there is no ‘God’s eye perspective’ 
that could account for all-encompassing knowledge about our world. Philosophy’s task is 
therefore to mediate between ‘expert knowledge and everyday practices’, and is thus 
critical by nature (Habermas, 1992: 50–1). Philosophy must not be engaged only with 
the scientific system, but must also look upon the life-world, and vice versa. Only in this 
way can it discover the reason that is already operating in everyday communicative 
practice. In reaching mutual understanding, a communicative rationality occurs which 
provides a standard for evaluating systematically distorted forms of communication and !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
76 According to Brieskorn (2010: 26–7): ‘Reason – by which is meant practical reason – is the faculty that 
wants to orient human life to a final horizon, and this more in a general and fundamental way than in 
detail, where reason also takes the conditions of the orientation into consideration. Thus reason would not 
be merely power which determines a social form of life in an ethical and legal sense but also shows it to be 
guided by principles, but which […] not only seeks to guard against errors concerning the conduct of life 
but also to discover the truth concerning life and to feed it into social life. To these conditions also belongs 
the fact that reason, on the human side, involves participating in the one reason and that those who 
participate are fallible, finite beings who are in many respects needy and in many ways open to 
improvement. This participating reason should know this and take it into consideration. It must take the 
“veto” of reality seriously if it is not to fall into error and to commit itself to too little or too much. This 
participating reason can overtax or undertax human beings; it can assume that they are endowed with a 
form of self-possession which they never had or with an incapacity which they falsely assume to be 
insurmountable. In orienting itself to as much reason, it has the power to correct’. 
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of life (Habermas, 1992: 50). Our practical understanding of the world and linguistic 
knowledge should be seen as co-dependent77 – language cannot entirely determine what 
we can know of the world or what the world is for us. We also learn from experience, 
and this empirical knowledge can lead us to revise the meanings of the terms we use 
(Fultner, 2003: xiii–xiv).  
 
All mentioned characteristics of postmetaphysical thinking are of course closely 
interrelated. Habermas’ postmetaphysical thinking follows Kant in ending the practice 
of applying categories of understanding which are cut out for inner-worldly phenomena 
to the world as a whole – a devaluation of essentialist statements about nature and 
history (Habermas, 2010). His notion of postmetaphysical thinking is procedural and 
historically situated, frugal, fallibilistic, and more humble in its claims than metaphysical 
thinking. Language creates meaning, reason is no longer understood as an omniscient 
saviour, and more emphasis is given to intersubjectivity rather than the philosophy of 
consciousness. What remains are knowing, speaking, and acting subjects that use 
postmetaphysical reason. The latter ‘can defend itself against a postmodern and 
scientistic-naturalistic defeatism concerning reason; thus it is not a scientistic, but a 
critical reason which is able to reflect on its possibilities and limitations and its various 
forms’ (Ricken, 2010: 56). 
 
There are several problems with a proceduralist (postmetaphysical) understanding of 
reason. First, such understanding makes it seem self-evident that only right procedures 
will solve the problem of cultural self-confidence and trust (Kompridis, 2005: 330). By 
cultural self-confidence and trust, Kompridis means the confidence to hope again and to 
be able to recognise and see the future possibilities, which have been foreclosed from 
our sensibilities. Secondly, proceduralism possesses a purist element which preserves the 
belief that the final agreement is always the best one (Kompridis, 2005: 335). And lastly, 
critical theory that is based solely on postmetaphysical thinking is missing a connection 
to modernity’s time consciousness78 and hence utopian potential. The utopian potential !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
77  Honneth (1995: 292) writes: ‘If, therefore, with the overcoming of metaphysical thinking, the 
legitimating source of the sciences has also dried up, then it becomes evident for the first time that no 
form of knowledge is, by nature, equipped with a superior epistemological competence; rather, numerous 
linguistically articulated forms of knowledge confront one another in social reality, and it is not possible on 
the basis of reason to decide which of them can raise a legitimate claim to validity’.  
78 Kompridis (2006: 26) argues that critical theory's utopian traits got partly erased because of Habermas' 
proceduralism, which is designed to decide about procedures and validation of the norms. In this way, 
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cannot be produced solely from a conception of reason that possesses its own logic or 
from reason that is understood in terms of rational procedures (Kompridis, 2006: 228). 
The reason for this is that, understood in this way, reason cannot provide for any new 
orientation in critique since it is oblivious to modernity’s relation to time, something 
which is absolutely necessary to finding a new orientation. Therefore, modern reason 
lacks utopianism since it does not take into account ‘historically disclosed sources of 
meaning and possibility’ (Kompridis, 2006: 228). 
 
7.4 Cosmopolitanism and Utopia 
 
Today’s critical thinking is deep-rooted in postmetaphysical thinking to supposedly 
avoid finalism or totalitarian utopianism. Even Honneth identifies only a formalistic 
conception of good life but the problem with something which is supposed to have 
substance having such exceedingly impartial characteristics is that they are ‘unable to 
arouse the ethical imagination and […] lack motivational and justificatory power’ 
(Cooke, 2004: 416). So if a critical theory is to retain the utopian impulse, which is 
absolutely necessary for it to be able to fulfil its emancipatory vision and imagine a 
better world, it should not dismiss the metaphysical characteristic of utopian thinking. 
Utopian thinking means envisioning the substantive ethical imaginings of a good society 
‘that would be possible only if certain currently hostile social conditions were 
transformed’ (Cooke, 2004: 419). Social critique always entails a metaphysical moment, 
because envisaging good society inherently possesses the characteristic of metaphysics: 
‘Insofar as the static, ahistorical, absolutist – metaphysical – moment of its [social 
criticism’s] emancipatory perspective is unavoidable, the challenge facing critical social 
theory is how to accommodate this metaphysical moment without falling prey to the 
dangers of “bad utopianism”, on the one hand, and “finalism” (with its tendency 
towards “totalitarianism”) on the other’ (Cooke, 2004: 419). Contemporary critical 
theory must therefore adopt this utopian moment, together with its metaphysical 
characteristic, in a way that will make it apt for picturing a better future but not in terms 
of either finalism or delusional, unachievable dreams. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
claims Kompridis, Habermas incorporated science into philosophy and critique since his method is in a 
way searching for a kind of truth through procedures. But the drawback for critique was that it lost its 
connection to time – critique is not open to historical experience anymore, and nor does it possess the 
utopian impulse which would help it imagine future possibilities. 
Chapter 7: Critical Cosmopolitanism’s 
Utopianism and World-Disclosing Critique 
!
- 153 - 
Cosmopolitanism has often been associated with utopianism but unfortunately usually 
not the good kind. Its distinctive future-orientation makes it prey to bad utopianism but 
also false accusations. For instance, Kendall, Woodward and Skrbiš (2009: 151) believe 
that the cosmopolitan imagination should spring from realism and that ‘that identifying 
cosmopolitan bonds with utopias is politically and sociologically naïve’. The mentioned 
authors are not the only ones who avoid connecting cosmopolitanism with utopia. Some 
think that utopia is only a bad thing and calm their readers that their cosmopolitanism is 
not the kind that would be utopian. To provide a few examples: Nowicka and Rovisco 
(2009: 4) assure us that the cosmopolitanism from below discussed in their book is not 
utopian; Linklater (2010: 26) writes that ‘it is easier to understand how cosmopolitan 
principles might yet be embodied in the individual self – in basic emotions and drives – 
as opposed to being treated as well-meaning but utopian aspirations that are remote 
from daily existence’; and Stivens (2008: 90) warns that ‘feminist scholarship is now 
wary of the perceived universalisms and utopianisms of cosmopolitanisms in their many 
guises’, etc. In all these and other similar cases utopianism is understood as something 
unattainable, a wishful thinking that may produce horrible results and is therefore best 
avoided. The problem with merely stating that utopianism is bad is that either an 
assumption is made or only the bad version of utopianism is considered. For this reason, 
it is necessary to first conceptualise utopia, which has been done in the first part of the 
chapter, and only then decide whether it can complement cosmopolitanism or whether 
it hinders it. 
 
There are other authors who openly acknowledge and embrace the much-needed 
connection between utopianism and cosmopolitanism. Hayden (2009: 51–2) claims that 
the utopian impulse can be located at the heart of cosmopolitanism, and that it can 
already be found in the classical worldview of cosmopolitanism. Diogenes the Cynic and 
the Stoics express the utopian impulse with the idea of the citizen of the world and the 
wish to ‘connect all persons together into a civic whole’. Reflexive utopianism’s impulse 
in today’s cosmopolitanism plays the role of rehabilitating and self-reforming the first 
modernity’s ideals of human rights, justice, autonomy and democracy in order to make 
them suitable for the post-national era of the second modernity (Hayden, 2009: 53). As 
such, the utopia in cosmopolitanism does not stem from nowhere, and nor does it build 
its ideals from scratch; rather, it tries to re-imagine the old ideals that may still work but 
not well enough for the needs of the post-national world. We must therefore judge 
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cosmopolitanism not in terms of its feasibility but its ability to creatively imagine 
(Hayden, 2009). Douzinas (2007: 148) also thinks that cosmopolitanism and utopia are 
inherently linked; he even claims that cosmopolitanism ‘belongs to one of the noblest 
Western traditions, that of utopia’, which means that cosmopolitanism has been a part 
of utopianism from the very beginning. Cosmopolitanism is not some sort of 
institutional blueprint in order to move away from which it must re-acquire ‘its 
imaginary power and rediscover its classical radical urge’ (Douzinas, 2007: 148). Its 
imaginary power should not just be limited to what is feasible here and now, but, as 
Hayden (2009) correctly points out, it should be used to radically reimagine concepts 
and modernity’s heritage for use in a postnational world. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The significance of utopia to critical cosmopolitanism is high – it enhances 
cosmopolitanism’s ability to imagine things anew and comprehend the world through 
new eyes, but also evokes rich ethical vision of a good life. Yet there is another 
important role that utopia has and that is its resistance to nihilism: ‘Without utopia, we 
are only left with simple nihilism’ (Douzinas, 2007: 286). Nihilism can take two forms – 
it is either a denial of the existing world and the creation of an illusory one, where there 
is no pain or conflict, or it can take the form of being content with the actual world and 
giving up passions and values (Diken, 2009: 3). Utopia and cosmopolitanism tackle both 
forms of such desperateness. They resist hopelessness on the one hand and try to build a 
better future while acknowledging reality on the other. Utopia in cosmopolitanism gives 
us hope; hope that remains alive even after the atrocities of the 20th century and those 
that still wound our world today. Cosmopolitanism not only gives us hope in hopeless 
times but also in times when social conditions seem insurmountable. There may be 
times when conditions can be considered relatively good, but they can always be better, 
no matter how unimaginable this may appear. As Douzinas (2007: 298) rightly points 
out, the battle now takes place between the law and desire, both in their widest senses. 
The law tells us what exists and can exist within the boundaries made by it, whereas 
hope points to the beyond, the not-yet, to different possibilities: 
 
‘If cosmopolitanism was an early utopia, the opposition between cosmos and 
polis has now become the struggle between law and desire, in their widest 
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meaning. Law, the principle of the polis, prescribes what constitutes a 
reasonable order by accepting and validating some parts of collective life, while 
banning, excluding others, making them invisible. Law (and rights) links 
language with things or beings; it nominates what exists and condemns the rest 
to invisibility and marginal existence. As the formal and dominant decision 
about existence, law carries huge ontological power. Radical desire, on the other 
hand, like the cosmos of old, is the longing for what does not exist according to 
law; for what confronts past catastrophes and incorporates the promise of the 
future. Following Diogenes, Zeno and the utopian tradition, the 
‘cosmopolitanism to come’, this being together of singularities, is constructed 
here and now with friends, in acts of hospitality, in cities of resistance. This 
cosmopolis brings together here and now the just polis and the principles of 
resistance of the cosmos already incarnate in our present cities’ (Douzinas, 2007: 
298). 
 
Nihilism is not just associated with fatalism but in its origin it is also ‘an inability to 
accept pain, conflict, and antagonism’ (Diken, 2009: 2). However, because such a world 
does not exist, nihilism at the same time denies the world as it is, which is completely 
contrary to cosmopolitanism or even utopia. Nihilism therefore invents an unreal world 
that does not and can never exist, because it has absolutely no connection to the existing 
one. In order to resist such nihilism, it is important to remain worldly. Fine (2007: 120), 
following Arendt, says that nihilism is an omnipresent danger of thinking – while 
thinking ‘may clear the path for judgement, it may equally engender a mere reversal of 
old values’. Therefore, thinking ‘needs judgement to save itself from itself’ (Fine, 2007: 
121). This means that it must be connected to the world and action, and it must become 
a worldly activity. And worldliness is a  
 
‘cosmopolitan virtue par excellence that refuses to rationalise the division of the 
life of the mind into reified faculties or its separation from the life of work and 
politics. The spectre of nihilism is never far from the surface of the life of the 
modern mind because worldlessness, which is akin to subjectivism /…/, isolates 
the mind from the world, gives even to the life of the mind a barbaric and 
nihilistic aspect. We cannot conceive of cosmopolitanism without the life of the 
mind but neither can we conceive of it without facing up to the worldlessness 
that affiliates the life of the mind to the logic of destruction’ (Fine, 2007: 131–2). 
 
We cannot just invent new concepts and consequently find a new way of living. No, we 
must get oriented in the present and disclose its hidden aspects, and connect it to both 
the future and the past. Or, as Kompridis (2005: 342) writes, ‘it is the capacity to be 
receptive to what has been lost or to what we are now losing that makes us capable of 
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calling upon concepts that can generate, not just register, experience’. I believe that 
critical cosmopolitanism can deliver a critique that is underpinned by utopianism in a 
transformative and critical sense, and which functions as a world-disclosing critique 
disclosing new possibilities and at the same time importantly contributing to our self-
transformation and self-decentring. 
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CHAPTER 8 
HOSPITALITY: CRITICAL COSMOPOLITANISM’S 
CRITIQUE AND A WAY FORWARD 
 
he aim of this chapter is to show how critical cosmopolitanism works and 
criticises real life’s pathologies. I have chosen the concept of hospitality for a 
number of reasons. Firstly, it combines normative, political and social elements and thus 
allows us to demonstrate how critical cosmopolitanism tackles all these dimensions in a 
critique. Secondly, hospitality is an outstandingly ethical concept that prescribes a way 
of orientating towards others. This is an apt basis for critique because critical 
cosmopolitanism as well as recognition theory build their identity predominantly on 
ethical considerations and developments. And thirdly, hospitality offers us a good 
terrain, on both theoretical as well as societal levels, to emphasise those imperfections or 
impediments that prevent people from leading a better life. 
 
There are certain negative features belonging to hospitality – its concept and the way it 
manifests itself in the contemporary world. Even though there are aspects that work 
relatively well, such as offering some hospitality to strangers at all, its manifestation and 
political realisation often prove to be a failure. Consider the recent examples of the 
refugees that reached the Italian island of Lampedusa. In one weekend in May 2015 
more than 5,000 migrants were saved from boats (Jones, 2015), whereas the total 
number of refugee and migrant arrivals to Europe (mostly to Italy and Greece) across 
the Mediterranean has already surpassed 100,000 (UNHCR, 2015). These people are 
accommodated in detention centres or sent back to their home countries. The Italian 
and Greek islands that see the largest number of arrivals in this part of the world lack 
proper capacities, services, personnel and resources to properly accommodate the guests 
and the island communities. Hospitality as we implement it today is therefore a double-
edged sword. On the one hand, it is of course much better than no hospitality at all; but 
on the other hand, people – guests and local hosts – affected in these processes are often 
inadequately taken care of, integrated and respected. The chapter will try to tackle those 
incoherencies in the concept of hospitality that often distort its full potential. 
T 
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The chapter follows Strydom’s (2011) methodological structure, which was introduced 
in the second chapter of this thesis. To be able to see critical theory work in action, the 
first part of the chapter will disclose the problem of hospitality and in this way constitute 
an object for critical theory to tackle. In this particular case the internal contradiction 
within the concept of hospitality is emphasised, which among other things worsens the 
political manifestation of hospitality in the real world. In the second part of the chapter, 
a diagnostic reconstruction and explanatory critique will be pursued, where I will be 
attempting to show how cosmopolitanism’s normative dimension helps us to diagnose 
social pathology in the case of hospitality, and then to implement a theoretically based 
explanatory critique.79 The last part of the chapter will re-examine the components of 
critical cosmopolitanism and assess whether they were satisfactorily used in the critique 
of hospitality. 
 
8.1 Problem Disclosure and Object Constitution: Hospitality’s 
Contradictions 
 
Hospitality is a well-disputed and much-debated concept as well as a regular occurrence 
in social reality. Hospitality’s task is a demanding one; in its implementation, it needs to 
relate ethics with politics, particularity with universality, as well as communities with 
outsiders, and vice versa. It can take place on a daily basis on a micro level, among 
friends who invite people into their homes, or on a larger scale among refugees or 
migrants and host countries. The gist of hospitality lies in inviting someone, who 
appears to be an outsider, into your home and offering him or her help, shelter, and 
other material assistance. In short, hospitality is about welcoming otherness. Thus, 
hospitality is not just about materiality but also, and primarily, about social relations – 
how these get formed and sustained among complete strangers. In other words, 
analytically, the concept of hospitality provides us with an understanding of peace 
relations and the refugee crises, whereas normatively it furthers our comprehension of 
the place and significance of the stranger in the social world (Baker, 2013: 1). 
 !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
79 The third methodological moment of critique, the scientific-public validation, will not be pursued in the 
chapter. For this, we would have to engage in public deliberation, test out the criticism and thereby try to 
change the everyday social practices. 
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There is no doubt that in the contemporary world, hospitality is a concept that still fails 
to bring about its potential promise in its entirety. According to the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2014), at the end of 2013 there were more 
than 51 million individuals ‘forcibly displaced worldwide as a result of persecution, 
conflict, generalised violence, or human rights violations’, which is the highest number 
on record so far. The forcibly displaced people include refugees, asylum-seekers, 
returnees (refugees and internally displaced people), stateless people, internally displaced 
people, and others of concern. One of the main pathologies in today’s understanding of 
hospitality is what Bonnie Honig (2001) calls the re-inscription of foreignness as a 
problem, as something that needs to be solved because it threatens the stability, identity 
and cohesiveness of societies. Perhaps the most illustrative case of such an understanding 
of foreignness in the context of hospitality is the recent ‘human ping-pong’ in Southeast 
Asia, where Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand all turned away migrant boats that came 
from Myanmar and Bangladesh and were stranded in the Andaman Sea for days (BBC, 
2015). More generally, hospitality often gets used metaphorically and in a negative sense 
when talking about national border and asylum policies. Gibson (2007: 159) offers an 
example of Britain’s mobilisation of hospitality as a way of ‘justifying increasingly 
fortified border controls into the nation. Hospitality is invoked precisely as a way of 
curtailing Britain’s hospitableness. The metaphor of hospitality, together with tolerance 
and generosity, functions as an alibi in order to protect Britain’s own interests and self-
image’. It seems that hospitality, though inherently a highly respectable concept and 
practice, generates its own terrors and contradictions.  
 
Besides understanding foreignness as a problem, another difficulty with the concept of 
hospitality can be identified. That is, it is constructed in a way that is internally 
contradicting. Even the word itself, which stems from the Latin hostis and its derivations 
can mean either host, guest or even enemy (Wills, 2005: 289). The concept of hospitality 
therefore faces at least two fundamental contradictions. Firstly, from Derrida (Derrida 
and Dufourmantelle, 2000: 25), the law that governs hospitality is a paradoxical one 
because it prescribes absolute (unconditional, hyperbolical) and conditional hospitality 
at the same time. The former is unattainable and potentially harmful80 but undeniably 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
80 Derrida (Derrida and Dufourmantelle, 2000: 25) argues that ‘absolute hospitality requires that I open 
up my home and that I give not only to the foreigner […], but to the absolute, unknown, anonymous 
other, and that I give place to them, that I let them come, that I let them arrive, and take place in the place 
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necessary for the concept to even exist, whereas the latter is not real hospitality anymore 
since it imposes conditions upon the guest and can therefore easily become violent. This 
apparent contradiction is most visible when the ethics of hospitality is applied to political 
reality, where unconditional hospitality cannot and does not exist and the conditional 
kind causes violence too often, be it in the case of the refugees who seek hospitality in 
foreign countries or in the case of humanitarian intervention and the just or unjust 
(in)hospitality towards the guests. The second fundamental contradiction in the concept 
of hospitality lies in the issue of difference/sameness. Do we treat others as 
fundamentally different from ourselves or do we acknowledge our similarities and even 
sameness? When treating others as completely different subjects from us, we fail to 
recognise our connectedness and interdependence, and to treat them fairly because we 
immediately establish a hierarchical relationship. On the other hand, treating others as 
completely the same, caused by a difference-denying logic, prevents us from 
understanding others’ plights contextually and each case singularly. I believe it is these 
two internal contradictions of (un)conditionality and difference/sameness that 
contribute to the pathologies of contemporary ethical and political expressions of 
hospitality on a global level. 
 
The point of cosmopolitan critique is not to develop a correct ethics of hospitality but to 
point to those contradictions and inconsistencies in the concept that cause social 
pathologies. The next section of the chapter will thus perform a reconstructive critique 
(which is also Honneth’s method instead of immanent critique), where these 
contradictions and future possibilities will be identified and researched more in detail. 
 
8.2 Diagnostic Reconstruction and Explanatory Critique 
 
The primary function of reconstruction in critical theories is to ‘identify, recover and 
make explicit the structuring force of both pragmatic presuppositions and possibilities of 
the concrete situation’ (Strydom, 2011: 136). Reconstruction therefore embodies 
immanent transcendence – it brings together the immanent interpretative moment and 
the transcendent constructive moment, where reconstruction is not completed once and 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
I offer them, without asking of them either reciprocity (entering into a pact) or even their names. The law 
of absolute hospitality commands a break with hospitality by right, with law or justice as rights’. 
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for all but must be reconsidered and revised regularly (Strydom, 2011: 137). 
Reconstruction does not only make empirical observations or interpret an event in order 
to give it some meaning, but ‘identifies the deep-seated, formal, generative and 
regulative set of elements and relations that lay down the parameters of what transpires 
in the actual concrete situation’ (Strydom, 2011: 137). On the basis of pre-theoretical 
knowledge, a reconstructive explanation must find the possibilities for betterment within 
the actual situation. It does so in forms of both negative and positive critique. In the case 
of the former one, it criticises negatively, that is, emphasises all that is wrong and fails, 
whereas the latter one discloses available opportunities that have so far been neglected 
or overlooked. In this latter way, it is a world-disclosing critique. The positive and 
negative critiques take place in both the immanent and transcendent moments of 
critique: 
 
‘Immanent reconstructive critique takes a negative form in targeting what is 
amiss with the self-understanding of actors, their orientations, practices, relations 
and institutions, and a positive form in disclosing new possibilities, 
interpretations, orientations, modes of organi[s]ation or protest or 
transformative potentials available in the situation. Transcendent reconstructive 
critique takes a negative form in exposing distorted, ideological, naturali[s]ed or 
reified and such features of socio-practical ideas of reason or cultural models, 
and a positive form in disclosing surpluses of meaning contained in ideas of 
reason or cultural models that are ignored, only partially or selectively used in 
practice or not recogni[s]ed at all’ (Strydom, 2011: 137–8). 
 
Thus, in order to exercise the reconstructive critique, we must look at both its immanent 
and transcendent moments. Immanently, we will criticise the existing practices or actors 
and what they have been doing wrong, and try to suggest what should be changed or 
thought of in a new light in order to avoid past failings. On a transcendental level, those 
ideas of reason need to be exposed that have so far been reified, ideological or distorted 
in some other way, and then be complemented with the revelation of the surplus of 
meaning (for instance, recognition) in ideas of reason or cultural models that has 
previously been overlooked. Besides this reconstructive moment, explanatory critique 
also needs to take place in order to clarify what causes something to remain hidden or 
get distorted, that is, what are those factors or mechanisms that cause such failings. 
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8.2.1 Immanent Reconstructive Critique 
 
One of the main constraints to altering immigration and hospitality practices is the 
everlasting tension between sovereignty and cosmopolitanism, which often works in the 
favour of the former. Strengthening the sovereignty of a country usually, but not 
necessarily,81 means tightening the immigration laws. But as Valdez (2012: 103) argues, 
following Kant, strengthening sovereignty may not restrict cosmopolitanism if non-
European (that is, non-colonialist countries) strengthen their sovereignty. This can only 
enhance the cosmopolitan realm since non-European countries become more equal to 
European ones and thus can respond better to the their power. Such understanding of 
strengthening sovereignty is important in the case of humanitarian interventions where 
the countries in need often lack sovereignty powers or are asymmetrical with the more 
powerful countries. 
 
Cosmopolitan and sovereign rights should therefore act in complementary ways, which 
means that institutional changes are absolutely necessary in order to make this happen. 
A legal framework that would make it possible for cosmopolitan and sovereign rights to 
act in complementary ways requires the creation of cosmopolitan spaces, ‘in which 
immigrants’ political action can lead to a gradual transformation of the regime of 
sovereignty. Cosmopolitan spaces of politics emerge when immigrants act politically to 
alter the conditions of admission and incorporation, thus requesting to be part of a 
mutual agreement. These spaces exist whenever immigrants engage in the task of 
challenging the conditions of incorporation in favo[u]r of inclusion’ (Valdez, 2012: 110). 
These cosmopolitan spaces must be gradually institutionalised in order to guarantee the 
right to freedom and place to all newcomers and remove the fear of being an impostor 
or being deported (Valdez, 2012: 111). Or, as Dikeç (2002: 244) aptly claims, it is 
important to denounce seeing a stranger as a disturbance and rather ‘to provide for the 
social, cultural, institutional, ethical and political spaces where we could learn to engage 
with and learn from each other, while being able to constitute our subjectivities free 
from subordination, in democratic ways’. Hospitality is found in such open spaces that 
allow for recognition among participants but also contestation. !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
81 For instance, Singapore announced that it needs highly skilled and qualified workers in order to boost 
their economy (Beaugé, 2010). On the one hand, they increased the influx of such kind of workers, but on 
the other hand tried to reduce the number of immigrant workers in mid-level positions with stricter 
employment pass rules (Reuters, 2011). 
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Thus, another problem that occurs in practices of hospitality and does not only pertain 
to the tensions between ‘sovereignty, self-determination of a (political) community, 
belonging and citizenship, on one hand, and cosmopolitan norms, on the other’, is the 
lack of rights to democratic participation (Friese, 2010: 335). These are not only 
insufficiently given to guests but also to people in the local arena. In order to change the 
ill side of practices of hospitality, local communities need to get involved in co-creating 
hospitable spaces, and decisions about these issues should not be taken only elsewhere. 
The local community needs to be fully involved in this process if we want to renew 
hospitality practices in order to be more rooted, stem from below and not just remain a 
‘normative-moralistic academic exercise’ (Friese, 2010: 336). 
 
8.2.2 Transcendental Reconstructive Critique 
 
The first difficulty in the contemporary understanding of hospitality that 
cosmopolitanism can effectively address is the fact that a lot of migration scholarship still 
depends on and stays within national boundaries and frameworks (Levitt, 2012: 493; 
Savić, 2005). Instead of methodological nationalism, thinking about hospitality and 
related topics should resort to methodological cosmopolitanism or at least to 
transnational methodology. However, using the latter, one must be careful not to look 
only at two places – the source and destination country – ‘without stopping to consider 
how these are also influenced by other places and scales of social experience where co-
nationals or fellow believers have settled’ (Levitt, 2012: 495). Hospitality studies should 
therefore ‘open their gaze’ and examine how different processes of incorporation 
transpire at the same time and reciprocally inform on each other, which means to look 
at how people still stay a part of the economy and politics of their homelands and at the 
same time participate in and become connected to the multitude of new places (Levitt, 
2012: 495). 
 
So, it is important to keep in mind the multiplicity of spaces involved in hospitality and 
migration manifestations as well as the various reasons and factors that lead to 
migration on the one hand, and those that influence the way a guest is received in the 
host country, on the other. This means that besides economic factors, a much wider 
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array of socio-cultural considerations needs to be included. The nation-state 
understanding of inclusion and belonging is not adequate anymore in order to respond 
to immigrants (Shabani, 2007: 96), since it only works within a citizens/aliens 
distinction. Another moral standpoint must be adopted that takes into account the 
‘analyses of the determinants and processes of migration’ (Zavediuk, 2014: 177). 
 
The second problematic assumption of much of the hospitality practices that partly 
derive from the above-mentioned problem is that the foreigner is always seen as a threat 
to the established order or welfare of the people. Rundell (2004: 93) writes that the 
relations between absolute strangers and outsiders82 are often one-dimensional and full 
of discomfort, anxiety and stigmatisation. This is completely against the logic of a 
cosmopolitan way of relation to the Other, which prescribes engagement with the Other 
and learning from him or her. The cosmopolitan attitude is an attitude in which the 
‘gestural dimension of unconditional hospitality comes from a capacity to recogni[s]e 
the other qua other as absolute stranger and not merely as an outsider. In this way, the 
mobili[s]ing category is not a right that is legali[s]ed and can be instituted, and into 
which one either does or does not fall, but rather is one of the movement from outsider 
to absolute stranger’ (Rundell, 2004: 96–7). The foreigner must therefore necessarily be 
reconsidered in more democratic terms (Marchi, 2014: 622), which means to 
acknowledge his or her potential manifold roles in a positive sense and not only consider 
him or her from the position of the border. Guests can be seen as the liberators of their 
hosts (Marchi, 2014) or as Honig (2001: 4) so aptly puts it, when she speaks about 
foreign-founders: 
 
‘The novelties of foreignness, the mysteries of strangeness, the perspective of an 
outsider may represent the departure or disruption that is necessary for change. 
The foreignness of the founder might also be a way of marking and solving a 
perennial problem of democratic founding in which the people must be equal 
under the law and cannot therefore receive it from any one of their own 
number. Some theorists, such as Julia Kristeva, speculate that stories of foreign-
founders are a culture’s way of marking its inextricable relation to otherness, its !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
82 Rundell (2004: 92) makes a clear distinction between absolute strangers and outsiders: ‘[T]he notion of 
the absolute stranger is one that is constituted through the open contingent condition of modernity. So too 
is the category of the outsider. However, the category of the outsider has an additional dimension in that 
it is generated from the position of a boundary that is marked between “us” and “them”, and as such is 
not generated only from a position of existential contingency. […] In this context of the juridically-
instituted and legitimated boundaries of the nation-state, a distinction can also be made between absolute 
strangers and outsiders. Outsiders are those absolute strangers without legal entitlement to either arrive or settle 
within a given territory’. 
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strangeness to itself. Finally, the foreignness of the foreign-founder might be a 
way of modeling the impartiality, breadth of vision, objectivity, and insight that a 
founder must have. Who but an outsider could be trusted to see beyond the 
established lines of conflict and division that make shared governance difficult’? 
 
Benhabib (2004: 90), too, believes that migrants do not necessarily disrupt people’s 
political culture but can transform and revitalise it in important ways: ‘the multicultural 
challenge posed to political liberalism by the influx of new immigrant groups leads to a 
deepening and widening of the schedule of rights in liberal democracies. The “rights of 
others” do not threaten the project of political liberalism; quite to the contrary, they 
transform it toward a more inclusionary, dynamic, and deliberative democratic project’. 
 
The third difficulty or tension that characterises hospitality is its unbalanced handling of 
identity and difference. In the spirit of cosmopolitan moderation, hospitality must find 
the right non-dialectical approach to identity and difference. Gideon Baker (2009: 108) 
finds both the statist and globalist understandings of political community to be 
characterised by a dialectical approach to the question of how to find place for both 
identity and difference, because they try to synthesise the two by incorporating the 
particular within the universal. Such logic denies difference, but can hospitality 
transcend the tension between identity and difference or at least turn that tension into 
something beneficial? 
 
‘Since identity and difference are mutually constitutive, attempts to transcend 
the dichotomy in the direction of singularity, as much as in the name of 
universality, are fundamentally flawed. Is it then possible to articulate a 
cosmopolitanism that resists the false hope of a “beyond” to the binary of 
identity and difference? Can we articulate a cosmopolitan ethics that denies 
neither universals nor singularities and which opens up the political space 
necessary to negotiate between them? […] The productive tension between 
identity and difference at the heart of cosmopolitan ethics is captured by the 
ethics of hospitality, where our awareness of the identity of the stranger as a 
fellow human being seeking refuge is opposed by the irreducible difference of the 
stranger as Other – someone who, as a guest in a home not his own, suffers the 
violence of assimilation’ (Baker, 2009: 108–9). 
 
This means that hospitality is not essentially only about the host but also about the 
Other. Therefore, hospitality must not concern itself with only one or the other, but 
must engage with both. That is because hospitality should never prioritise one over the 
other; it must always keep them in tension and make this tension a productive one that 
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would resist dialectics. Instead of dialectics, a decision must be pursued. Making a 
decision in this case does not mean a reductive one that once and for all decides which 
side should win: ‘For a hospitable ethics defined by responsibility for the Other, the 
decision is a sine qua non of acting ethically’ (Baker, 2009: 120). Following Derrida, 
Baker shows that a decision, if it is taken singularly each time, like a kind of judgement, 
keeps in tension ‘the ideal and the real, the ethics and the politics, and the universal and 
the particular’ (Baker, 2009: 120). Such ‘decisionistic quality of cosmopolitan 
obligation’, which is ethically hospitable, gives us ‘a practice rooted in ethical 
universality that does not merely accommodate difference […] but which begins with it 
and must remain open to it’ (Baker, 2009: 120). Welcoming others does not just mean 
accepting their difference but also a realisation that this encounter definitely entails also 
some modification of our world and ourselves. Hospitality must also be looked at from 
outside the state domain of law. It is a relationship in which not only openness to the 
Other is found, but also ‘acknowledgement of my primary alienness both as regards the 
other and as regards myself, my own identity: the acknowledgement of myself as a 
stranger with respect to the person I am prepared to accept, and of myself as a stranger 
to myself, just as a person who lives in permanent otherness to his own separate, 
particular, finite identity’ (Marci, 2013: 193). Therefore, when encountering the Other 
and entering into hospitable relations with them the basis for construction of a common 
world is instigated. Still (2012: 50) follows Luce Irigaray’s conception of hospitality and 
argues that such hospitality ‘goes beyond a moral response to an other’s needs (sharing 
shelter, food or money) to reach towards an intimate sharing in difference […]. It is this 
intimate sharing in difference that would create a future world, constructed together, to 
share’.  
 
Last but not least, there is another, perhaps the biggest, tension in the concept of 
hospitality that often causes social pathologies. This is the tension between conditional 
and unconditional hospitality, which constitutes the concept but is at the same time a 
source of many mishandlings and violations of hospitality. Despite the inability of 
conditionality and unconditionality in hospitality ever to be reconciled, there must 
remain a constant tension between the two in order to be able to practice conditional 
hospitality and at the same time not to let go of the unconditionality that makes the 
conditional possible at all. The relationship between the two must once again be a non-
dialectical one. We must understand the two senses of hospitality as ‘heterogeneous and 
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indissociable’ (Baker, 2009: 124), which means to never completely close the gap 
between them ‘by any law or rights, by any political or juridical means’, and at the same 
time to realise that ‘without laws, rights, and so on there can be no opening of the door 
to the Other, nothing determinate or concrete to give whatsoever’. The two are never to 
be reconciled or synthesised; the two laws must keep pulling each other in their own 
direction, one emphasising the necessary, unconditional underlying ethics, and the other 
making it possible in reality. Such practice of hospitality is characterised by 
‘undecidability’ (Baker 2009, 2010). 
 
Undecidability does not mean adopting a passive manner in which nothing ever gets 
decided. It is a prerequisite for responsibility (Baker, 2010: 89) because a decision needs 
to be made anew and singularly each time, be it in cases of domestic hospitality or 
humanitarian intervention. It is therefore a condition of ethical action and not an 
obstacle to it, because its uncertainty becomes a site of strategy and decision-making 
rather than non-action (Baker, 2010: 92). Baker (2010: 100) calls such undecidability 
‘bounded undecidability’, ‘in which each pole both calls to and challenges the other; it is 
manifestly not a blind leap in the dark. The fact that two very different moral 
imperatives weigh on us with equal force is very far from relativism’. Such practice of 
undecidability brings the political back into cosmopolitanism since it means having to 
decide uniquely and responsibly each time how to offer a hospitality that treats the 
stranger as a guest in the home (Baker, 2009: 125): 
 
‘This problematic, or double-bind, of hospitality is the deconstruction in practice 
of any attempt at stabili[s]ing the binary of identity-difference in 
cosmopolitanism; and it turns cosmopolitanism from a pure ethics into an 
ethico-politics. “Defying dialectics,” it turns out, is at once the ethical imperative 
and the political practice of a hospitality that is cosmopolitan, indeed, of a 
cosmopolitanism that is hospitality’. 
 
8.2.3 Explanatory Critique 
 
The explanatory moment of critique ‘accounts for whatever contingent material, 
structural or real forces, factors or mechanisms cause what is amiss and goes unnoticed 
in the actual situation’ (Strydom, 2011: 138). The question in the case of hospitality is 
why its potential is deformed or treated unsatisfactorily.  
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‘Of particular importance here, theoretically, are those contingently intervening, 
interfering, impeding, retarding, deforming or blocking forces, factors, 
structures, mechanisms or related processes which only a historical-sociological 
materialist or realist theory of society is able to specify and identify and thus 
make available as explanans in a casual explanation that can contribute to a 
critique of an undesirable, unjustifiable, pathological state of affairs’ (Strydom, 
2011: 138). 
 
So, the point of an explanatory critique is to identify those societal structures or 
mechanisms that block the practical realisation of socio-structural possibilities. We must 
therefore identify those interferences to a practical realisation of hospitality that prevent 
it from developing to its full potential. Such a process of identification is not a mere 
empirical one; it is post-empirical (Strydom, 2011: 139) in the sense that it does not refer 
to ordinary empirical experiences, but rather to the mechanisms underlying them. 
These mechanisms can range from transformative, to generative, to relational (Strydom, 
2011: 140). The task of identification of such mechanisms is not only to point to the 
interferences that they cause, but also to indicate the juncture that could possibly lead to 
transformation. I believe that one of the most visible mechanisms or system imperatives 
that prevent hospitality from being realised in a better way and to a fuller extent is the 
nationalist framework which exclusively dictates and determines forms of hospitality and 
who is entitled to rights of freedom and place. Nationalism makes a clear distinction 
between ‘us and them’ and therefore inhibits hospitable relations. This relational 
impediment must therefore be transformed in a cosmopolitan manner, that is, in a way 
that would allow for an enrichment of solidarity relations among strangers and for 
exploring the identities of both or several groups. Benhabib (2004) calls for not open but 
porous borders that would allow for a more democratic understanding and assignment of 
membership. This is only possible through ‘democratic iterations’83 that are able to 
make the distinction between us and them more ‘fluid and negotiable’. Such 
transformative mechanisms could open up more democratic spaces, which would allow 
for local people to participate and co-decide in the process of hospitality. It is in such 
collective learning that we must look for opportunities to create new normative ideas, 
new postnational conceptions of membership or solidarity and new kinds of subjects.  !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
83  Benhabib (2004: 19) defines democratic iterations as ‘complex processes of public argument, 
deliberation, and learning through which universalist right claims are contested and contextuali[s]ed, 
invoked and revoked, throughout legal and political institutions as well as in the public sphere of liberal 
democracies’. 
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8.3 Elements of Critical Cosmopolitanism Revisited 
 
Just like Honneth’s critical theory of recognition, cosmopolitanism as critical theory 
takes its bearings from the ethical turn in critical theory. In the case of hospitality, it 
therefore does not focus only on the obstacles to realisation of reason but mostly on 
obstacles to self-realisation of subjects. Social pathologies here are not understood as 
merely pathologies of rationality, but are believed to be found in those places where 
human beings cannot attain the status of equal membership of a community, that is, 
pathologies are found pre-theoretically in the everyday life. Despite the similarity to 
Honneth’s critical theory in finding normativity in self-realisation, critical 
cosmopolitanism importantly departs from it as well and stays loyal to critical theory’s 
tradition of ‘critically transforming the meaning of reason, and thereby the normative 
substance of critique’ (Kompridis, 2004: 331).  
 
What cosmopolitanism and Honneth’s critical theory of recognition do share in 
common is the social-philosophical approach to justice rather than the political-
philosophical one. Whereas the latter tends to identify the correct and best order of 
justice, the former focuses on realisation of the good life, that is, the self-realisation of 
subjects. Critical cosmopolitanism understands justice in this wider sense, not just in 
distributive terms but also in terms of suffering. It focuses on those social conditions that 
cause suffering on the one hand, and those that make justice possible on the other. 
Critical cosmopolitanism does not look for technical solutions, but focuses on 
discovering new potentials for human development and ethical aspects of our social 
lives. In the case of hospitality, critical cosmopolitanism therefore emphasises the 
prerequisites and conditions in which human beings (in this case, migrants or those 
whose state is being intervened, for instance) can flourish. Critical cosmopolitanism 
therefore does not make any general claims about justice, but investigates social 
phenomena in their particularity. It brings to light those social pathologies in the 
practice of hospitality that lead to injustice or unethical relations between hosts and 
guests, and comprehends these in the wider sense of suffering. The unequal treatment of 
migrants, for instance, is not necessarily a violation of legal justice but suffering 
nevertheless exists and is felt by subjects. In such cases, a normative dimension of justice 
is breached, that is, misrecognition or a denial of recognition, which injures the subject’s 
dignity and causes him or her injustice. Migrants’ denial of full recognition is a denial of 
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‘the moral value of the person, her integrity, rights or social value’ (Deranty, 2009: 318). 
With the approach of critical cosmopolitanism we can see that merely state boundaries 
and state jurisdiction are not capable of dealing with claims of justice and therefore a 
move away from statism is needed (Shabani, 2007: 87) in order to, firstly, understand 
injustice and, secondly, to address it with a cosmopolitan approach. 
 
An important inherent element of critical cosmopolitanism that has major 
methodological consequences in practising critique is the concept of immanent 
transcendence. This concept plays a major role in the critique of hospitality. The 
dialogical immanent transcendence in cosmopolitanism reminds us that there is no 
single truth, and when it comes to hospitality this is especially important to bear in 
mind. Specifically, it is often wrongly perceived that the foreigner is the disturbance in a 
coherent, closed system, but this is just one side of the story (and even this one might be 
wrong). Hospitality must consider multiple sides of the truth and must therefore be 
achieved through dialogue and taking the different perspectives of both hosts and 
visitors into account. Another important characteristic of dialogical immanent 
transcendence is that the truth can always be challenged and is never set in stone. 
Hospitality must always reconsider its position and be ready to change it. The dialogical 
immanent transcendence in cosmopolitanism also concerns how people relate to each 
other in social and political settings. Hospitality shapes identities and relationships 
between individuals and groups and it is a way of understanding encounters with 
strangers (Brun, 2010: 342), and without some sort of a dialogue this is not possible. On 
the other hand, hospitality from such a dialogical perspective can be understood also as 
a condition for intersubjective communication – rather than seeing hospitality as 
something that definitely leads to cosmopolitan justice or citizenship, we can understand 
it as ‘the normative requirement necessary to establish an ethical condition for 
intersubjective communication at the global level, where discursive communication 
regarding the substance of a future condition of cosmopolitan justice is to be subjected 
to global public reason’ (Brown, 2010: 310). Hospitality therefore does not mean justice 
per se, but a beginning from which justice can be built. This is a very minimalistic 
interpretation of hospitality but it must certainly be considered to be a beginning in 
every attempt to establish hospitable relations. 
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Cosmopolitanism’s disclosing aspect in terms of an immanent transcendent reading of 
hospitality can be found in ordinary experience, that is, in the pre-theoretical everyday 
reality that can open up the beyond. Cosmopolitanism’s task is to facilitate the 
emergence of a new world or the discovery of previously hidden aspects of the current 
world. Critical cosmopolitanism’s critique importantly highlights the inadequacy of the 
nation-state framework within which hospitality is usually considered. This is of course 
not to say that states do not play any important role in managing migrant crises. The 
state is still the most important and most competent entity that can provide for and 
implement migration laws. Because migration is a complex global phenomenon, why 
not open up our analytical tools and study the phenomena and our options for 
enhancing hospitality arrangements more comprehensively and appropriately? 
 
Perhaps the most evident type of cosmopolitanism’s immanent transcendence in 
analysing hospitality is self-transcendence or self-transformation. Hospitality does not 
only change those who are forced to migrate but also and especially hosts. Individuals or 
groups undergo a process of self-transformation whenever they are exposed to 
examining their identity, culture, membership, and subjectivity. A good example of this 
would be the case of northern Sri Lankan Muslims that have become internally 
displaced persons after the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam expelled them from the 
region. The majority of the northern Muslims sought refuge in the Puttalam district, 
where the majority of the population is also Muslim. Both groups needed to assume new 
roles, those of hosts and those of guests even though they practised the same religion, or 
perhaps precisely because of this: ‘The maintenance of the identity as guest becomes an 
important boundary marker to the host. In fact the hospitable engagements resulted in a 
number of boundary markers becoming more explicit: the troubled relationship 
between Muslims and Sinhalese in the area […], the relationships between Muslims and 
Tamils in the north, the various regional identities of Muslims in Sri Lanka and the 
relationship between local and international humanitarian discourses of assistance to 
those displaced by the war’ (Brun, 2010: 349). The identities of both groups were 
negotiated through their interaction and under the influence of external factors. 
 
The concept of recognition of course plays a very important role in critical 
cosmopolitanism addressing the issues of hospitality. Recognition here is not interested 
only in identity; rather, here, it is mainly related to justice. The first relationship of 
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recognition, that is, love (or care in the cosmopolitan sense) is used when criticising the 
perception of migrants as a homogenous, victimised group of people with the same 
story, difficulties and needs. What critical cosmopolitanism does in this respect is two 
things. Firstly, it tries to judge each event singularly and to find balance accordingly 
between conditional and unconditional hospitality; and, secondly, it recognises each 
person’s singularity, which means that a stranger is not an abstract individual but a 
singular human being. It also recognises that hospitality necessarily entails a kind of 
violence and tries to mitigate it precisely through constant decision-making and 
questioning of the suitability of (un)conditional hospitality. It must retain its quality of 
‘an ongoing exercise of political judgement in the face of violence’ (Fine, 2006: 49). The 
second relationship of recognition, legal recognition, is especially pertinent for a 
discussion about hospitality. Because human rights are usually something given 
exclusively by the state, stateless persons are in danger of becoming right-less just 
because they do not belong to any political community or have been for some reason 
expelled or forced to leave theirs. What critical cosmopolitanism does is urges us to 
expand our methodical tools when it comes to re-thinking hospitality in such a way as to 
not be thought of only within national frameworks. The sense of political community 
must therefore be expanded and cosmopolitan citizenship understood in a way that 
enlarges our moral capacity to be concerned not only about our fellow citizens but also 
those who are outside our immediate political community (Nussbaum in Benhabib, 
2004: 95). The last pattern of recognition, cosmopolitan solidarity, works in the political 
and intersubjective realm and not on an emotional level. Cosmopolitan solidarity in the 
case of hospitality tries to make sure that hospitality is not initiated out of some kind of a 
feeling of pity; rather, it always acknowledges our shared human condition while 
respecting plurality, diversity and difference (Arato and Cohen, 2010: 168) and 
therefore follows the path of communication and action. Such solidarity precedes 
institutions, but importantly paves the path for the establishment of them and also 
continually sustains them. To be in solidarity with someone, cosmopolitanism teaches 
us, is not to identify him or her as one of us but to recognise them at all. 
 
Critical cosmopolitanism’s ethics again moves beyond the dichotomy between 
cosmopolitan vs. communitarian or normative vs. realist debates. This proves to be 
useful in the case of hospitality, which entails complex factors and issues that need to be 
approached from different angles – suffering, as well as the relational aspect, for 
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example. Critical cosmopolitanism of course adheres to common cosmopolitan ethical 
norms, such as a sense of obligation, treating others with respect and the idea of a 
common human community. Besides these, critical cosmopolitanism also adheres to 
three distinct ethical premises: judgement; moderation; and human interrelatedness and 
interdependence. The constant activity of finding the most suitable solution in relation 
to hospitality is due to cosmopolitanism’s moderation – that is, retaining that constant 
tension between conditional and unconditional hospitality, and avoiding falling into 
either of the two extremes. Critical cosmopolitanism understands that hospitality can 
never be grounded on something given and solid, and that it should be grounded on 
something that constantly moves and requires new positioning all the time. The second 
ethical premise is connected to the first one. The capacity to judge each situation 
independently and reflectively is required in order to retain the middle position. 
Undecidability in the context of hospitality is a perfect example of such judgement. The 
latter must come from our shared world and values, which is the third ethical stance of 
critical cosmopolitanism, and it must then be applied to a particular situation. Because 
of our interconnectedness and shared reality, we all have an obligation to create the 
conditions that make good life possible. We must enhance our hospitality practices not 
only because we collectively face the same destiny and problems, but first and foremost 
because the shared world is built by us, political and ethical responsibilities stem from it, 
and we are conditioned by it.  
 
Critical cosmopolitanism’s critique of the concept of hospitality functions on three levels: 
social; political; and normative. The social here plays an especially important role. 
Social life must be understood in terms of intersubjectivity in the sense that subject- and 
identity-formation as well as formation of our agency all depend on society and 
interaction between people. In hospitality, the creation of the meaning of others also 
stems from intersubjectivity, and the perception of the Other as someone who threatens 
us and our system can change only through engagement and ethical encounter with the 
Other. In this way, sharing and commonality become the main qualities of 
intersubjectivity and the prerequisites for building a common world. The latter is the 
condition for sustaining plurality and constructing a common political world as well. 
Critical cosmopolitanism aims to change the status quo on all three – social, political and 
normative – levels and points to the beyond, where it is possible for current 
circumstances to be different. This is important because critical cosmopolitanism’s 
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utopianism and the ability to imagine things differently makes it immune to the criticism 
that as a critical theory it does not possess the important dimension of possibilities. 
Critique is important but so is imagining what comes after: ‘Sometimes […] we get too 
wound up in critique without charting a way forward. We phrase the question as one of 
good versus bad, in versus out, rather than when, under what circumstances and for whom. 
[…] Critical analysis is important, but we also need a way out’ (Levitt, 2012: 499). In the 
case of hospitality, critical cosmopolitanism shows facts that were previously hidden 
from us when it looks for the extraordinary in everyday life and changes our sensibilities 
and self-conception. Criticising the concept of hospitality from the vantage point of 
cosmopolitanism is a possibility-disclosing practice. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Critical cosmopolitanism’s critique of hospitality points to those contradictions that 
prevent hospitality from being realised to its fullest potential, and identifies those 
possibilities that can that may have the ability improve our practices of hospitality. The 
reconstructive critique thus uncovers those elements that impede or distort hospitality. 
These have been identified as follows: seeing the Other as a problem; making a strict 
distinction between ‘us and them’; remaining within a strong nationalist framework; the 
inability to find balance between conditionality and unconditionality, and universality 
and particularity; and not emphasising the relational aspect enough. At the same time, 
however, the reconstructive critique also points to possible changes within the 
mentioned areas. Critical cosmopolitanism highlights the importance of relationality 
and the building of ethical relations among strangers when considering hospitality. It 
also highlights that this is the basis from which we must build our imperfect practices for 
the imperfect world. To be able to reimagine the failed practices of hospitality in a new 
light, critical cosmopolitanism urges us to step away from limiting nationalist analytical 
frameworks, which cannot adequately attend to the problems of an increasing numbers 
of displaced people and poorly prepared host environments in which they seek refuge. 
There are no unambiguous answers possible to offer but not due to an attempt to avoid 
the responsibility to change, but, rather, because it is absolutely necessary for it to be like 
this. Cosmopolitanism must never prescribe final and therefore totalising solutions to 
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anything, and so hospitality, too, must become a practice that needs always to be 
reconsidered, renewed, contextualised and reimagined in the spirit of cosmopolitanism. 
 
‘We need to reconsider hospitality in all its illogicality and contradictions; a 
hospitality which remains a real hospitality only if it is entirely open to the 
possibility of its own negation, ready to welcome the inhospitable, that which 
pushes it irrevocably towards its own elimination; a hospitality that, at the very 
moment it is being offered, accepts the possibility of being contradicted, 
repudiated, disintegrated, and overthrown in its self-reflecting transformation 
into the hostility that forever threatens it and forever maintains a necessary state 
of tension with it’ (Marci, 2013: 191). 
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CONCLUSION 
 
t the core of this thesis lies the argument that cosmopolitanism can be used and 
understood as a critical theory that contributes substantially to judging and 
assessing the ideas as well as the experiences of the political and social world. What this 
thesis has aimed to highlight is cosmopolitanism’s unique contribution to accounts of 
intersubjectivity and normativity that to a certain extent differs from both traditional 
critical theories as well as second wave critical theories such as that of Habermas. 
Critical theory as we know it today lacks the cosmopolitan normative underpinning to 
guide us in reconsidering our practices and beliefs about human interaction. Perhaps the 
major issue or area that is addressed only in a limited way in previous types of critical 
theory but enhanced both by Honneth and cosmopolitanism is justice. Whereas 
Habermas’ sense of justice is limited to the contradiction between abstract principles 
and social situations, Honneth and theorists of cosmopolitanism understand justice and 
hence the experience of injustice in a much broader sense. 
 
This thesis’ objective was therefore twofold: on the one hand, cosmopolitanism was used 
to enhance critical theory, more precisely, Honneth’s theory of recognition; and, on the 
other, cosmopolitanism was introduced as a self-sustaining type of critical theory 
containing all the necessary elements of a critical theory. The aim stemmed from two 
concerns: first, that critical theory lacks an overt cosmopolitan incentive to addressing 
pathologies; and, second, that cosmopolitanism is inadequately comprehended to be 
only a subjective feeling, moral stance or political reality. If we want cosmopolitanism to 
be an illuminative and analytical tool with which to guide, assess and shape our social 
actions, and if we want it to be something more than a western, prescriptive, totalising 
ideal, cosmopolitanism must itself be subjected to criticism and appropriated in a way 
that allows room for self-criticism and changes in self-understanding. Specifically, the 
principal and one of the most necessary characteristics of critical theory is that it must 
look at itself just as critically as it looks at the world. The same goes with 
cosmopolitanism and its theorising. Cosmopolitan theorists must be aware that 
cosmopolitanism is always a part of the world it describes and criticises and as such must 
be able to change and adapt to different contexts and changing times. 
A 
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Even though cosmopolitanism is usually thought as something that already exists in the 
world, be it a sentiment, institution or everyday practice, its critical aspect should be 
emphasised in order to be able to circumvent its often inaccurate absolute 
manifestations. We could say that there is an emerging field of critical cosmopolitanism, 
but that it has not been comprehensively articulated except in some cases such as 
Delanty (2009; 2012), Kurasawa (2011), Mignolo (2000) and Rumford (2008). The first 
chapter saw that there are instances in recent scholarship that underline the critical 
characteristics of cosmopolitanism in order to avoid it being turned into a doctrine or 
ideology as well as in order to make it more suitable for critical reflection upon the 
world. However, it was seen that none of the scholars connected cosmopolitanism 
directly to critical theory and this is a gap that the thesis aimed to close. 
Cosmopolitanism inherently possesses characteristics – such as openness, emancipation 
and emphasis on dialogue – that are all prerequisites for the operation of critical theory. 
In order to understand cosmopolitanism in terms of a critical theory, these and similar 
characteristics should be further cultivated and emphasised as key cosmopolitan 
elements. Understanding cosmopolitanism as critical theory must also contain a move 
away from Eurocentrism and the cultivation of cosmopolitanism as a critical outlook 
which is just as critical of itself. 
 
Before connecting cosmopolitanism to critical theory, the latter needed to be studied in 
order to understand its elements, methodology, and objects. Critical theory as a social 
scientific project has a rich tradition and several different strands. The second chapter 
identified three general main sources of the Frankfurt account of critical theory: 
autonomous agency; emancipation; and reflection. These three sources build the basis 
for critical theory’s endeavours and methodology. Methodologically, the concept of 
immanent transcendence was identified as the principal concept of contemporary 
critical theory. The emphasis in critical theory’s endeavours has always been on 
immanent critique, which means that critical theory must find the resources to change 
the world for the better immanently in existing circumstances even though they might 
not be so favourable. One cannot look for salvation in external worlds but must come to 
terms with the world that we live in, not in a conservative sense but in the sense of 
engaging with it and finding those instances in it that could hold answers to possible 
changes. 
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I decided to look at Honneth’s critical theory of recognition more closely because of its 
contemporariness and similarity to cosmopolitanism. Honneth’s critical theory, 
especially his theory of recognition, offers a helpful framework for thinking about 
cosmopolitanism as critical theory. They share similar presuppositions about the social 
world such as relationality and interdependence among people and social justice as the 
ideal of ethical life, for instance. One of the fundamental features of Honneth’s critical 
theory is its social-philosophical character. The task of critical theory in his opinion is to 
contribute to social justice, which itself must be understood much more broadly than in 
just liberal or distributive terms. This includes identifying social pathologies on the one 
hand and leading and living a good life on the other. Normatively, the moral feeling of 
injustice is the one that points to such pathologies and obstacles to the realisation of 
ethical life. However, most importantly here is to know that critical theorists must 
engage with social reality and phenomena, and draw theoretical implications from it in 
order to unearth the resources needed for social reality’s practical transformations. To 
be able to do this, critical theory should follow – as Honneth does – the dialectical 
method of intramundane or immanent transcendence. He ascertains that recognition is 
one such theoretical resource found in social reality that can animate social 
transformations. 
 
Because the concept of immanent transcendence proved to be such an important and 
perhaps even the most constitutive part of critical theory, it was studied more closely in 
the fourth chapter. Generally, it could be argued that people and their lives always exist 
and transpire somewhere in-between numerous boundaries that get crossed and 
established over and over again. The immanent and transcendent must inevitably be 
comprehended as working together since the latter can only come into existence if we 
do not abandon the former. This-worldly transcendence involves a kind of standing 
back and looking beyond, which means that it definitely possesses a certain normative 
critical standpoint. Cosmopolitanism, too, works by a method of immanent 
transcendence. If it is to nurture its critical stance, then cosmopolitanism must renounce 
simple immanence, which only looks at the empirical manifestations of cosmopolitanism 
in the contemporary world. It should also avoid being completely transcendent because 
that would mean that it communicates and actualises single truth and that it is beyond 
any critique. I identified three types of immanent transcendence found in 
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cosmopolitanism: dialogical, which conveys certain epistemological implications; 
disclosing, which exposes previously hidden possibilities and carries a utopian impulse; 
and, lastly, self-transcendence, which involves self-transformation or changes in self-
understanding that result from encounters with others. 
 
To be able to talk about cosmopolitanism as critical theory, there needs to be a 
paradigm through which cosmopolitanism can identify resources in social reality that 
could stimulate social change. Even though communication could very well work with 
cosmopolitanism as such a paradigm, I chose the concept of recognition partly because 
it already contains communication to a certain extent, and partly because the 
consequences of using recognition as a paradigm carries with it implications that are 
more in line with cosmopolitanism’s own principles and workings. Although recognition 
is a rich concept that possesses many different meanings, the fifth chapter analysed 
Honneth’s concept of recognition because it is linked directly to critical theory. 
Honneth’s understands recognition as a form of action and behaviour, as providing a 
normative underpinning to social criticism and ethical life, as an empirical 
phenomenon, and as a resource to be used to aid an individual’s self-realisation. 
However, one possible criticisms of his understanding of recognition and its application 
could be how it focuses on a state framework. This is where cosmopolitanism expands 
on recognition relationships, applies them at a global level, and offers them its own 
normative framework. The relationships of love (confidence), rights (respect) and 
solidarity (esteem) can be ‘cosmopolitanised’ and it was shown that such steps are 
necessary and that cosmopolitanism can contribute substantially to further our 
understanding of recognition on a global level. 
 
After showing how recognition fits into cosmopolitanism, and how the latter can make 
use of the former, it was necessary to tackle the question of ethics and normativity, 
which are the basis of every critical theory. In order to fulfil the aim of the thesis – to 
establish cosmopolitanism as critical theory – there needs to be a thorough engagement 
with the normative and ethical underpinnings of critical theory. The potential problem 
with determining ethics is that it can very easily become too totalising and restricting. 
So, in order to avoid a transcendental kind of ethics, ethics needs to be formal enough 
not to oppress different communities and different people’s lifestyles within those 
communities. Cosmopolitanism’s approach to ethics takes into account human suffering 
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and obligation to others as well as relationality and future-orientation. It does not 
adhere to any dogmatic beliefs but resorts to judgement, moderation and stems from the 
idea of human interrelatedness and interdependence. How these three features work is 
perhaps most visible in cosmopolitan solidarity. I think that solidarity is the most 
profound expression of ethics. It combines and holds together opposites, contradictions, 
and differences; it creates new spaces and worlds; it strives for a good or better life; it 
combines individuality and communitarianism; it creates a horizon of values that a 
society tries to actualise; and it emphasises our duty to fellow human beings. 
Cosmopolitan solidarity was theorised in the sixth chapter and it was shown that it 
resonates closely with Gadamer’s understanding of solidarity. Specifically, it was 
substantiated with three characteristics that express a cosmopolitan disposition: 
engagement with otherness and respect for difference; acknowledgement of the common 
world; and self-understanding. 
 
What cosmopolitanism possesses and Honneth’s critical theory does not to such an 
extent is a strong utopian element. Utopianism becomes apparent through 
cosmopolitanism’s capacity for world-disclosing critique, which not only exposes social 
pathologies but also points to future possibilities. Utopianism therefore becomes a kind 
of tool for criticism and possesses strong transformative capabilities. Like 
cosmopolitanism and critical theory, utopianism challenges the status quo. It is world-
disclosing critique that perhaps expresses such utopianism most explicitly making us 
think anew and in connection to both past and present, and making us see things as well 
as ourselves in a different light. It makes us become aware of things and people that 
previously we may not have noticed and become receptive to their normative demands. 
Such critique has a lot to do with changes in self-understanding and is therefore closely 
related to self-transcendence. Utopianism in critical cosmopolitanism allows for a re-
imagining of the old ideals that may not be appropriate enough anymore for the needs 
of the post-national world. It also makes us acknowledge pain, conflict, and hostilities in 
the contemporary world and engage with them in a way that shows us a possible way 
out. 
 
The last chapter looked at critical cosmopolitanism ‘in action’, that is, how it works and 
engages in critique when faced with a real world phenomenon such as the (non)practice 
of hospitality. Hospitality was chosen for numerous reasons: it combines normative, 
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political and social elements; it is a particularly ethical concept that prescribes a way of 
orientation towards others; and it offers us good ground upon which to assess those 
impediments that prevent people from leading a better life. Methodologically, the first 
step was problem-disclosure and object-constitution, which pointed to the apparent 
problem of denying hospitality to refugees and migrants in the contemporary world, and 
to internal contradictions in the construction of the concept of hospitality. After that, I 
engaged in reconstructive and explanatory critiques, which uncovered those elements 
and mechanisms that impede or distort hospitality. Critical cosmopolitanism underlined 
the importance of relationality and building ethical relations among strangers in 
hospitality relations. 
 
Throughout the dissertation we have hopefully seen that critical cosmopolitanism can 
be designated as a kind of critical theory. If we follow the identified (following Strydom, 
2011) seven dimensions of contemporary critical theory – the transcendental, dialectical, 
normative, ontological, theoretical, epistemological, and methodological – we can argue 
that critical cosmopolitanism does indeed consist of all these dimensions. It was shown 
that cosmopolitanism entails immanent transcendence and that it operates with its use. 
Critical cosmopolitanism also engages in dialectical critique, which means that it resorts 
to a faculty of judgement in order to arrive at a decision. Normatively, critical 
cosmopolitanism does not serve some kind of plan but aims at illumination, 
emancipation and transformation, including self-transformation. On an ontological 
level, critical cosmopolitanism deals with the perception and construction of social 
reality, it looks at real world phenomena and those tensions in it that could have some 
ethical or political implications. It also possesses a multidimensional theoretical 
character, which means that cosmopolitanism can be understood as a social theory that 
deals with reconstructive, materialist, historical or sociological themes. The 
epistemological dimension in critical theory is quite an important one because 
cosmopolitanism allows for a dialogical immanent transcendence which brings together 
many views and does not favour one over another from the beginning. It is reflective 
and presupposes the openness required to learn and create new worlds. 
Methodologically, critical cosmopolitanism follows the concept of immanent 
transcendence and finds those instances in social reality that could change the 
development of social structures in socio-historical processes for the better. 
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Limitations of the Study and Implications For Future Research 
 
As with every work, this thesis has also had to face some limitations to what it could 
address and resolve. First of all, Honneth’s critical thought is not a completely coherent 
or monolithic theoretical work. Whereas his early works concentrated almost solely on 
the concept of recognition, his recent works, such as his 2010 book, The Pathologies of 
Individual Freedom: Hegel’s Social Theory, and his 2013 book, Freedom’s Right: The Social 
Foundations of Democratic Life, focus more on social justice in connection to realising 
communicative, personal and moral freedom. As such, Honneth’s use of engagement 
with the themes and objectives of critical theory do differ through his rich and extensive 
academic endeavours. Therefore, to engage only with one aspect of Honneth’s work on 
critical theory might be limiting and insufficient to a comprehensive and in-depth 
understanding of how his critical theory works and how it connects to cosmopolitanism. 
Being limited by space, I decided to focus on one part of his theory only – the one that I 
thought most connected and similar to cosmopolitanism. Another possible limitation is 
that the study could have taken some other forms of critical theory as its basis and may 
then have produced somewhat different results. One such pertinent option would be to 
connect cosmopolitanism with Habermas’ communicative ethical framework, which 
seems inherently compatible with cosmopolitanism’s dialogical dispositions. However, as 
Habermas’ theory is itself imbued with cosmopolitanism, I chose Honneth specifically 
because it does not usually strictly speak of cosmopolitanism let alone explicitly use it. In 
this way would not only cosmopolitanism be enhanced by critical theory’s attributes but 
also recognition theory would benefit from cosmopolitanism’s enhancement.  
 
The implications of this study for future research are twofold. First, it engaged in a fairly 
new understanding of cosmopolitanism as a critical tool which could help us look at the 
world critically and through universal values and norms. By doing so it also showed that 
variants of cosmopolitanism that exist out there in the social world and in academia 
need to be critical of themselves as well. Cosmopolitanism should therefore not be 
understood as a blueprint for a better society but as a constant engagement with social 
reality in a critical manner. Second, incorporating cosmopolitanism into critical theory 
generally or seeing cosmopolitanism as a critical theory might help answer some of the 
plights that critical theory has had to face from its very beginning. Some critics have 
argued that critical theory does not engage enough with practical political questions 
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since it only tries to develop latent (class) consciousness (Held, 2013: 25). Contrary to 
this, cosmopolitanism does engage with actual political issues and does not even shy 
away from imagining new political institutions and practices. It is not only a process of 
self-emancipation and self-creation and as such this is where contemporary critical 
theory – Habermas and especially Honneth included – could benefit from 
cosmopolitanism. 
 
Cosmopolitan Hope in a Non-Cosmopolitan World 
 
I would like to conclude this thesis by reading one of Primo Levi’s short stories called A 
Tranquil Star (2007). This is ‘a fable that awakens echoes, and in which each of us can 
perceive distant reflections of himself and of the human race’ (Levi, 2007: 157). It is also 
an allegory; the ‘tranquil star’ may be interpreted as a metaphor for reason. The story 
describes how there was once a peaceful, big, hot, bright star somewhere in the 
universe. Levi writes that its characteristics were hard to describe precisely; not because 
the star was too difficult to observe, but because our language lacked the proper words 
to be able to embody all its grandiosity and exceptionality. It was tranquil by nature but 
one day it became unusually restless: ‘Of this restlessness Arab and Chinese astronomers 
were aware. The Europeans, no: the Europeans of that time, which was a time of 
struggle, were so convinced that the heaven of the stars was immutable, was in fact the 
paradigm and kingdom of immutability, that they considered it pointless and 
blasphemous to notice changes. There could be none – by definition there were none’ 
(Levi, 2007: 158). However, Levi continues, an Arab observer persisted and kept 
observing the changing star, and even named it ‘the capricious one’. After the death of 
the Arab, the star did not attract much attention anymore, partly also because it was 
reduced to a barely visible dot. Levi (2007: 159) writes, ‘But in 1950 (and the message 
has only now reached us) the illness that must have been gnawing at it from within 
reached a crisis, and here, for the second time, our story, too, enters a crisis: now it is no 
longer the adjectives that fail but the facts themselves’. Humanity still does not know 
much about the convulsive death-resurrection of stars and their explosions – the latter 
are among the most catastrophic events in the sky, but we understand only the how, not 
the why. Eventually, the star exploded. An observer would have seen his gentle sun swell 
tremendously. After that, he would have been forced to seek shelter, because the 
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consequences were disastrous: ‘After ten hours, the entire planet was reduced to 
vapo[u]r, along with all the delicate and subtle works that the combined labo[u]r of 
chance and necessity, through innumerable trials and errors, had perhaps created there, 
and along with all the poets and wise men who had perhaps examined that sky, and had 
wondered what was the value of so many little lights, and had found no answer’ (Levi, 
2007: 160). After that, in the present times, the reader meets Ramón Escojido who lives 
and works at an observatory. One evening, whilst developing a photographic plate in 
the darkroom, he notices something unusual, something new: not a big thing, a barely 
perceptible spot, which could very well be a speck of dust, ‘but there is also the 
minuscule probability that it’s a nova’ (Levi, 2007: 162). 
 
This short story can serve as an illustration of the capabilities, wrongs and future 
possibilities of reason and of man-made theories. Levi is suggesting that bright, highly 
admired and all-knowing (European) reason has failed humanity, but at the same time 
he also implies and perhaps believes that nevertheless there is still a bit of hope left. 
Most of all, one must be wary of science, people or systems who claim to be omniscient. 
Embracing the human mind’s limitations and all its potential weaknesses, Levi dwelled 
on his experience in Auschwitz and despite the unprecedented horror managed to find 
intimations to counter it. He rethought of the Holocaust in light of the removal of 
certainty and the dried up authority that clings to ‘common sense’, and replaced it with 
more fluid, evolving paths of knowledge that are built up in dialogue with others and are 
sensitive to historical and, especially, individual experiences (Gordon, 2001: 202). Levi 
(2000: 477) therefore urges us to 
 
‘be cautious about delegating to others our judgements and our will. Since it is 
difficult to distinguish true prophets from false, it is as well to regard all prophets 
with suspicion. It is better to renounce all truths, even if they exalt us by their 
splendour or if we find them convenient because we can acquire them gratis. It 
is better to content oneself with other more modest and less exciting truths, 
those one acquires painfully, little by little and without shortcuts, with study, 
discussion, and reasoning’. 
 
 
 
Bibliography 
!
- 185 - 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Aboulafia, M. (2010) Transcendence: On Self-Determination And Cosmopolitanism. Stanford, California: Stanford 
University Press. 
Adam, B. and van Loon, J. (2000) ‘Introduction: Repositioning Risk; the Challenge for Social Theory’, in 
Adam, B., Beck, U. and van Loon, J. (ed.) The Risk Society and Beyond: Critical Issues for Social 
Theory. London and Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE, pp. 1–31. 
Alway, J. (1995) Critical Theory and Political Possibilities: Conceptions of Emancipatory Politics in the Works of 
Horkheimer, Adorno, Marcuse, and Habermas. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press. 
Anderson, J. (2011) ‘Situating Axel Honneth in the Frankfurt School Tradition’, in Petherbridge, D. (ed.) 
Axel Honneth: Critical Essays: With a Reply by Axel Honneth. Boston: Brill, pp. 31–57. 
Anderson, S. C. (2009) Hegel’s Theory of Recognition from Oppression to Ethical Liberal Modernity. London and 
New York: Continuum. 
Antonio, R. J. (1981) ‘Immanent Critique as the Core of Critical Theory: Its Origins and Developments 
in Hegel, Marx and Contemporary Thought’, The British Journal of Sociology, 32(3), pp. 330–45. 
Appiah, K. A. (2006a) The Case for Contamination. The New York Times Magazine, 1 Jan. Available from: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/01/01/magazine/01cosmopolitan.html (11.07.2015). 
———. (2006b) Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers. New York: W.W. Norton & Co. 
Arato, A. and Cohen, J. L. (2010) ‘Banishing the Sovereign? Internal and External Sovereignty in 
Arendt’, in Benhabib, S., Tsao, R. T. and Verovšek, P. J. (eds.) Politics in Dark Times: Encounters 
With Hannah Arendt. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 137–71. 
Arendt, H. (1968) Men in Dark Times. New York: Harcourt, Brace and World. 
———. (1978) The Life of the Mind: Thinking. London: Secker and Warburg. 
———. (1992) Lectures on Kant’s Political Philosophy. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
———. (2005) Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954: Formation, Exile, and Totalitarianism. New York: Schocken 
Books. 
Baker, G. (2009) ‘Cosmopolitanism as Hospitality: Revisiting Identity and Difference in 
Cosmopolitanism’, Alternatives 34(2), pp. 107–28. 
———. (2010) ‘The “Double Law” of Hospitality: Rethinking Cosmopolitan Ethics in Humanitarian 
Intervention’, International Relations 24(1), pp. 87–103. 
———. (2013) Hospitality and World Politics. Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Bankovsky, M. (2012) Perfecting Justice in Rawls, Habermas and Honneth: A Deconstructive Perspective. New York: 
Continuum. 
Bayertz, K. (1999) Solidarity. Dordrecht and Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 
Bibliography 
!
- 186 - 
BBC (2015) Myanmar Denies Responsibility For Migrant Boat Crisis. BBC, 16 May. Available from: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-32766748 (31.05.2015). 
Beardsworth, R. (2011) Cosmopolitanism and International Relations Theory. Cambridge, UK and Malden, 
Massachusetts: Polity. 
Beaugé, F. (2010) Singapore Plans For New Wave of Immigrants to Help Economy's Growth. The 
Guardian, 3 August. Available from: 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2010/aug/03/singapore (02.06.2015). 
Beck, U. (2002) ‘The Cosmopolitan Society and its Enemies’, Theory, Culture and Society, 19(17), pp. 17–44. 
Bellah, R. N. (2011) Religion in Human Evolution: From the Paleolithic to the Axial Age. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Benhabib, S. (1986) Critique, Norm, and Utopia: A Study of the Foundations of Critical Theory. New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
———. (2003) The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield. 
———. (2004) The Rights of Others: Aliens, Residents and Citizens. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
———. (2006) Another Cosmopolitanism. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. (2011) Dignity in Adversity: Human Rights in Troubled Times. Cambridge, UK and Malden, 
Massachusetts: Polity. 
Bernstein, J. M. (1994) Frankfurt School: Vol. 3: Critical Assessments of Leading Sociologists. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Bhambra, G. K. (2010) ‘Sociology after Postcolonialism: Provincialized Cosmopolitanism and Connected 
Sociologies’, in Boatcă, M., Costa, S. and Gutiérrez-Rodríguez, E. (eds.) Decolonizing European 
Sociology: Trans-disciplinary Approaches. Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 33–47. 
———. (2011) ‘Cosmopolitanism and Postcolonial Critique’, in Rovisco, M. and Nowicka, M. (eds.) The 
Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, pp. 313–28. 
Bloch, E. (1996) The Principle of Hope, Volume 1. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Bohman, J. (1994) ‘World Disclosure and Radical Criticism’, Thesis Eleven 37(1), pp. 82–97. 
Brassett, J. and Bulley, D. (2007) ‘Ethics in World Politics: Cosmopolitanism and Beyond?’, International 
Politics 44 (1), pp. 1–18. 
Brieskorn, N. (2010) ‘On the Attempt to Recall a Relationship’, in An Awareness of What Is Missing: Faith and 
Reason in a Post-Secular Age. Cambridge: Polity, pp. 24–35. 
Brighouse, H. and Brock, G. (eds.) (2005) The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Brock, G. and Brighouse, H. (2005) ‘Introduction’, in Brock, G. and Brighouse, H. (eds.) The Political 
Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–9. 
Bronner, S. E. (1994) Of Critical Theory and Its Theorists. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Bibliography 
!
- 187 - 
Brown, G. W. (2010) ‘The Laws of Hospitality, Asylum Seekers and Cosmopolitan Right: A Kantian 
Response to Jacques Derrida’, European Journal of Political Theory 9(3), pp. 308–27.  
Browne, C. (2008) ‘The End of Immanent Critique?’, European Journal of Social Theory, 11(5), pp. 5–24.  
Brun, C. (2010) ‘Hospitality: Becoming “IDPs” and “Hosts” in Protracted Displacement’, Journal of Refugee 
Studies 23(3), pp. 337–55. 
Brunkhorst, H. (2005) Solidarity: From Civic Friendship to a Global Legal Community. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press. 
Burden, T. (2003) ‘Utopia’, in Outhwaite, W. (ed.) The Blackwell Dictionary of Modern Social Thought. Malden, 
MA: Blackwell Publishers. 
Burns, T. (2013) ‘Hegel, Cosmopolitanism, and Contemporary Recognition Theory’, in Burns, T. and 
Thompson, S. (eds.) Global Justice and the Politics of Recognition. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, pp. 64–87. 
Butler, J. (2009) Frames of War: When Is Life Grievable? London and New York: Verso. 
Calhoun, C. J. (2002) ‘Imagining Solidarity: Cosmopolitanism, Constitutional Patriotism, and the Public 
Sphere’, Public Culture, 14(1), pp. 147–71. 
Camus, A. (2000) The Rebel. London: Penguin Books. 
Cannon, B. (2001) Rethinking the Normative Content of Critical Theory: Marx, Habermas, and Beyond. New York: 
Palgrave. 
Capaldi, N. (1999) ‘What’s Wrong with Solidarity’, in Bayertz, K. (ed.) Solidarity. Dordrecht and Boston: 
Kluwer Academic Publishers, pp. 39–55. 
Carauș, T. (2015) ‘Introduction: Cosmopolitanism of Dissent’, in Carauș, T. (ed.) Cosmopolitanism and the 
Legacies of Dissent. New York: Routledge. 
Chambers, S. (2004) ‘The Politics of Critical Theory’, in Rush, F. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Critical 
Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 219–47. 
Chen, X. (2004) Being and Authenticity. Amsterdam and New York: Rodopi. 
Chernilo, D. (2009) ‘Cosmopolitanism and Social Theory’, in Turner, B. S. (ed.) The New Blackwell 
Companion to Social Theory. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 533–50. 
———. (2013) ‘Jürgen Habermas: Modern Social Theory As Postmetaphysical Natural Law’, Journal of 
Classical Sociology, 13(2), pp. 254–73. 
Chouliaraki, L. (2012) ‘Cosmopolitanism as Irony: A Critique of Post-Humanitarianism’, in Braidotti, 
Rosi, Hanafin, P. and Blaagaard, B. (eds.) After Cosmopolitanism. New York: Routledge, pp. 77–
96. 
Cladis, M. S. (2005) ‘Beyond Solidarity? Durkheim and Twenty-First Century Democracy in a Global 
Age’, in Alexander, J. C., and Smith, P. (eds.) The Cambridge Companion to Durkheim. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 383–409. 
Bibliography 
!
- 188 - 
Cooke, M. (2004) ‘Redeeming Redemption: The Utopian Dimension of Critical Social Theory’, Philosophy 
and Social Criticism 30(4), pp. 413–29. 
Couton, P. and López, J. J. (2009) ‘Movement as Utopia’, History of the Human Sciences 22(4), pp. 93–121.  
Crossley, N. (1996) Intersubjectivity: The Fabric of Social Becoming. London and Thousand Oaks, California: 
Sage Publications. 
d’Entrèves, M. P. (2000) ‘Arendt’s Theory of Judgment’, in D. Villa (ed.) The Cambridge companion to Hannah 
Arendt. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 245–60. 
Dallmayr, F. (2003) ‘Cosmopolitanism: Moral and Political’, Political Theory, 31(3), pp. 421–42. 
Delanty, G. (2009) The Cosmopolitan Imagination: The Renewal of Critical Social Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
———. (2011) ‘Varieties of Critique in Sociological Theory and Their Methodological Implications For 
Social Research’, Irish Journal of Sociology, 19(1), pp. 68–92. 
———. (2012) ‘The Idea of Critical Cosmopolitanism’, in Delanty, G. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of 
Cosmopolitanism Studies. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, pp. 38–46. 
Delanty, G. and He, B. (2008) ‘Cosmopolitan Perspectives on European and Asian 
Transnationalism’, International Sociology 23(3), pp. 323–44. 
Deranty, J.-P. (2009) Beyond Communication: A Critical Study of Axel Honneth’s Social Philosophy. Leiden!and 
Boston: Brill. 
———. (2011) ‘Reflective Critical Theory: A Systematic Reconstruction of Axel Honneth’s Social 
Philosophy’, in Petherbridge, D. (ed.) Axel Honneth: Critical Essays: With a Reply by Axel Honneth. 
Boston: Brill, pp. 59–88. 
Derpmann, S. (2009) ‘Solidarity and Cosmopolitanism’, Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, 12(3), pp. 303–15. 
Derrida, J. and Dufourmantelle, A. (2000) Of Hospitality. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. 
Desmond, W. (1995) Being and the Between. Albany: State University of New York Press. 
Desmond, W. D. (2008) Cynics. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Deutscher, M. (2007) Judgment after Arendt. Aldershot, Hants, England and Burlington, VT: Ashgate. 
Devenney, M. (2004) ‘Ethics and Politics in Discourse Theory’, in Devenney, M. (ed.) Ethics and Politics in 
Contemporary Theory: Between Critical Theory and Post-Marxism. London and New York: 
Routledge, pp. 163–77. 
Dikeç, M. (2002) ‘Pera Peras Poros: Longings for Spaces of Hospitality’, Theory, Culture and Society 19(1), pp. 
227–47. 
Diken, B. (2009) Nihilism. Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon and New York, NY: Routledge. 
Disch, L. J. (1993) ‘More Truth Than Fact: Storytelling as Critical Understanding in the Writings of 
Hannah Arendt’, Political Theory 21(4), pp. 665–94. 
Bibliography 
!
- 189 - 
Douzinas, C. (2007) Human Rights and Empire: The Political Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism. London and New 
York: Routledge-Cavendish. 
Duara, P. (2014) ‘Abrahamic Faiths and Dialogical Transcendence’, in Mason, E. and Bahrawi, N. (eds.) 
Reading the Abrahamic Faiths: Rethinking Religion and Literature. London: Bloomsbury, pp. 47–60. 
Durkheim, E. (1960) The Division of Labour in Society. New York: Free Press. 
Eisenstadt, S. N. (1995) Power, Trust, and Meaning: Essays in Sociological Theory and Analysis. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
———. (2003) Comparative Civilizations and Multiple Modernities. Leiden: Brill. 
Ferrara, A. (2007) ‘“Political” Cosmopolitanism and Judgment’, European Journal of Social Theory 10(1), pp. 
53–66. 
Fine, R. (2006) ‘Cosmopolitanism and Violence: Difficulties of Judgment’, British Journal of Sociology 57(1), 
pp. 49–67. 
———. (2007) Cosmopolitanism. London: Routledge. 
———. (2008) ‘Judgment and the Reification of the Faculties: A Reconstructive Reading of Arendt’s Life 
of the Mind’, Philosophy and Social Criticism 34(1–2), pp. 157–76. 
———. (2009) ‘Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights: Radicalism in a Global Age’, Metaphilosophy 40 (1), 
pp. 8–23.  
———. (2012) ‘The Idea of Cosmopolitan Solidarity’, in Delanty, G. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of 
Cosmopolitanism Studies. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, pp. 376–86. 
Fine, R. and Boon, V. (2007) ‘Introduction: Cosmopolitanism: Between Past and Future’, European Journal 
of Social Theory 10(5), pp. 5–16. 
Fine, R. and Cohen, R. (2002) ‘Four Cosmopolitanism Moments’, in Vertovec, S. and Cohen, R. (eds.) 
Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice. New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 
137–62. 
Fine, R. and Smith, W. (2003) ‘Jürgen Habermas’s Theory of Cosmopolitanism’, Constellations 10(4), pp. 
469–87. 
Finlayson, J. G. (2005) Habermas: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
———. (2009) ‘Morality and Critical Theory: On the Normative Problem of Frankfurt School Social 
Criticism’, Telos, 146, pp. 7–41. 
Forester, J. (1987) Critical Theory and Public Life. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Franceschet, A. (2005) ‘Cosmopolitan Ethics and Global Legalism’, Journal of Global Ethics, 1(2), pp. 113–
26. 
Fraser, N. and Honneth, A. (2003) Redistribution or Recognition?: A Political-Philosophical Exchange. London: 
Verso. 
Friese, H. (2010) ‘The Limits of Hospitality: Political Philosophy, Undocumented Migration and the 
Local Arena’, European Journal of Social Theory 13(3), pp. 323–41. 
Bibliography 
!
- 190 - 
Fuchs, M. (2000) ‘Articulating the World: Social Movements, the Self-Transcendence of Society and the 
Question of Culture’, Thesis Eleven 61(1), pp. 65–85. 
Fultner, B. (2003) ‘Translator’s Introduction’, in Habermas, J. Truth and Justification. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. vii–xxii. 
Gadamer, H.-G. (1980) Dialogue and Dialectic: Eight Hermeneutical Studies on Plato. New Haven, CT, and 
London: Yale University Press. 
———. (1992) Hans-Georg Gadamer on Education, Poetry, and History: Applied Hermeneutics. Albany: State 
University of New York Press. 
———. (1998) Praise of Theory: Speeches and Essays. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
———. (1999a) ‘Friendship and Solidarity’, Research in Phenomenology, 39(2009), pp. 3–12. 
———. (1999b) Hermeneutics, Religion, and Ethics. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
———. (2002) The Beginning of Knowledge. New York: Continuum. 
———. (2013) Truth and Method. London: Bloomsbury Publishing. 
Gaus, G. F. (1999) Social Philosophy. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe. 
Geuss, R. (1981) The Idea of a Critical Theory: Habermas and the Frankfurt School. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
———. (2004) ‘Dialectics and the Revolutionary Impulse’, in Rush, F. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to 
Critical Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 103–38. 
Gibson, S. (2007) ‘“Abusing Our Hospitality”: Inhospitableness and the Politics of Deterrence’, in 
Germann Molz, J. and Gibson, S. (eds.) Mobilizing Hospitality: The Ethics of Social Relations in a 
Mobile World. Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate, pp. 159–74. 
Gilabert, P. (2006) ‘Cosmopolitanism and Discourse Ethics: A Critical Survey’, New Political Science 28(1), 
pp. 1–21. 
Giri, A. K. (2006) ‘Cosmopolitanism and Beyond: Towards a Multiverse of Transformations’, Development 
and Change, 37(6), pp. 1277–92. 
Gonsetti-Ferencei, J. A. (2010) ‘Immanent Transcendence in Rilke and Stevens’, The German Quarterly, 
83(3), pp. 275–96. 
Gordon, R. S. C. (2001) Primo Levi's Ordinary Virtues: From Testimony To Ethics. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Gotham, K. F. (2007) ‘Critical Theory and Katrina Disaster, Spectacle and Immanent Critique’, City, 
11(1), pp. 81–99. 
Gross, D. (2009) The Past in Ruins: Tradition and the Critique of Modernity. Amherst: University of 
Massachusetts Press.  
Guyer, P. (2010) ‘The Deduction of the Categories: The Metaphysical and Transcendental Deductions’, 
in Guyer, P. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge and New 
York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 118–50. 
Bibliography 
!
- 191 - 
Guyer, P. and Wood, A. W. (1998) ‘Introduction’, in Kant, I., Guyer, P. and Wood, A. W. (ed.) Critique of 
Pure Reason. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1–80. 
Habermas, J. (1990) Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
———. (1992) Post-metaphysical Thinking: Philosophical Essays. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
———. (1997) ‘Kant’s Idea of Perpetual With the Benefit of Two Hundred Years Hindsight’, in Bohman, 
J. and Lutz-Bachman, M. (eds.) Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s Cosmopolitan Ideal. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, pp. 113–54. 
———. (2001) ‘Why Europe Needs a Constitution’, New Left Review, 11, pp. 5–26. 
———. (2003) Truth and Justification. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
———. (2010) ‘A Postsecular World Society? On the Philosophical Significance of Postsecular 
Consciousness and the Multicultural World Society’. Interviewed by Eduardo Mendieta, The 
Immanent Frame, SSRC (http://blogs.ssrc.org/tif/wp-content/uploads/2010/02/A-
Postsecular-World-Society-TIF.pdf, 03.05.2014), 3 February. 
Hayden, P. (2005) Cosmopolitan Global Politics. Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing. 
———. (2009) ‘Globalization, Reflexive Utopianism, and the Cosmopolitan Social Imaginary’, in 
Hayden, P. and El-Ojeili, C. (eds.) Globalization and Utopia: Critical Essays. Basingstoke and New 
York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 51–67. 
Haynes, P. (2012) Immanent Transcendence: Reconfiguring Materialism in Continental Philosophy. London and New 
York: Bloomsbury Publishing. 
Hechter, M. (1987) Principles of Group Solidarity. Berkeley: University of California Press.  
Heins, V. (2008) ‘Realizing Honneth: Redistribution, Recognition, and Global Justice’, Journal of Global 
Ethics 4 (2), pp. 141–53. 
———. (2010) ‘Of Persons and Peoples: Internationalizing the Critical Theory of Recognition’, 
Contemporary Political Theory 9 (2), pp. 149–70. 
Held, D. (2005) ‘Principles of Cosmopolitan Order’, in Brock, G. and Brighouse, H. (eds.) The Political 
Philosophy of Cosmopolitanism. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 10–
27. 
———. (2013) Introduction to Critical Theory: Horkheimer to Habermas. Hoboken: Wiley. 
Honig, B. (2001) Democracy and the Foreigner. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
Honneth, A. (1991) The Critique of Power: Reflective Stages in a Critical Social Theory. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
———. (1995) ‘The Other of Justice: Habermas and the Ethical Challenge of Postmodernism’, in White, 
S. K. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Habermas. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 289–323. 
———. (1996) The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts. Cambridge Massachusetts: 
MIT Press. 
Bibliography 
!
- 192 - 
———. (1997)  ‘Recognition and Moral Obligation’, Social Research 64 (1), pp. 16–35. 
———. (2000) ‘The Possibility of a Disclosing Critique of Society: The Dialectic of Enlightenment in 
Light of Current Debates in Social Criticism’, Constellations, 7(1), pp. 116–27. 
———. (2002) ‘Grounding Recognition: A Rejoinder to Critical Questions’, Inquiry 45 (4), pp. 499–519.  
———. (2004) ‘Recognition and Justice: Outline of a Plural Theory of Justice’, Acta Sociologica 47(4), pp. 
351–64. 
———. (2007) Disrespect: The Normative Foundations of Critical Theory. Oxford: Polity. 
———. (2009) Pathologies of Reason: On the Legacy of Critical Theory. New York: Columbia University Press. 
———. (2010) The Pathologies of Individual Freedom: Hegel’s Social Theory. Princeton, N.J. and Woodstock: 
Princeton University Press. 
———. (2012) The I in We!: Studies in the Theory of Recognition. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
———. (2013) Freedom’s Right: The Social Foundations of Democratic Life. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
———. (2014) ‘The Normativity of Ethical Life’, Philosophy and Social Criticism, 40(8), pp. 817–26.  
Honneth, A. and Markle, G. (2004) ‘From Struggles for Recognition to a Plural Concept of Justice: An 
Interview with Axel Honneth’, Acta Sociologica 47(4), pp. 383–91. 
Horkheimer, M. (1982) Critical Theory: Selected Essays. New York: Continuum Publishing Corporation. 
———. (2004) Eclipse of Reason. London and New York: Continuum. 
How, A. (2003) Critical Theory. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 
Hoy, D. C. and McCarthy, T. (1994) Critical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Inada, K. K. (2008) ‘Immanent Transcendence: The Possibility of an East–West Philosophical Dialogue’, 
Journal of Chinese Philosophy, 35(3), pp. 493–510. 
Iser, M. (2013) ‘Recognition’, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Available from: 
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2013/entries/recognition/ (21.06.2015). 
Jabri, V. (2007) ‘Solidarity and Spheres of Culture: The Cosmopolitan and the Postcolonial’, Review of 
International Studies, 33, pp. 715–28. 
Jacobs, B. (2001) ‘Dialogical Rationality and the Critique of Absolute Autonomy’, in Hohendahl, P-U. 
and Fisher, J. (eds.) Critical Theory: Current State and Future Prospects. New York: Berghahn Books, 
pp. 139–53. 
Jarvis, S. (1998) Adorno: A Critical Introduction. New York: Routledge. 
Jay, M. (1973) The Dialectical Imagination: A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-
1950. Boston: Little, Brown. 
Jones, C. (1999) Global Justice: Defending Cosmopolitanism. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Bibliography 
!
- 193 - 
Jones, G. (2015) More Than 5,000 Mediterranean Migrants Rescued in Past Days. The Huffington Post, 31 
May. Available from: http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/05/31/mediterranean-
migrant-crisis-europe_n_7478436.html (31.05.2015). 
Jordaan, E. (2011) ‘Including the Excluded: Communitarian Paths to Cosmopolitanism’, Review of 
International Studies, 37, pp. 2365–85. 
Kant, I. (1991) Political Writings. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
———. (1998) Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Karagiannis, N. and Wagner, P. (2013) ‘The Stranger in Synagonistic Politics’, in Schaap, A. (ed.) Law and 
Agonistic Politics. Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, pp. 147–62. 
Kendall, G., Woodward, I. and Skrbiš, Z. (2009) The Sociology of Cosmopolitanism: Globalization, Identity, 
Culture and Government. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
Kitcher, P. (2006) ‘A Priori’, in Guyer, P. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 28–61. 
Kögler, H. (2011) ‘Hermeneutic Cosmopolitanism, or: Toward a Cosmopolitan Public Sphere’, in 
Rovisco, M. and Nowicka, M. (eds.) The Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism. 
Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, pp. 226–42. 
Kompridis, N. (1994) ‘On World Disclosure: Heidegger, Habermas and Dewey’, Thesis Eleven, 37(1), pp. 
29–45. 
———. (2000) ‘Reorienting Critique: From Ironist Theory to Transformative Practice’, Philosophy and 
Social Criticism 26(4), pp. 23–47.  
———. (2004) ‘From Reason to Self-Realisation? Axel Honneth and the “Ethical Turn” in Critical 
Theory’, in Rundell, J. F., Petherbridge, D., Bryant, J., Hewitt, J. and Smith, J. (eds.) 
Contemporary Perspectives in Critical and Social Philosophy. Leiden and Boston: Brill, pp. 323–60. 
———. (2005) ‘Disclosing Possibility: The Past and Future of Critical Theory’, International Journal of 
Philosophical Studies 13(3), pp. 325–51. 
———. (2006) Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory Between Past and Future. Cambridge, Massachusetts: 
MIT Press. 
———. (2007) ‘Struggling over the Meaning of Recognition: A Matter of Identity, Justice, or Freedom?’, 
European Journal of Political Theory 6 (3), pp. 277–89. 
———. (2011a) ‘On Critique and Disclosure: A Reply to Four Generous Critics’, Philosophy and Social 
Criticism 37(9), pp. 1063–77. 
———. (2011b) ‘Receptivity, Possibility, and Democratic Politics’, Ethics and Global Politics, 4(4), pp. 255–
72. 
Kurasawa, F. (2004) ‘A Cosmopolitanism from Below: Alternative Globalization and the Creation of a 
Solidarity without Bounds’, European Journal of Sociology 45(2), pp. 233– 55. 
———. (2007) The Work of Global Justice: Human Rights as Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Bibliography 
!
- 194 - 
———. (2011) ‘Critical Cosmopolitanism’, in Rovisco, M. and Nowicka, M. (eds.) The Ashgate Research 
Companion to Cosmopolitanism. Burlington, VT: Ashgate, pp. 279–94. 
Lancaster, A. (2000) ‘Instantiating Critical Utopia’, Utopian Studies: Journal of the Society for Utopian Studies 
11(1), pp. 109–19. 
Lawson, G. (2008) ‘A Realistic Utopia? Nancy Fraser, Cosmopolitanism and the Making of a Just World 
Order’, Political Studies 56(4), pp. 881–906. 
Levi, P. (2000) If This Is a Man; The Truce. London: Everyman's Library. 
———. (2007) A Tranquil Star: Unpublished Stories. London: Penguin. 
Levitt, P. (2012) ‘What’s Wrong with Migration Scholarship? A Critique and a Way Forward’, Identities-
Global Studies In Culture And Power 19(4), pp. 493–500. 
Linklater, A. (1990) Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan. 
———. (1996) ‘The Achievements of Critical Theory’, in Smith, S., Booth, K. and Zalewski, M. (eds.) 
International Theory: Positivism and Beyond. Cambridge and New York:  Cambridge University 
Press, pp. 279–98. 
———. (2001) ‘The Changing Contours of Critical International Relations Theory’, in Wyn Jones, R. 
(ed.) Critical Theory and World Politics. Boulder, Colorado and London: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, pp. 23–43. 
———. (2007) ‘Distant Suffering and Cosmopolitan Obligations’, International Politics, 44(1), pp. 19–36. 
———. (2010) ‘Moral Progress and World History: Ethics and Global Interconnectedness’, in van Hooft, 
S. and Vandekerckhove, W. (eds.) Questioning Cosmopolitanism. Dordrecht and New York: 
Springer, pp. 21–35. 
Manners, I. (2008) ‘The Normative Ethics of the European Union’, International Affairs, 84(1), pp. 45–60. 
Mannheim, K. (1998) Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge. London and Henley: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul. 
Marchi, L. (2014) ‘Ghosts, Guests, Hosts: Rethinking ‘Illegal’ Migration and Hospitality Through Arab 
Diasporic Literature’, Comparative Literature Studies 51(4), pp. 603–26. 
Marci, T. (2013) ‘Social Inclusion in Terms of Hospitality’, International Review of Sociology 23(1), pp. 180–99. 
Marcuse, H. (1998) Collected Papers of Herbert Marcuse: Technology, War, and Fascism. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
Markell, P. (2003) Bound By Recognition. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. 
McBride, C. (2013) Recognition. Cambridge, UK: Polity. 
McCarthy, T. (1994) ‘Philosophy and Critical Theory: A Reprise’, in Hoy, D. C. and McCarthy, T. 
Critical Theory. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 5–100. 
Mendieta, E. (2009) ‘From Imperial to Dialogical Cosmopolitanism’, Ethics and Global Politics, 2(3), pp. 
241–58. 
Bibliography 
!
- 195 - 
Mignolo, W. D. (2000) ‘The Many Faces of Cosmo-polis: Border Thinking and Critical 
Cosmopolitanism’, Public Culture 12(3), pp. 721–48. 
Miller, D. (2007) National Responsibility and Global Justice. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press. 
Mills, C. W. (1959) The Sociological Imagination. London: Oxford University Press. 
Morkūnienė, J. (2004) Social Philosophy: Paradigm of Contemporary Thinking. Washington, D.C.: Council for 
Research in Values and Philosophy. 
Morrow, R. A. and Brown, D. D. (1994) Critical Theory and Methodology. Thousand Oaks, California: Sage 
Publications. 
Moyaert, M. (2011) ‘Between Ideology and Utopia: Honneth and Ricœur on Symbolic Violence, 
Marginalization and Recognition’, Études Ricœuriennes/ Ricœur Studies 2(1), pp. 84–109. 
Nascimento, A. (2014) ‘Human Rights and the Paradigms of Cosmopolitanism: From Rights to 
Humanity’, in Lutz-Bachmann, M and Nascimento, A. (eds.) Human Rights, Human Dignity, and 
Cosmopolitan Ideals: Essays on Critical Theory and Human Rights. Burlington, VT: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited. 
Nowicka, M. and Rovisco, M. (2009) ‘Introduction: Making Sense of Cosmopolitanism’, in Nowicka, M. 
and Rovisco, M. (eds.) Cosmopolitanism in Practice. Farnham, UK and Burlington, VT: Ashgate 
Publishing, pp. 1–16. 
Nussbaum, M. C. (1997) ‘Kant and Stoic Cosmopolitanism’, Journal of Political Philosophy 5(1), pp. 1–25. 
Parekh, B. (1981) Hannah Arendt and The Search for a New Political Philosophy. London: Macmillan. 
Parekh, S. (2008) Hannah Arendt and the Challenge of Modernity: A Phenomenology of Human Rights. New York: 
Routledge. 
Parker, D. (1998) ‘Introduction: The Turn to Ethics  in the 1990s’, in Adamson, J. Freadman, R. and 
Parker, D. (eds.) Renegotiating Ethics in Literature, Philosophy, and Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 1–17. 
Pedersen, J. (2012) ‘Social Philosophy: A Reconstructive or Deconstructive Discipline?’, Philosophy and 
Social Criticism 38(6), pp. 619–43.  
Pensky, M. (2007) ‘Two Cheers for Cosmopolitanism: Cosmopolitan Solidarity as Second-  Order 
Inclusion’, Journal of Social Philosophy, 38(1), pp. 165–84.  
———. (2008) The Ends of Solidarity: Discourse Theory in Ethics and Politics. Albany: State University of New 
York Press. 
———. (2011) ‘Social Solidarity and Intersubjective Recognition: On Axel Honneth’s Struggle For 
Recognition’, in Petherbridge, D. (ed.) Axel Honneth: Critical Essays: With a Reply by Axel Honneth. 
Boston: Brill, pp. 125–53. 
Pereira, G. (2013) Elements of a Critical Theory of Justice. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
Petherbridge, D. (2011) ‘Introduction: Axel Honneth’s Project Of Critical Theory’, in Petherbridge, D. 
(ed.) Axel Honneth: Critical Essays: With a Reply by Axel Honneth. Boston: Brill, pp. 1–30. 
Bibliography 
!
- 196 - 
———. (2013) The Critical Theory of Axel Honneth. Lanham: Lexington Books. 
Pierik, R. H. M. and Werner, W. G. (eds.) (2010) Cosmopolitanism in Context: Perspectives From International Law 
and Political Theory. Cambridge, UK and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Pieterse, J. N. (2006) ‘Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism: Towards an Agenda’, Development and Change 37(6), 
pp. 1247–57. 
Pilapil, R. D. (2013) ‘Disrespect and Political Resistance’, Thesis Eleven 114(1), pp. 48–60. 
Pollock, S., Bhabha, H. K., Breckenridge, C. A and Chakrabarty, D. (2000) ‘Cosmopolitanisms’, Public 
Culture, 12(3), pp. 577–89. 
———. (2002) ‘Cosmopolitanisms’, in Breckenridge, C. A., Pollock, S., Bhabha, H. K. and Chakrabarty, 
D. (eds.) Cosmopolitanism. Durham, N.C. and London: Duke University Press, pp. 1–14. 
Postone, M. (2004) ‘Critique, State, and Economy’, in Rush, F. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Critical 
Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 165–93. 
Puntel, L. B. (2012) ‘Habermas’ Postmetaphysical Thinking: A Critique’. Available: 
http://www.philosophie.uni-
muenchen.de/lehreinheiten/philosophie_1/personen/puntel/download/2013_habermas.pd
f (26.04.2014). 
Rapport, N. (2012a) ‘Emancipatory Cosmopolitanism: A Vision of the Individual Free From Culture, 
Custom and Community’, in Delanty, G. (ed.) Routledge Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies. 
Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, pp. 101–14. 
———. (2012b) Anyone: The Cosmopolitan Subject of Anthropology. New York: Berghahn Books. 
Ray, L. (1993) Rethinking Critical Theory: Emancipation in the Age of Global Social Movements. London and 
Newbury Park, California: Sage Publications. 
Reder, M. and Schmidt, J. (2010) ‘Habermas and Religion’, in An Awareness of What Is Missing: Faith and 
Reason in a Post-Secular Age. Cambridge: Polity, pp. 1–14. 
Rescher, N. (1977) Dialectics: A Controversy-Oriented Approach to the Theory of Knowledge. Albany: State 
University of New York Press. 
Reshaur, K. (1992) ‘Concepts of Solidarity in the Political Theory of Hannah Arendt’, Canadian Journal of 
Political Science, 25(4), pp. 723–36. 
Reuters (2011) Singapore Tightens Rules For Hiring Foreigners. The China Post, 17 August. Available 
from: 
http://www.chinapost.com.tw/business/asia/singapore/2011/08/17/313605/Singapore-
tightens.htm (02.06.2015). 
Richmond, S. (2004) ‘Introduction’, in Sartre, J-P. The Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch For a Phenomenological 
Description. London and New York: Routledge. 
Ricken, F. (2010) ‘Postmetaphysical Reason and Religion’, in An Awareness of What Is Missing: Faith and 
Reason in a Post-Secular Age. Cambridge: Polity, pp. 51–58. 
Rilke, R. M. (1946) Selected Letters of Rainer Maria Rilke, 1902–1926. London: Macmillan & Co. 
Bibliography 
!
- 197 - 
Rilke, R. M. and Poulin, A. (1977) Duino Elegies and The Sonnets to Orpheus. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. 
Roberts, J. (2004) ‘The Dialectic of Enlightenment’, in Rush, F. (ed.) The Cambridge Companion to Critical 
Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 57–73. 
Rorty, R. (1989) Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Rothstein, E. (2003) ‘Utopia and Its Discontents’, in Rothstein, E., Muschamp, H. and Marty, M. E. (eds.) 
Visions of Utopia. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–28. 
Rumford, C. (2008) Cosmopolitan Spaces: Europe, Globalization, Theory. New York, Routledge. 
———. (2012) ‘Bordering and Connectivity: Cosmopolitan Opportunities’, in Delanty, G. (ed.) Routledge 
Handbook of Cosmopolitanism Studies. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge, pp. 245–53. 
Rundell, J. (2004) ‘Strangers, Citizens and Outsiders: Otherness, Multiculturalism and the Cosmopolitan 
Imaginary in Mobile Societies’, Thesis Eleven 78(1), pp. 85–101. 
Rundell, J. F., Petherbridge, D., Bryant, J., Hewitt, J. and Smith, J. (2004) ‘Issues and Debates in 
Contemporary Social and Critical   Philosophy’, in Rundell, J. F., Petherbridge, D., Bryant, J., 
Hewitt, J. and Smith, J. (eds.) Contemporary Perspectives in Critical and Social Philosophy. Leiden and 
Boston: Brill, pp. 1–25. 
Rush, F. (2004) ‘Conceptual Foundations of Early Critical Theory’, in Rush, F. (ed.) The Cambridge 
Companion to Critical Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 6–39. 
Sabia, D. (2010) ‘Defending Immanent Critique’, Political Theory 38(5), pp. 684–711. 
Sartre, J-P. (2004) The Transcendence of the Ego: A Sketch For a Phenomenological Description. London and New 
York: Routledge. 
Savić, O. (2005) ‘Figures of the Stranger Citizen as a Foreigner’, Parallax 11(1), pp. 70–78. 
Schmidt, J. (2010) ‘A Dialogue in Which There Can Only Be Winners’, in An Awareness of What Is Missing: 
Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age. Cambridge: Polity, pp. 59–71. 
Schwartz, B. I. (1975) ‘The Age of Transcendence’, Daedalus, 104(2), pp. 1–7. 
Schwartz, R. (2004) ‘Introduction’, in Schwartz, R. (ed.) Transcendence: Philosophy, Literature, And Theology 
Approach the Beyond. New York: Routledge, pp. vii–xii. 
Schweiger, G. (2012) ‘Globalizing Recognition: Global Justice and the Dialectic of Recognition’, Public 
Reason 4 (1–2), pp. 78–91. 
Seel, M. (1994) ‘On Rightness and Truth: Reflections On the Concept of World Disclosure’, Thesis Eleven 
37(1), pp. 64–81. 
Sen, A. (2009) The Idea of Justice. London: Allen Lane. 
Shabani, O. A. P. (2007) ‘Cosmopolitan Justice and Immigration: A Critical Theory Perspective’, European 
Journal of Social Theory 10(1), pp. 87–98. 
Shapcott, R. (2010) International Ethics: A Critical Introduction. Cambridge, UK and Malden, MA: Polity. 
Sher, G. (2012) Ethics: Essential Readings in Moral Theory. New York: Routledge. 
Bibliography 
!
- 198 - 
Simmel, G. (2010) The View of Life: Four Metaphysical Essays, With Journal Aphorisms. Chicago and London: 
The University of Chicago Press. 
Sinnerbrink, R. (2011) ‘The Future of Critical Theory? Kompridis On World-Disclosing Critique’, 
Philosophy and Social Criticism, 37(9), pp. 1053–61. 
Sixel, F. W. (1988) Crisis and Critique: On the Logic of Late Capitalism. Leiden and New York: E.J. Brill. 
Skrbiš, Z. and Woodward, I. (2011) ‘Cosmopolitan Openness’, in Rovisco, M. and Nowicka, M. (eds.) The 
Ashgate Research Companion to Cosmopolitanism. Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, pp. 53–68. 
Stahl, T. (2013) ‘Habermas and the Project of Immanent Critique’, Constellations 20(4), pp. 533–52. 
Staples, K. (2012) ‘Statelessness and the Politics of Misrecognition’, Res Publica 18 (1), pp. 93–106.  
Starkey, H. (2012) ‘Human Rights, Cosmopolitanism and Utopias: Implications for Citizenship 
Education’, Cambridge Journal of Education 42(1), pp. 21–35. 
Steinberger, P. J. (1990) ‘Hannah Arendt on Judgment’, American Journal of Political Science 34(3), pp. 803–
21. 
Stevenson, N. (2006) ‘European Cosmopolitan Solidarity: Questions of Citizenship, Difference and Post-
Materialism’, European Journal of Social Theory, 9(4), pp. 485–500. 
Still, J. (2012) ‘Sharing the World: Luce Irigaray and the Hospitality of Difference’, Esprit Createur 52(3), 
pp. 40–51. 
Stivens, M. (2008) ‘Gender, Rights and Cosmopolitanisms’, in Werbner, P. (ed.) Anthropology and the New 
Cosmopolitanism: Rooted, Feminist and Vernacular Perspectives. Oxford and New York: Berg, pp. 87–
109. 
Stjernø, S. (2004) Solidarity in Europe: The History of an Idea. Cambridge, UK, and New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Strydom, P. (2011) Contemporary Critical Theory and Methodology. Abingdon, Oxon and New York: Routledge. 
Sturm, D. (1998) Solidarity and Suffering: Toward a Politics of Relationality. Albany: State University of New 
York Press. 
Subberwal, R. (n. d.) Dictionary of Sociology. McGraw-Hill Education. 
Taylor, D. (2002) ‘Hannah Arendt on Judgement: Thinking for Politics, International Journal of Philosophical 
Studies 10(1), pp. 151–69. 
Toros, H. and Gunning, J. (2009) ‘Exploring a Critical Theory Approach to Terrorism Studies’, in 
Jackson, R., Smyth, M. and Gunning, J. (eds.) Critical Terrorism Studies: A New Research Agenda. 
New York: Routledge, pp. 87–108.  
Turner, B. S. (2009) ‘Introduction’, in Turner, B. S. (ed.) The New Blackwell Companion to Social Theory. 
Chichester, UK and Malden, USA: Wiley-Blackwell, pp. 1–16. 
Turner, B. S. and Rojek, C. (2001) Society and Culture: Principles of Scarcity and Solidarity. London and 
Thousand Oaks, California: SAGE. 
Bibliography 
!
- 199 - 
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (2014) War’s Human Cost: UNHCR Global Trends 2013. 
UNHCR. Available from: http://www.unhcr.org/5399a14f9.html (30.05.2015). 
———. (2015) Mediterranean Crossings in 2015 Already Top 100,000. UNHCR. Available from: 
http://www.unhcr.org/557703c06.html (09.06.2015). 
Valdez, I. (2012) ‘Perpetual What? Injury, Sovereignty and a Cosmopolitan View of Immigration’, 
Political Studies 60(1), pp. 95–114. 
van Hooft, S. (2010) ‘Cosmopolitanism, Identity and Recognition’, in van Hooft, S. and Vandekerckhove, 
W. (eds.) Questioning Cosmopolitanism. Dordrecht and New York: Springer, pp. 37–47. 
Varga, S. and Gallagher, S. (2012) ‘Critical Social Philosophy, Honneth and the Role of Primary 
Intersubjectivity’, European Journal of Social Theory 15(2), pp. 243–60.  
Vaughan-Williams, N. (2007) ‘Beyond a Cosmopolitan Ideal: The Politics of Singularity’, International 
Politics, 44(1), pp. 90–106. 
Vertovec, S. and Cohen, R. (2002) ‘Introduction: Conceiving Cosmopolitanism’, in Vertovec, S. and 
Cohen, R. (eds.) Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context and Practice. New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 1–22. 
Waldron, J. (2000) ‘What is Cosmopolitan?’, The Journal of Political Philosophy, 8(2), pp. 227–43. 
Walhof, D. R. (2006) ‘Friendship, Otherness, and Gadamer’s Politics of Solidarity’, Political Theory, 34(5), 
pp. 569–93. 
Walkowitz, R. L. (2006) Cosmopolitan Style: Modernism Beyond the Nation. New York: Columbia University 
Press. 
Ward, E. (2013) ‘Human Suffering and the Quest For Cosmopolitan Solidarity: A Buddhist Perspective’, 
Journal of International Political Theory, 9(2), pp. 136–54. 
Warnke, G. (2012) ‘Solidarity and Tradition in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics’, History and Theory, 51, pp. 6–
22. 
Wiggershaus, R. and Robertson, M. (1995) The Frankfurt School: Its History, Theories, and Political Significance. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
Wilde, L. (2013) Global Solidarity. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press. 
Wills, D. (2005) ‘Hospitality’, in Protevi, J. (ed.) The Edinburgh Dictionary of Continental Philosophy. Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press. 
Wyn Jones, R. (1999) Security, Strategy, and Critical Theory. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Yar, M. (2003) ‘Honneth and the Communitarians: Towards a Recognitive Critical Theory of 
Community’, Res Publica 9(2), pp. 101–25. 
Zavediuk, N. (2014) ‘Kantian Hospitality’, Peace Review: A Journal of Social Justice 26(2), pp. 170–77. 
 
